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A B S TR A C T
As a spokesman for the Texas states' rights-secession 
movement, Oran Milo Roberts followed the overriding philos­
ophy of the compact theory of states. His unswerving belief 
in this principle led him to become the president of the 
Texas Secession Convention and the axis around which seces­
sion revolved in Texas.
Through a detailed analysis of Roberts' rhetorical 
acts from the beginning of the secession movement in 1850 to ' 
the secession of the state in 1861, this case study attempts 
to identify and evaluate the agitational strategies which 
Roberts utilized. The situation, strategies, and effects of 
Roberts' speaking and activities are examined in four con­
flicts: The Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute in 1850, the 
campaign against the Know-Nothing Party in 1855, the campaign 
for secession in 1860, and the Texas Secession Convention in 
1861.
The analysis reveals that Roberts used nine agitational 
strategies to achieve his rhetorical goals. These nine strat­
egies constitute the analytical framework for the study. The 
strategies are: petition, the solicitation of the establish­
ment; promulgation, the publication of the agitator's
vi
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message; solidification, the unification and reinforcement 
of the agitator's group; polarization, the division of the 
enemies from the friends in order to force a conscious 
choice; escalation/confrontation, the deliberate harrass- 
ment of the establishment designed to goad them into vio­
lent confrontation; objectification, the placement of blame 
on a particular group; mythication, the emotionalization or 
romanticization of the agitator's cause; legitimation, the 
justification of the agitator's actions; and image building, 
the establishment of the rhetor's credibility. Because he 
was a lawyer and a judge, Roberts used the strategy of le­
gitimation most frequently. He was a master of constitu­
tional legitimation.
Roberts' rhetorical.strategies brought about five 
major results. First, he helped to keep the states' rights 
Democrats in power.. Secondly, he justified secession to 
the Texans. Thirdly, he unified Texans into an activist 
group and convinced them to join the Confederate Union. 
Fourthly, he helped to ruin Sam Houston politically.
Fifthly, he built an image of a wise and selfless leader of 
the state.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For the first five years of statehood, from 1845 to 
1850, Texans were concerned with local issues such as the 
state debt and the protection of the frontier. Issues of 
national politics held second place until the Texas-New 
Mexico boundary dispute in 1850. As a result of the dis­
pute, the states' rights Democrats in Texas began their agi­
tation and their threats of secession against the Federal 
Government and did not cease until the secession of Texas 
from the Union in 1861.^
One of the most prominent and influential of the Texas 
states' rights-secession leaders was Oran Milo Roberts. In 
1850, while a district judge, he became a leader of the Dem­
ocratic Party with his speech on the Texas-New Mexico bound­
ary conflict. In 1855 he became a standard-bearer of the 
states' rights movement in East Texas during the campaign 
against the Know-Nothing Party. In 1860, while an associ­
ate justice of the Texas Supreme Court, he rose to state­
wide prominence with his secession speech, said to be the
1
Ralph W. Steen, History of Texas (Austin, Texas: The 
Steck Company, 1939), pp. 255-258 and Frank W. Johnson, A 
History of Texas and Texans, 5 vols. (Chicago: The American 
Historical Society, 1914), 1: 521-531.
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the turning point in public action, in the same year he 
drew up the call for a convention of the people and led 
the successful campaign for that purpose. In 1861 he pre­
sided over the Texas Secession Convention, maneuvered the 
resignation of Sam Houston, and convinced the Texans to
follow him out of the Union of the United States and into
2the Union of the Confederate States.
As a politician, Roberts followed one overriding idea 
that the individual states had the inviolable right to gov­
ern themselves.^ His belief in this principle made him, in
4
Texas, "the axis around which secession moved." Roberts 
entered the fight at the inception of the movement and de­
voted much of his lifetime to it. Because he was more in­
fluential in the movement than any other man in Texas at 
the time, he may justifiably be called the father of Texas 
secession.
Statement of the Problem 
Historians and biographers alike agree that Roberts 
was important in Texas history. In his eulogy to the Texas
^Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Career of 0. M. Roberts" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1932), pp. 57-123; 
Walter Prescott Webb, ed., The Handbook of Texas, 2 vols. 
(Austin, Texas: The Texas State Historical Association, 1952), 
2: 484-485, 587-588; and Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Journal of 
the Secession Convention of Texas (Austin, Texas: Austin 
Printing Company, 1912), pp. 7-251.
^James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: 
Nixon-Jones Printing Company, 1885), pp. 277-278.
4Robert Kingsley Peters, "Texas: Annexation to Seces­
sion" (Ph.D. dissertation. University of Texas, 1977), p. 346.
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3Historical Association, Dudley G. Wooten testifies- to 
Roberts' eminence:
Contemplating his whole life and services, I 
do not hesitate to declare that in all departments 
of public, professional, and private labor, he was 
the most versatile and most useful man Texas has 
produced in the fifty years of her existence as an 
American state. Others were preeminent in this or 
that direction? he was great in all. . . . [Hel 
- has no rivals in the annals of Texas worthies.*
James T. De Shields states that "no other man except Sam
Houston had a longer, more varied and successful career
g
during this era," and Lelia Bailey confirms that Roberts
was "one of the greatest characters that adorned the pages
7
of Texas history." Roberts served his state as a district 
attorney, a district judge, a Supreme Court associate jus­
tice and chief justice, and governor. However, he was most 
active as a politician and most prolific as a speaker when 
he felt the sovereignty of the state threatened by the 
North. As a drafted gubernatorial candidate in 1878, he 
made only two campaign speeches and one speech in favor of 
Hancock for President. As a two-term governor he delivered 
only the necessary inaugural addresses in 1879 and 1881 and 
one state-of-the-state report during his second term. He
Dudley G. Wooten, "The President’s Annual Address:
The Life and Services of Oran Milo Roberts," The Quarterly 
of the Texas State Historical Association 2 (July 1898): 14.
^James T. De Shields, They Sat in High Places: The 
Presidents and Governors of Texas (San Antonio, Texas: The 
Naylor Company, 1940), p. 311.
7Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. Roberts," 
Preface.
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also made a few ceremonial speeches on education and agri-
O
culture. Despite Roberts' prominence in the state and in 
the states' rights-secession cause, no investigation of his 
public speaking has appeared.
The secession movement in Texas dated from the terri­
torial dispute over her western boundary in 1850 to the se-
9
cession of the state m  1861. Roberts entered the conflict 
at the beginning and dedicated himself to the movement until 
the very end. Therefore, this study examines Roberts' 
states' rights speaking from 1850-1861 to determine the ef­
fects of his states' rights rhetoric upon the course of 
Texas history. The investigation concentrates on Roberts' 
speaking and activities in four rhetorical conflicts: the 
first conflict occurred in 1850 over the Texas-New Mexico 
boundary; the second conflict transpired in 1855-1857 during 
the campaign against the Know-Nothing, or American, Party; 
the third took place in 1860 after Lincoln's election when 
Roberts worked for a secession convention; and the fourth 
conflict occurred in 1861 when, as President of the Texas 
Secession Convention, Roberts urged the secession of Texas 
and the union with the Confederacy.
8Oran Milo Roberts, Speeches and Literary Productions, 
1878-1883, Roberts Papers, Archives, University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas.
8Anna Irene Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Move­
ment in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 18 (July 
1914): 41-48; and Webb, The Handbook of Texas, 2: 587.
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As to the significance of such a study, Paul D.
Brandes states that "if periods of lawlessness have such 
powerful effects upon societies, certainly the rhetoric 
which that lawlessness produced (or which produced that law­
lessness) is worthy of study." Brandes maintains that "it 
is important to gain a comprehension of the rhetoric of 
agitation, not only so that we can comprehend our own past, 
but also so that we can deal more realistically with the 
present and the future."^ Perhaps this dissertation will 
not only focus deserved attention on a significant phase in 
the career of an important figure in Texas history, but will 
also add to a better understanding of the theory and prac­
tice of agitational rhetoric.
Methodology
This study will test the idea that, as a states' 
rights-secession speaker, Roberts was an agitator rather 
than a traditional statesman. Leo Lowenthal and Norbert 
Guterman define an agitator as an "advocate of social change" 
who articulates the frustrations of a section of the popula­
tion, proposes to defeat the social group responsible for 
the discontent, promotes a movement capable of achieving 
this objective, and proposes himself as its leader.
10Paul D. Brandes, The Rhetoric of- Revolt (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 1-2.
•*‘1Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, Prophets of 
Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator 
(New York: Harper and Brother^, 1949), p. 6^
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6Brandes describes an agitator as a "man of words" who
"unites with a cause to the extent that he openly advocates
lawlessness" to seek the economic and social ends he de- 
12sires.
Edwin Black suggests that agitative or exhortative 
discourse should be examined by the rhetorical critic dif­
ferently from deliberative discourse. Black states that 
"as long as rhetorical criticism is confined to the explica­
tion of discourses whose only use of emotionality is to bias 
the judgement of auditors, neo-Aristotelian criticism should 
function adequately; but once we recognize a genre of dis­
course that operates differently, then we are outside of
13Aristotle's theory." Waldo W. Braden regards this ap­
proach as "another option," not necessarily an alternative
14to neo-Aristotelianism but rather a complement to it.
Robert S. Cathcart states that the Aristotelian approach to 
criticism is a valid scientific-rational approach to the 
analysis and evaluation of a speech but that "numerous 
speeches do not lend themselves to Aristotelian interpreta­
tions."^5 J. Jeffrey Auer agrees that the rhetoric of
12Brandes, The Rhetoric of Revolt, p . .3.
^5Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in
Method (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 138.
^Waldo W. Braden, review of Rhetorical Criticism: A
Study in Method, by Edwin Black in Southern Speech Journal
31 (Spring 1966): 250.
^5Robert S. Cathcart, Post Communication: Critical 
Analysis and Evaluation (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Com­
pany, Inc., 1966), p. 73.
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7agitation is different from the rhetoric of traditional ad­
vocacy and therefore should be viewed differently.16 
Arthur Smith also proposes a different approach to agita­
tional rhetoric. He states that "because the agitator's 
purpose is different from the statesman's, he necessarily 
uses rhetorical designs peculiar to his ends." Smith fur­
ther explains that "his [the agitator's] designs are pecu­
liar not in the sense that he lacks the traditional rhetori­
cal tools, such as invention, arrangement, style, and deliv­
ery, but that he utilizes specialized designs within these
17 18conventional canons." Therefore, this case study at­
tempts to discover the specialized designs which Roberts 
utilized.
In a format suggested by Black, the four conflicts 
are each divided into three parts: situations, strategies, 
and effects. To Black, the situation "refers to the pre­
vailing state of the audience's convictions, the reputation 
of the rhetor, the popularity and urgency of his subject;
in sum, to all the extralinguistic factors that influence
19an audience's reactions to a rhetorical discourse." In
J. Jeffrey Auer, ed., The Rhetoric of Our Times 
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 5^
17Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 25-26.
18Auer, An Introduction to Research in Speech (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 120. Auer 
defines a case study as "an intensive, even microscopic, 
investigation . . ., in situ, of an individual 'case'."
19Black, Rhetorical Criticism, p. 133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
this p^psr the discussxons of si'tuGtions includG thg histor- 
ical-political backgrounds, the physical-sociological milieu, 
the audiences, and Roberts' rhetorical goals for each con­
flict.
Black defines rhetorical strategies as “characteris­
tics of the discourse." He explains that "there is a lim­
ited number of ways in which a rhetor can and will respond 
rhetorically to any given situational type." He maintains 
that "there may be accidents of a given response that will 
prove singular," but that on the whole, "there will be only 
a finite number of rhetorical strategies available to a 
rhetor in any given situation, and his playing his own vari­
ations on these strategies-will not prevent the critic from
identifying the strategies as characteristic of the situa-
20tion." The sections on strategies in this analysis reveal 
and discuss the specific designs or methods utilized by 
Roberts to achieve his rhetorical goals.
According to Black, effects "refer- to responses to
21the strategies in the situations." This study considers 
both immediate and long-range effects. It also attempts to 
evaluate Roberts' rhetorical success in light of other his­
torical, political, and sociological - factors.
Definition and Characteristics of Agitation 
Charles Lomas defines agitation as "a persistent and 
uncompromising statement and restatement of grievances
20Ibid., pp. 133-134.
2^Ibid., p. 134.
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9through all available communication channels, with the aim 
of creating public opinion favorable to a change in some 
condition." To Lomas, "agitation may be rhetorical, rely­
ing on the written or spoken word for its effect," or it 
"may be activist, using deeds rather than words." The nec­
essary preconditions for agitation are injustice or apparent 
injustice, a massive resistance to change motivated by high 
principles, apathy, self-interest or fear, and an available
channel of communication between the agitator and his audi- 
22ence. Extending Lomas’ concept, Smith defines agitation 
as "the recurring statement of grievances through any com­
munication channel with the intent of creating a dramatic 
situational change by using provocative language." Smith 
suggests that the key elements in an agitational campaign
are a persistent spokesman, a feeling of unrest in the com-
23munity, a means of communication, and a single purpose. 
Similarly, John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs state that 
"agitation exists when (1) people outside the normal deci­
sion-making establishment (2) advocate significant social 
change and (3) encounter a degree of resistance within 
the establishment such as to require more than the normal
22Charles Lomas, The Agitator in American Society 
{Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 
pp. 2, 8.
23Arthur Lee Smith, Jr., "Samuel Adams' Agitational 
Rhetoric of Revolution? (Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of California Los Angeles, 1968), pp. viii, 4.
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discursive means of persuasion."24 Utilizing both verbal 
and non-verbal extra-discursive means of persuasion,
Roberts repeatedly and provocatively stated his grievances 
with the intent.of creating a dramatic situational change. 
From the time of the first federal-state conflict in 1850 
until after the Civil War, Roberts continually blamed the 
North for the "impending crisis" and praised the South.
When the South could not turn the tide of increasing north­
ern control and abolition sentiment, following the lead 
of Calhoun, Rhett, Yancey, and other southern radicals, 
Roberts advocated revolution and war if necessary.
Mary McEdwards maintains that the language of agita­
tion "belongs to a particular type of rhetoric" which 
"evokes extreme movement away from the status quo— usually
25a complete reversal of existing conditions or situations."
Using McEdwards' definition, the states' rights-secession
movement can be classified in some ways as an agitation
2 6and in some ways as a "counter-agitation." In opposition 
to the abolition movement, the secession movement may more 
appropriately be termed a counter-agitation. But to the 
southern mind, the North, including the Federal Government, 
the northern states, the abolitionists, and the Republicans,
24John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric 
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc. , 1971), p. 4.
25Mary G. McEdwards, "Agitative Rhetoric: Its Nature 
and Effect," Western Speech 32 (Winter 1968):36.
2 6Lomas, The Agitator in American Society, pp. 16-18.
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was the establishment and abolition was rapidly becoming 
"the existing state of things," especially after the passing 
of personal liberty bills in the northern states. To the 
southerners, after Lincoln's election, abolition was the 
status quo. To Roberts and the Texans, the Federal Govern­
ment and the northern states, and later Lincoln and the 
Republicans, were the larger establishment. Although the 
political power occasionally shifted in Texas, to Roberts 
and the secessionists, the local opposition was always Sam 
Houston and the Texas Unionists, at one time called the 
Know-Nothings. To Roberts, the existing conditions were 
increasing northern domination and interference, the free- 
soil movement, and the abolition movement. These were the 
social conditions which Roberts attempted to reverse.
Bowers and Ochs suggest that both verbal and nonverbal 
behavior should be examined by the critic of agitational 
rhetoric. In fact, Bowers and Ochs state that their primary
concern is "the analysis of instrumental, symbolic events
27which are largely nonverbal, or extra-verbal." Brandes
also suggests that in order to understand fully the agitator
and the agitation it may be necessary for the rhetorical
28critic to observe "the crosscurrents" or other factors 
as well as the speaker's words. Smith states that his defi­
nition of agitational rhetoric provides for the agitator's
27Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, pp. 2, 6.
2 8Brandes, The Rhetoric of Revolt, p. 15.
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use of any channel of communication whatever.2  ^ Although 
this study focuses on Roberts' public speaking, it will 
also consider other extrinsic factors which Roberts exploit­
ed to further his cause.
Strategies of Agitation
Although no definitive.list of agitational strategies
has been formulated, several sources have suggested the
various rhetorical designs available to the agitator. This
study will consider Roberts' use of petition, promulgation,
30solidification, polarization, escalation/confrontation,
31objectification, legitimation, mythication, and image 
32building. These nine strategies constitute the analytical
criteria for this study. Bowers and Ochs suggest that in
order to execute his general strategies, an agitator em-
33ploys more specific methods or "tactics." This paper 
also attempts to discover the specific tactics which Roberts 
used to carry out his strategies.
29Smith, "Samuel Adams' Agitational Rhetoric of 
Revolution," p. 4.
2^Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, pp. 17-37.
2^Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, pp. 25-42.
32Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persua­
sion: A Means of Social Influence, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 152-267.
33Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, p. 16
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Petition
The strategy of petition can include any "normal dis­
cursive means of persuasion." Whenever social change is 
desired, the advocates usually begin by representing their 
case to the establishment. Agitation does not exist when 
petition is used alone, but early employment of petition 
is crucial to an agitational movement. If an establishment 
can show that petition has not occurred, it can discredit 
the agitators as "irresponsible firebrands" who disdain 
normal decision-making processes in favor of disturbance 
and disruption. An'agitator is unlikely to be successful 
unless he can show that he has first gone through the normal 
channels of persuasion. Unless he has done this and has
met with avoidance or suppression, he is unlikely to win
34support for his more drastic strategies.
Promulgation
Once the agitator has met with avoidance or suppres­
sion, he is likely to proceed to the strategy of promulga­
tion. Literally promulgation means "to make known a decree,
law, or doctrine by public declaration; to announce offi- 
35cially." Bowers and Ochs explain that this strategy seeks 
the public's social support by publicizing the agitator's 
position, "one of the main purposes of promulgation, and
34Ibid., p. 17.
35The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 1047.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
of all the succeeding strategies, is to win public accept-
ance of the agitator’s ideology, their system of values
and beliefs, and policies." The purpose of promulgation
cannot be fulfilled unless the agitators can get "exposition
36of that ideology in a form understandable to the public."
Solidification 
Solidification refers to "the rhetorical processes 
by which an agitating group produces or reinforces the co­
hesiveness of its members, thereby increasing their respon­
siveness to group wishes." The target of this strategy 
is the agitator's group rather than some group beyond it.
Some of the tactics of solidification also serve promul­
gating or polarizing functions, but are mainly solidifying 
or unifying. The tactics of solidification are essentially
reinforcing rather than initially persuasive in their rela-
37tionship to ideology and group membership. Lomas alludes 
to this strategy when he states that the agitational move­
ment is often "directed to those who are aggrieved and seeks
to organize them into a force powerful enough to demand 
-38action . .
Polarization
Polarization is a divisive strategy used "to force a 
conscious choice between agitation and control." It presents
36Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, pp. 17-18.
37Ibid., p. 20.
38Lomas, The Agitator in American Society, p. 14.
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to the undecided an either-or situation. It "assumes that
anyone who has not committed himself in one way or another
to the agitation is supportive of the establishment." Since
an agitator attempts to produce change, the burden of proof
is upon him to show that change is desirable. Anyone who
has not committed himself to the proposed change is assumed
to be content with the establishment way. The strategy of
polarization encompasses tactics designed to move the uncom-
39mitted out of that column and into the agitator's ranks.
Lomas suggests the use of polarization when he explains that
the agitator places all of the stereotypes of evil on the
side of the oppressor and all of the stereotypes of good
40on the side of the oppressed. Polarization, then, keeps 
the line between "them," the enemies, and "us," the friends, 
clearly delineated; it degrades the enemies or oppressors 
and praises the friends, or the oppressed. The agitator 
forces the uncommited to make a choice.
Escalation/Confrontation 
The strategy of escalation/confrontation is designed 
"to escalate the tension in the establishment until finally 
establishment representatives resort to violent suppression 
in a confrontation with the agitators." Here the agitator 
harrasses and irritates the establishment so that it will 
become apprehensive and overprepare for agitation. Since
3 g  •
Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, p. 26.
^Lomas, The Agitator in American Society, p. 18.
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overpreparation generally results in confusion, the agita­
tor can make the establishment look foolish and expose in­
adequacies. If the establishment does not adjust or capitu­
late and if the agitators do not relent, the conflict esca­
lates to open confrontation. In other words, if the two
sides do not compromise, the result is almost inevitably 
41war. Smith implies the use of this strategy when he ex­
plains that the opposition can be lured into position by 
provocative statements or actions by the agitators and that 
often the agitators have only to threaten a provocation
A O
to cause the establishment to respond vigorously. Brandes 
also alludes to the strategy of escalation/confrontation 
when he states that agitators often turn to advocating law­
lessness when the establishment will not respond to their 
43milder threats.
Objectification 
Objectification refers to group blame. According 
to Smith, "It is the agitator's use of language to direct 
the grievances of a particular group toward another collec­
tive body such as an institution, nation, political party 
or race." Objectification is related to, but different 
from, vilification or individual blame. Both strategies 
strive to embarrass the opposition. But objectification
^Bowers and Ochs, The Rehtoric of Agitation and 
Control, pp. 35-37.
^2Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 31.
^Brandes, The Rhetoric of Revolt, p. 3.
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attempts "to channel all of the frustrations of a group 
onto a single ill-defined body." Here the agitator tries 
to show that a certain race or party is responsible for 
all of the misfortune that befalls the agitator's devotees.
A safer strategy than vilification, objectification provides 
the agitator with greater protection from scrutiny and aims 
at vaguely defined bodies which are relatively stable in 
nature. Therefore the agitator is immune to an exacting 
examination and is little affected by the opposition's per­
sonnel changes. Since agitation is based on deeply-felt 
grievances, those grievances are usually not changed by 
the retirement of a political official. Therefore objecti­
fication "canalizes a group's negative feelings toward a 
collective body as the source of grievances." Blame be­
comes "the expression of a collective despair turned against 
those in the society who possess means to eradicate the 
alleged causes of grievances or who should be removed from
positions of authority so that the agitational ends are 
44accomplished.
Mythication
Mythication is the employment of language "that sug­
gests the sanction of supra-rational forces!' in order to 
create "a spiritual dynamism" for the agitator's movement. 
Like solidification, mythication is primarily an exhortative 
strategy aimed at the agitator's followers. In using
^Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, pp. 29-32.
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mythication, the rhetor instills in his audience feelings 
of dignity, self-congratulation, particularity, and superi­
ority. The agitator sets his followers apart from all other 
groups and appropriates "the combined forces of the uni­
verse" on their side. He romanticizes and glorifies his 
cause. "The members of the group become for all practical 
reasons the chosen people, the saviors and the beautiful.
e
When using mythication, for support the agitator calls upon
46recurring archetypal motifs as defined by Northrop Frye.
Legitimation
Legitimation is a justificatory design which seeks 
"to explain, vindicate and justify" the actions of the agi­
tator and the activists involved in his movement. It is 
"a refutative strategy" in that it answers the opposition, 
but it is "more than an argumentative rebuttal;" it is "a 
psychological weapon" which affects the agitator's "atti­
tude, outlook, and possibilities." As a justificatory strat­
egy, legitimation explains that whatever actions occur at 
the hands of his people result from the "arrogance or obsti­
nacy" of the opposition. The agitator explains that the 
action would never have occurred had the opposition lis­
tened to his reasoning. He argues that violence was not 
planned but that it was provoked and thereby grew directly
^Ibid., pp. 34-40.
46Northrop Frye, "The Archetypes of Literature," in 
Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. W. J. Bate (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 601-609.
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out of oppressive conditions. Always prepared with a "legal" 
justification, "the agitator does not allow himself to be 
encapsulated by the charges of his opposition.47 Legitima­
tion is similar to rationalization which Robert Oliver de­
fines as "a process of justifying ourselves, our groups,
48and our beliefs." Whenever an agitator vindicates or 
justifies his cause, he uses legitimation.
Image Building
Image building refers to the establishment of the 
rhetor's credibility, prestige, or reputation. Brembeck 
and Howell agree with the classical concept of ethos as 
a combination of prior reputation and calculated action 
on the part of the speaker to build his prestige. They 
observe that Aristotle listed three sources of personal 
credibility— sagacity, high character, and good will. Mod­
ern research has discovered that contemporary audiences 
view specifically "trustworthiness" and "expertness" as 
the main components of credibility. Trustworthiness is 
defined as "the degree of confidence in the communicator's 
intent to communicate the assertions he considers most 
valid." Expertness is defined as "the extent to which a 
communicator is perceived to be a source of valid asser­
tions." A message is judged more favorably when made by a
47Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, pp. 40-41.
48Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of Persuasive 
Speech, 2d ed. (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1957), 
p. 276.
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communicator of high credibility than by one of low credi- 
49bility. Monroe and Ehninger discuss these two major 
traits of credibility as "competence" and "trustworthi­
ness."50 This study will consider both the extrinsic and 
the intrinsic determinants of the agitator’s credibility—  
both his reputation and his calculated use of language and 
ideas to build his prestige.
Sources and Contributory Studies
The major source is the Roberts Papers found in the 
archives collection of the University of Texas Library in 
Austin. The papers contain manuscript, typescript, and 
printed materials. They include a diary, a partial auto­
biography, scrapbooks, reminiscences, memoirs, photographs 
legal documents, lecture notes, certificates, pamphlets, 
newspaper clippings, correspondence, and speeches. Except 
for the Texas-New Mexico boundary speech, published in the 
Texas State Gazette, all other speech texts were examined 
in both handwritten and published form. During the last 
few years of his life, Roberts collected the memoirs of 
his fifty years of public service and verified the facts 
of his long career. Therefore, many of the items in the 
collection contain explanatory, handwritten notations by 
Roberts. The papers of Thomas J. Rusk, John H. Reagan,
A Q
Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, pp. 252-257.
50Alan H. Monroe and Douglas Ehninger, Principles 
of Speech Communication, 6th brief ed. (Glenview, Illinois 
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), pp. 339-343.
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and John S. "Rip" Ford, also housed in the University of 
Texas archives, proved helpful.
Another major primary source is the Texas newspapers 
including the Dallas Herald, the Galveston Daily News, the 
Henderson Democrat, the Marshall Texas Republican, the San 
Augustine Red-Land Herald, and the Austin Texas State Ga­
zette . These newspapers provide information on the speaking 
occasions, the audience composition, the effect of the speak­
ing, and the attitudes and actions of the states' rights 
Democrats. The pro-Democratic, pro-secession Austin Texas 
State Gazette is especially valuable.
Roberts' own history of Texas gives special insight 
into his motives and his actions between 1850 and 1861.^  
Several writings of his contemporaries verify his account
of events and add to an understanding of Roberts' role in
52the states' rights-secession movement. Especially valu­
able is the eulogy by Dudley Wooten, who became the second
Oran Milo Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and 
Judicial History of Texas For Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 
1845-1895" in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, 
ed. Dudley G. Wooten, 2 vols. (Dallas, Texas: William G. 
Scarff, 1898), 2:7-239.
52Especially useful were John S. Ford, Memoirs, Ford 
Papers, Archives, University of Texas, Austin, Texas; Sam 
Houston, The Writings of Sam Houston, eds. Amelia W. Williams 
and Eugene C. Barker, 8 vols. (Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 1943); Francis R. Lubbock, Six Decades in 
Texas, or Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, ed. C. W.
Raines (Austin, Texas: Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900); and 
James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: Nixon- 
Jones Printing Company, 1855).
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president of the Texas State Historical Association upon 
Roberts' death.
The Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas as­
sisted in analyzing Roberts' influence as president of the 
Texas Secession Convention. The publication contains the 
official proceedings of both sessions of the convention 
including the speeches of the delegates, a list and descrip­
tion of the delegates, the reports of the Committee on 
Public Safety, and a summary of the actions of the conven­
tion.^
The most useful contributory study is Lelia Bailey's 
dissertation on Roberts' life and public career. Although 
she gives little attention to Roberts' speeches, Bailey con­
tributes to an understanding of the historical aspects of
55Roberts' life and career. Three theses have also been
written in departments of history on various aspects of
Roberts' career: R. R. Coons emphasizes Roberts' educational
services;^ Frank Edgar Norton studies Roberts' administra-
57tive policies as governor; and Patrick Brown focuses on the
53Wooten, "The Life and Services of Oran Milo Roberts,"
1-20.
54Winkler, The Journal of the Texas Secession Conven­
tion. "
^Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M.Roberts."
^R. R. Coons, "The Life and Educational Services of 
0. M. Roberts" (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1950).
^Frank Edgar Norton, "The Major Administration Poli­
cies of Oran Milo Roberts" (M.A. Thesis, University of Texas, 
1925).
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laws passed during Roberts' administration.^® None of the 
theses discuss Roberts' secession activities or his public 
speaking.
58
Patrick Brown, "A Study of the Laws Passed During 
the Administration of 0. M. Roberts" (M.A. thesis, Sam 
Houston State Teachers College, 1949).
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND OF THE AGITATOR
It was the period of incipient division between 
the North and the South upon the great questions 
that arrayed them in actual hostility. The lead­
ers of Southern thought were marshaling their 
forces of logic and protest on the side of strict 
construction, States' rights theory of the Federal 
Constitution, and the first sounds of that memorable 
conflict that afterwards thrilled the country with 
eloquence and argument and shook the continent 
with the roar of battle, were just beginning to 
challenge the attention and excite the alarm of 
conservative and observant men. Young Oran Milo 
Roberts was taught in that school of stoic states­
manship .
With these words, Dudley G. Wooten aptly describes the times 
and environment in which Oran Milo Roberts spent his forma­
tive years and sets the scene for his involvement in the 
events to follow. This chapter examines Roberts' personal 
and professional background in order to understand the man
who became the axis around which secession revolved in 
2
Texas.
Birth and Ancestry 
Oran Milo Roberts, the youngest of the five children 
of Oba and Margaret Roberts, was born on July 9, 1815 in
Dudley G. Wooten, "The President's Annual Address:
The Life and Times of Oran Milo Roberts," The Quarterly of 
the Texas State Historical Association 2 (July 1898):2-3.
2
Robert Kingsley Peters, "Texas: Annexation to Seces­
sion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1977), p. 346.
24
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3
Laurens District, South Carolina. Although the family left 
South Carolina when Oran was but three years old, it was 
perhaps prophetic that he was born in the district adjacent 
to Abbeville District, the birthplace of John C. Calhoun.^ 
Later, as a young lawyer, an Alabama legislator, a Texas 
judge, a Texas Supreme Court Justice, and the President of 
the Texas Secession Convention, Roberts became an ardent 
admirer of Calhoun and an unswerving advocate of the Calhoun 
school of states' rights.
Roberts also shared with Calhoun his Scotch-Irish an­
cestry of which he was especially proud. His maternal grand­
father, Sam Ewing, had moved from Scotland to South Carolina 
just prior to the Revolutionary War and had commanded a com­
pany of cavalry during the struggle for Independence.^  In 
his autobiographical sketch, Roberts described his lineage:
0. M. Roberts inherited the physical and mental 
structure of his mother's family who belonged to 
that race of Scotch-Irish who emigrated to America 
after the Rebellion of 1745 and settled along east 
of the mountains in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and 
South Carolina. That race of men constituted the. 
ancestry of many of the most distinguished citizens 
of the United States. Amongst them may be numbered 
Andrew Jackson, Calhoun, the Earls and the Pickenses 
of South Carolina, Stonewall Jackson, the Ewings, 
Stewarts, McCorkles, Patrick Henry and many others.
3
Oran Milo Roberts, "Autobiographical Sketch,” p. 1, 
and "Part of an Autobiography," p. 1, Roberts Papers, 
Archives, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
4
Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in 
South Carolina 1852-1860 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Uni­
versity Press, 1950), p. 15.
5
Roberts, "Autobiographical Sketch," p. 1.
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A race of men who at every period of American his­
tory have come to the front in defence of the 
people's rights and good government.6
He was equally proud of his father's bloodline which con­
sisted of "a very large number of noble men and women whose 
ancestors settled in Virginia and were reported to be of 
Welch origin." He pictured them as "generally poor, but 
an independent, brave, self-reliant race of people, who
lived within their means and made at home almost all of the
7
necessities of life."
In 1818, when Oran Milo was three, Oba Roberts moved 
his wife, three sons, and two daughters to Alabama settling 
in the mountain region near Ashville in St. Clair County
O
where he farmed until his death in 1827. Some biographies
describe Oran's early childhood in Alabama as being "attended
q
with many difficulties" and "having a hard time trying to 
keep the hungry wolf from the door. u1^ Roberts stated that 
while his parents were "never absolutely poor," they were 
"in moderate circumstances kept so partly by making provision 
for their children as they grew up and left them."11
6Ibid., p. 2.
7Ibid.
^Ibid., p . 3. 
q
James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Lours: 
Nixon-Jones Printing Company, 1855), p. 273.
1^Wentworth Manning, Some History of Van Zandt County 
(Des Moines: Homestead Company, 1919, p. 142.
11Roberts, "Start of an Autobiography," p. 1.
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Oran's parents were middle-aged when they moved to 
Alabama and the three oldest children were already grown.
The oldest daughter, twenty years older than Oran, was mar­
ried to Robert Bourland, a planter in Mississippi who later 
helped Oran with his college expenses. The second daughter 
was also married and the oldest son, Jessee Roberts, became
a doctor. Oran was especially in awe of Jessee and was in-
12spired by his accomplishment. Oran Milo was proud of both 
his immediate family and of his ancestors.
Education
Oran Milo, along with the second youngest son, Frank­
lin Ford, was first sent to school in the "old field" or 
county schools in St. Clair County. Unfortunately, when 
Oran was only twelve years old, his father died and both 
boys were required to drop out of school and work on the farm. 
The two sons worked on their mother's farm until Margaret 
Roberts decided that Franklin Ford should enter a business 
and Oran Milo should return to school.
At sixteen Oran entered the newly established academy 
at Ashville. Here he studied primarily Greek and Latin un­
der a Mr. James Lewis, a well educated man who had abandoned 
the law profession for teaching. The academy lasted only 
six months, however, when Mr. Lewis was elected Clerk of 
the Circuit Court of St. Clair County. At this time Oran 
and three other boys were taken into the law office of a
■^Ibid., p. 3.
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young attorney named Ralph P. Lowe, a graduate of Miami Col­
lege in Ohio, who had just settled in Ashville. Oran stud­
ied with the lawyer for eighteen months until the end of 
1832 when Lowe was stricken with a fever and returned to
the North. Lowe was later elected a supreme court judge
13and Governor of the state of Iowa.
Roberts knew that he must get a formal education if 
he were ever to fulfill his boyhood dream of becoming a 
judge. When Oran was just a youth, his parents had fre­
quently entertained the lawyers and judges who attended the 
courts from a distance. He came to look on these men as 
"a class of men set apart" who were "in some way superior 
to other men." The idea of their importance and superiority
grew upon him and he decided that he too would become one
14of "the Judges." He was doubly inspired when his brother,
Jessee, the doctor whom he respected so much, confided in
Oran that the practice of medicine "was a drudgery" and ad-
15vised him that law was the "high road to fame." No doubt 
the tutelage under Lewis and Lowe strengthened his decision.
Therefore, although he lacked a complete, formal educa­
tion, Roberts decided in 1833 to try for admission to the 
University of Alabama. Roberts stated of the initial exper­
ience :
13Roberts, "Autobiographical Sketch," pp. 3-4 and 
"Start of an Autobiography," pp. 2-3.
1^Roberts, "Start of an Autobiography," p. 5
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An older brother , Franklin Ford Roberts, brought 
me and a faithful negro, Prince, that belonged 
to me, to Tuscaloosa— I to go to the University, 
and Prince to be hired out to help pay my expenses.
On the 13th day of February, 1833, my brother and 
I called upon the President . . .  He appointed 
a time and place for me to be examined for admis­
sion . . .  I stood a good examination in Latin 
and Greek and in Arithmetic, but was deficient 
in every other requirement.^
Despite his deficiencies Roberts was admitted to the 
University of Alabama with the provision that he receive 
private tutelage under Professors Hilliard, Brumely, and 
Bonfils in order to fill in the gaps of his education. Af­
ter one year of diligent study, Roberts had. compensated ade­
quately for his deficiencies and stood sixth in his class. 
During his four years at Alabama, Roberts continued to be 
an outstanding student. He was elected President of the 
Erosophic Debating Society his junior year, served as Li­
brarian of the University his senior year, and graduated 
as one of the top five students in his class of 1836.
Roberts was later considered to be one of the University's 
most illustrious alumnus. In 1881 the University of Alabama 
Alumni Association selected him to deliver the chief address 
at the commencement exercises and in 1882 the University
j. 8conferred upon him the degree of Doctor of Law.
Roberts, "Reminiseenses of the History of the Univer­
sity of Alabama During the Four Sessions That He Was A Stu­
dent In It, From February 1833 to December 1836," p. 1, 
Roberts Papers.
■^Ibid. , pp. 2-23
18The University of Alambama Record, 1836-1881, Letter 
Book, 1875-1881, Roberts Papers.
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Legal Training 
Immediately upon graduation from the University of 
Alabama Roberts began his study of law under Judge Ptolemy 
Harris near St. Stephens in South Alabama in exchange for 
tutoring Judge Harris's three sons. He later completed his 
study of law under Judge William P. Chilton/ a leading law­
yer in the town of Talladega, Alabama. He was admitted to 
the bar on September 22, 1837 and for four years practiced 
law first in Talladega and later in Ashville, Alabama. At
the age of twenty-three, Roberts was elected to the Alabama
19legislature in which he served for one year. His early 
training and experience in the fundamental principles of
20constitutional law were thorough and essentially practical.
In 1841 Roberts answered the call of the New West and 
moved to the Republic of Texas where "its unlimited re­
sources and unbounded prospects presented their allurements
21to his ambition." He took up the practice of law in San 
Augustine, in East Texas, which was considered to be the 
cultural and political center of Texas. Although San Augus­
tine had one of the strongest bars in the county, Roberts 
rose rapidly and was soon riding an extensive circuit of 
East Texas counties along with the district judge and the 
lawyers of established practice.
19Dictionary of American Biography, 16 (1935): 13-14 
and Roberts, "Autobiographical Sketch," pp. 5-7.
20Wooten, "The Life and Times of Oran Milo Roberts,"
p. 2. . .
21Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 274.
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On February 16, 1844, a little more than two years 
after Roberts' arrival in Texas, President Sam Houston ap­
pointed him district attorney. Two years later Roberts re­
alized his boyhood dream when J. Pinkney Henderson, the
22first governor of Texas, appointed him district judge.
He was the first judge of the district under the judiciary 
system of the state government and the task fell upon him 
to interpret and apply the body of statutes enacted under 
the new organic law and to bring them for the first time 
to the test of the Constitution, both of the State of Texas 
and of the United States. Roberts' legal talents and judi­
cial capacity were of the highest order and met all of the 
requirements of the situation. He gathered up the legal 
fragments of the revolution and annexation, blended them 
together and made a lasting impression upon the jurispru­
dence of the State. He held this position for eleven years
until he was elected Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
23of Texas.
Political Experience and Philosophy 
Politically Roberts was an ardent Democrat all of his 
life. To him the Democratic Party and democracy were one 
and the same. Once when asked to run for Congress as an 
independent candidate, Roberts firmly declined stating that
22Dictionary of American Biography, p. 14.
23Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 277.
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his "hopes for America's future were planted in Democracy" 
and that it was under the banner of that party that he de­
sired to see Texas use her influence in "preserving the Con­
stitution— in the spirit in which it had coma from the pen 
of the fathers." He vowed that he would do nothing to weak­
en the power of the party or to retard its development.24
Although Roberts worked locally for the Democratic
Party in his early years in Texas, because of his judicial
position, he had worked generally behind the scenes in an
organizational capacity. He had even turned down several
25offers to run for Congress from the Eastern District. It
took a situation like the Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute
in 1850 to draw him into the whirlwind of politics. Roberts
attested to this fact on July 17, 1850 while speaking in
San Augustine.
Were this [the boundary dispute] a mere party ques­
tion of politics I would have to decline the re­
quest of my fellow citizens to participate in it; 
but being national in its character— involving 
some of our dearest rights as citizens of Texas, 
and as citizens of this glorious confederacy of 
states, I do not feel myself warranted in with­
holding my views when thus solicited.26
24Roberts, "Some Account of His Aspiration for Politi­
cal Life in Congress," Diploma, Law Licenses, etc., Roberts 
Papers.
2^0. M. Roberts to W. D. Miller, 12 September 1843, 
Roberts Papers. Roberts states: "Although I have had many 
private solicitations from my friends to offer for Congress, 
my circumstances and situation as well as my inclination 
forbid it."
9g
Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," 19 July 1850, in San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land 
Herald, 27 July 1850.
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It was here, in 1850, that Roberts first became an 
active agitator against the Federal Government. He felt 
so strongly against federal intervention and so strongly 
for state sovereignty that he stepped out of his judicial 
role to play the part of a political agitator. More cor­
rectly he assumed both roles simultaneously. From that time 
on Roberts became a more visual and more vocal leader in 
the Democratic Party in Texas.
He ran for Congress in 1851 and in 1853 but when it 
became obvious in both races that his continued candidacy 
would mean not only defeat for himself but the defeat of 
the Democratic party and the success of the Whig candidate, 
he withdrew his name. He explained to the convention in 
1853 that he had withdrawn in 1851 "in the interest of the 
organization of the party" and that, "for the sake of har­
mony and in the interest of the party," he would again with- 
27draw his name.
From the political incidents of 1851 and 1853, Judge 
Roberts had acquired the confidence of the leading men of 
his party in his political integrity and party loyalty. He 
soon became one of the pillars in the Calhoun, states' 
rights, anti-Houston wing of the Democratic Party in Texas 
in opposition to the Jacksonian, nationalist, pro-Houston
27Roberts, "Some Account of His Aspiration for Poli­
tical Life in Congress," Roberts Papers.
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wing. Due to his South Carolina parentage and his Alabama
training, he aligned himself with the pro-slavery, states'
rights leaders and became known as a "formidable advocate
of the strict construction of the Federal Constitution, the
reserved rights of the States, and the inviolable sanctity
29of their domestic institutions."
In 1855 Roberts again took the lead in politics when 
the states' rights group was threatened by a new party—  
the American or Know-Nothing Party. Roberts and the other 
Calhoun Democrats were thoroughly aroused by the new myste­
rious party of Union men who held Houston in high favor,
and on June 16, 1855, the Democrats held a "Bomb-shell" Con-
30vention in Austin, declaring war on the Know-Nothings.
Judge Roberts spent much time and energy working for a Dem-
31ocratic triumph over the Know-Nothing movement. By 1857, 
the year Roberts was elected Associate Justice of the Su­
preme Court, the Know-Nothings had lost much of their effec­
tiveness, and by 1859 were virtually powerless because of
28Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0.. M. 
Roberts" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1932), 
p. 78.
29Wooten, "The Life and Services of Oran Milo Roberts,"
p. 7.
"^Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Par­
ties in Texas (Austin, Texas: University of Texas, 1916), 
p. 37.
31Texas State Gazette, 23 June 1855, and Roberts, 
"Speech in Opposition to Know-Nothingism," Roberts Papers.
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the efforts of Roberts and such men as Louis T. Wigfall,
3 2John H. Reagan, and Thomas J. Rusk.
In 1859 Houston was elected Governor, and Roberts de­
cided to run for the U.S. Congress. His friends, however, 
wanted him to stay in Texas in order to remain on the bench 
where he could wield the most influence. Thus Louis T. Wig­
fall, who was less known and less liked but a more "eloquent” 
33orator was sent to Congress, and Roberts remained in Texas 
to fight Sam Houston and to reorganize the Democratic Party.34
Because of the continued conflict over the slavery 
question between the North and South, the election of Abra­
ham Lincoln, the secession of South Carolina, and the subse­
quent secession of Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
and Louisiana, Roberts and the other Texas states' rights
leaders felt that "Texas had no choice but to go with her
35sister States of the South." A full-fledged campaign for 
secession was begun and Roberts assumed and held the leading 
part in the agitation. During 1860 he delivered the seces­
sion speech which was a turning point in public action, drew 
up the call for a convention of the people, and assisted
32Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas For Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845-1895" 
in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, ed. Dudley G. 
Wooten, 2 vols. (Dallas, Texas: William G. Scarff, 1898),
2:38.
33Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. Roberts,"
p. 99.
34Ibid., pp. 97-100.
3 5 Wooten, A Comprehensive History of Texas, 2:351.
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in the successful campaign for that purpose.3® In 1861 
he presided over the Texas Secession Convention and maneu­
vered the resignation of Sam Houston, the secession of
3 7Texas, and the uniting of Texas in the Confederacy, thus
achieving the results of his agitative efforts. In his
lectures and speeches made in later life, Roberts continued
38to defend his earlier secession stand.
Preparation for Speaking 
It is unlikely that Roberts received any direct, for­
mal training in elocution or in public speaking before he 
entered the University of Alabama. It is likely, however, 
that since "all reading remained essentially oral until 
the twentieth century . . . where the greatest emphasis 
was consistently placed upon aspects of audibility,
36Walter Prescott Webb, ed., The Handbook of Texas,
2 vols. (Austin, Texas: The Texas State Historical Asso­
ciation, 1952), 2:484-485, 587-588.
37Winkler, ed., Journal of the Texas Secession Con­
vention 1861 (Austin, Texas: Austin Printing Company, 1912), 
pp. 9-152.
38Roberts, "The Causes of the War North and South;"
"On the Crisis in 1860, Then Imposing a Duty Upon the Peo­
ple of the South, and Exhibiting the Wrongs Done by the 
Northern States;" "On Sovereignty: Its Location and Effects 
in the Governments of America;" "On the Close of the War, 
and President Andrew Johnson's Reconstruction of the Southern 
States." Lectures made at the University of Texas in 1891- 
92 as found in Oran Milo Roberts, Our Federal Relations:
From a Southern View of Them (Austin, Texas: Eugene Von 
Boeckmann, 1892), pp. 5-81; and Roberts, "Speech to the 
Reunion of the Mountain Remnants," 1895, Roberts Papers.
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articulation, enunciation, and pronunciation,"3  ^Oran Milo 
may have received some training in speaking under Ralph 
Lowe, the young attorney-teacher in the Academy at Ashville. 
Lowe was a lawyer and "the orator, lawyer, minister, and 
actor were all concerned with and characterized by their 
manner of speaking" in this era of the nineteenth century.40 
It is probable that Lowe included some training in writing 
and speaking English in addition to the instruction in Greek 
and Latin.
Not until he was admitted to the University of Alabama 
in 1833 did Roberts receive any formal instruction in elocu­
tion. Although he was proficient in Greek, Latin, and Math­
ematics, he was deficient in other studies, among which 
was the art of elocution. Professor Hilliard, who was Pro­
fessor of Elocution, volunteered to tutor Roberts in "sever­
al studies" and Roberts was soon accepted as a full-time 
Freshman. Roberts recalls: "Professor Hilliard redeemed 
his pledge to my great advantage, and I have had the pleas­
ure years afterwards of tendering to him my thanks for his
41kindness to me." No doubt, Professor Hilliard instilled 
in Roberts the importance of clarity of articulation which 
later characterized Robert's public speaking.
39Karl Wallace, ed., History of Speech Education in 
America (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1954), 
p. 279.
40Ibid., pp. 197-98.
41Roberts, "Reminiscences of the University of Ala­
bama," p. 1.
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Probably the most significant aspect of Roberts’ prep­
aration for agitational speaking was his participation in 
the Erosophic Debating Society at the University. During 
his sophomore year, Roberts began to "take a lively interest" 
in the debates and "tried to speak" when it came his turn.
He was elected President of the Erosophic Society at the 
end of his junior year. He later remembered:
During that session Bowden [Roberts' best friend] 
and I, by previous agreement, selected different 
sides upon the subjects debated, prepared ourselves 
in advance, and closed nearly every debate after 
those members of the society, who had been selected 
as they stood upon the roll, had completed their 
speeches . . .  of course, I could aspire only to 
meet him [Bowden] in arguments upon the facts and 
the law of the cases; for he had a style of ora- 
tory, whenever he spoke, that I never saw excelled.
Also during that session,politics, running high in 
Alabama, found its way into the University. When called 
upon to take sides in the debates of the Society, Roberts 
showed the influence of his roots. In a debate in 1836
over whether Van Buren or White should be elected President, 
Roberts argued for Van Buren, basing his reason not on polit­
ical wisdom, but on the fact that Andrew Jackson was for 
Van Buren. Roberts articulated the strength of his per­
sonal prejudice:
The truth is, that it was then understood that Gen­
eral Jackson was for Van Buren, and I merely fol­
lowed the hero of the hermitage. I would have 
stood up for him against |^y odds. Such was my 
raising in the mountains.
42Ibid.
43Ibid., p. 20.
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Ironically two of the most prevalent topics debated 
in the Erosophic Society and in the other debating socie­
ties throughout the South were slavery and secession, the 
topics which would consume Roberts' later years in Texas. 
Propositions debated included: "Is enslavement of human 
beings justifiable?"; "If South Carolina should secede from 
the Union ought the Southern states to assist her?"; "Has 
a state the right to withdraw from the Union at pleasure?"; 
and "Ought the government of the U.S. resort to force to 
secure the obedience of S. Carolina?"44 In those debates 
Roberts prepared not only for public speaking in general 
but for his pro-slavery, pro-secession role as a leading 
states' rights speaker in 1850-1861.
His training in speaking and debating also made him 
a keen observer of "good oratory" in others. In 1834 
Roberts was impressed by a eulogy of General Lafayette de­
livered by Judge Henry Goldthwaite, an Alabama Supreme 
Court Justice. Roberts stated.that Goldthwaite "delivered
extemporaneously a most feeling and eloquent address on 
45the occasion." On another occasion Roberts was moved 
by Reverend Moffit, a celebrated Methodist minister who 
was visiting Tuscaloosa. Roberts observed Moffit's delivery 
of the sermon in great detail, referring to the minister's 
vocal inflection:
44Wallace, History of Speech Education in America, 
p. 251.
4^Roberts, "Reminiscences of the University of Ala­
bama , " p . 7.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
I heard his voice, sometimes in thunder tones with­
out a break of harshness, then in lisping whisper 
that filled the house, then in clarion peals with­
out a jar, then in plaintive melody flowing over 
the house as a soft gentle breeze.46
Roberts also noted the Reverend's use of gestures:
I recollect only one thing in his whole sermon.
It was a figure. The soul of a little girl that 
by pain and death was free from its earthly tene­
ment; he compared her to a caged eagle, that broke 
through the bars of its prison, spread its wings 
upon the open air, and flew around in a circle, 
rising higher and higher in the circle as it flies, 
to find the course to its home, so the soul of the 
little girl, in its joyous freedom goes up around 
and around rising higher and higher, until it gets 
its direction: (he all the time moving his up- 
stretched arm pointing to the soul in circular 
flight describing its course in a circle), and 
gazing intently up as if looking at it as it gets 
higher and higher when all at once, he moved for­
ward, looked down at the congregation, and with 
a quick motion of his arm at highest reach he
pointed upwards. His gesture said 'gone up to
heaven' more plainly than if he had said it with 
words.47
Showing his appreciation for the power of such elo­
quence , Roberts observed:
A low murmur, as of relief, like an electric flash, 
passed over the whole audience. Such a scene can
be seen and felt, but it cannot be described. He
spoke for two hours, and I was sorry when he quit.48
The orator whom Roberts most observed and admired 
was his friend Frank W. Bowden, a classmate and fellow de­
bater at the University of Alabama and later- a lawyer in 
Texas. Roberts said of Bowden's oratorical ability:
4^Ibid., p. 8.
47Ibid.
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From the first speech that he made in the Erosophic 
Society, he was regarded the best orator in the 
school. In after life he became the greatest ora­
tor that I ever heard speak. He was excellent in 
diction, strong in argument, and overpowering in 
pathos, with a fund of acquired information that 
seemed inexhaustible.49
Roberts admired Bowden's "extraordinary power of oratory." 
Throughout the years he continued to describe Bowden's pub­
lic speaking talents:
In his speeches there was no theatrical acting.
His art in producing effect was nature's self.
. . . Every word uttered by him in his rapid de­
livery could have no substitute to express the 
thought intended. His arguments were logical.
. . . His pathos, by the uttering of some word or 
the delivery of a sentence, would thrill his whole 
auditory, however numerous, and bring unbidden 
tears in response to it.50
Undoubtedly Roberts' experiences and observations 
at the University of Alabama prepared him for public speak­
ing. But other elements contributed to his effectiveness. 
His noble ancestry engendered a sense of pride and self- 
confidence making him aware that he was of a long line of 
loyal and accomplished Scotch-Irish Americans. His legal 
training and early courtroom experience, often before a 
judge or jury, developed his speaking skills. His political 
experience in the Alabama legislature, his activities in the 
early county and state Democratic conventions, and his cam­
paigning also provided valuable experience in public
49Ibid., p. 12
^°Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 39.
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speaking- These accomplishments served as a rhetorical 
foundation for his later states' rights speaking.
Speech Preparation 
Probably because of his experiences as a librarian, 
a debater, a lawyer, a legislator and a judge, Roberts' 
speech preparation was thorough. Lynch states that "his 
powers of research found no satisfaction within the bounds 
of superficiality and no lodgment upon the surface of in­
vestigation.1'^ Wooten states that he "possessed a tireless
industry in the study of detail" and was "known for his 
52completeness." His extensive notes and outlines of his
53speeches which he preserved in his papers suggest that
Roberts was conscientious about his speech research.
Another contributing factor to his speech preparation
was the fact that he was also an author. From the day that
he left the University of Alabama, he wrote political essays
54on topics of the day. During his first years in Texas,
55he also wrote treatises on education and on famous
^^Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 280.
52Wooten, "The Life and Services of Oran Milo Roberts,”
p . 8.
53Roberts Papers, Archives, University of Texas, passim.
54
Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of O. M. Roberts,"
p. 22.
55Roberts, "In Defense of the University at St. Augus­
tine: Criticism Upon the Pedantry and Presumption of M. A. 
Montrose's Articles Published in the Red Lander Under Signa­
ture of 'Ave' and Strictures Upon Refusal of Canfield to 
Publish Articles Answering Montrose," 1843, Roberts Papers.
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men.56 These early writings were the predecessors of his
lengthier historical writings such as Our Federal Relations;
57From a Southern View of Them and Part III of Wooten's
5 8A Comprehensive History of Texas.
Another fact which should not be ignored when discuss­
ing Roberts' speech preparation is the fact that Roberts 
was intelligent and organized. Lynch portrays Roberts as 
a "Grecian Sage who had a highly philosophical and reflec­
tive mind"— a mind of "keen and ready perception which
blended the ardor of devotion and the candor of rectitude
59with the calm depths of reason." De Shields describes
Roberts as "clean, clear, sane, and uniformly efficient
and practical" and "a positive genius at details and 
60particulars."
Delivery
Roberts was not flamboyant. His chief attributes 
as a public speaker were probably his clarity and simpli­
city. June Welch observes that Roberts did not exhibit
56Roberts, "Reminiscences of Public Men of Alabama," 
1843, Roberts Papers.
57Roberts, Our Federal Relations: From a Southern 
View of Them (Austin,.Texas: Eugene Von Boeckmann, Printer, 
1892).
58Roberts, “The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 7-329.
59Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 280.
6®James T. De Shields, They Sat in High Places: The 
Presidents and Governors of Texas (San Antonio, Texas: The 
Naylor Company, 1940), p. 315.
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the "arts of the orator," but that "he knew what he meant 
to say and said it in clear-cut English. " She feels that 
this fact, along with Roberts' "Spartan integrity," gave 
insight to what he s a i d . D e  Shields also reports that 
in his delivery, Roberts "was not brilliant or showy, mak­
ing no pretentions to oratory or display" and that "he be­
lieved that language was made to express ideas in the sim-
62plest and most effective form." Norman G. Kittrell, awed 
by Roberts' simplicity, writes that "it was almost incon­
ceivable that a man who could write such opinions could 
be at the same time so absolutely simple in speech and ac­
tion ." 63
In demeanor Roberts is generally described as digni­
fied and professional. Lynch portrays him as "a man of 
great amiability," . . . "bland, polished and refined, yet 
plain and unostentatious in his manners," and adds that 
"his pure professional and social ethics, and his conversa­
tional powers render him a welcome and interesting guest
i t, 64 xn every cxrcle.
Consistent with his overall manner, Roberts was 
poised and erect. De Shields says that "Physically he was
^*June Welch, The Texas Governor (Dallas, Texas: G.L.A. 
Press, 1977), p. 87.
®3De Shields, They Sat in High Places, p. 315.
63Norman G. Kittrell, Governors Who Have Been and 
Other Public Men of Texas (Houston, Texas: Dealy-Adey-Elgin 
Company, 1921) , p. 37.
64Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 284.
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strong and graceful— not quite six feet tall, compactly
built; and he retained his wonderful vigor and his fine
muscular figure to the end of his life, never stooping in 
,.65carrxage.
In describing his facial features, De Shields declared 
them thin, dark, and pleasant: "He was dark of complexion, 
had a thin, keen, intellectual face; bright, alert eyes 
black in color; a pleasing humorous expression, usually 
smiling and gracious; . . . withal dignified and reserved.'^®
In dress, Roberts "always wore a Prince Albert coat. 
Photographs taken of him during various stages of his life 
show him wearing a long frock coat, white shirt, and dark 
bow tie, the customary dress style of that era.
Roberts often paid a great deal of attention to speak­
ing techniques— his own and others. In his memoirs of his 
days at the University of Alabama, he reported in great 
detail the acoustics of the Library and his practice in 
speaking there:
A striking characteristic of that room was the im­
mense re-verberation of sound. . . . The least harsh­
ness in the voice of a person speaking reverberated 
with such a confusion that he could not be heard 
at the distance of three feet. . . . To be heard, 
one had to speak without the least harshness in 
the sound of the voice. . . .  I very soon learned 
to speak so as to be heard loudly and distinctly 
over the room. I have thought since then that a
^5De Shields, They Sat in High Places, p. 315. 
66Ibid.
67Ibid.
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building so constructed would be well adapted to 
training the voice in exercises of elocution.68
He also noted such characteristics as vocal inflection, 
volume, and diction in the speaking of Judge Goldthwaite, 
Reverend Moffit, and Frank Bowden, as previously cited.
It appears that historians such as Lynch, Welch, Kitt­
rell, and De Shields associated the "arts of oratory" or 
eloquence with a grandiloquent, flamboyant style of speaking. 
If this was the case then one can conclude that Roberts 
was not considered eloquent and may have paled in comparison 
to the likes of Frank W. Bowden and Louis T. Wigfall. He 
attempted, however, to communicate his states' rights mes­
sages in a simple, clear, and effective manner. He found 
his strength in his basic intelligence, his ability to speak 
simply and clearly, and in the content of his speeches.
Summary
As a judge Roberts has been described as an objective,
disinterested jurist who was so concerned with the letter
69of the law that he "decided a case to pieces." On the 
other hand, as a political agitator for states' rights and 
secession, Roberts appears to have been guided by his re­
gional prejudices and his personal political philosophy.
In his speeches, and in his court decisions, he quoted con­
stitutional law often. But in his speeches he showed
6 8Roberts, "Reminiscences of the University of Ala­
bama," p. 19.
6 9Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 280.
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himself to be a southern, strict constructionist. As a 
judge Roberts "cared not a plugged nickel about the color 
of a defendant"^ but as an advocate of secession he be­
lieved in the inferiority and enslavement of the Negro race.
During his early years, Roberts had wanted to become 
a judge because that position would make him superior to 
other men. Respected by his colleagues and revered by his 
audiences, Roberts used this exalted position to employ 
his agitative rhetorical strategies in the events of 1850- 
1861.
Roberts' ultimate effectiveness as a states' rights 
speaker, then, probably did not result from his delivery.
It may have resulted more from who he was, the strategies 
he used, and the adaptation of those strategies to his par­
ticular audiences.
70Paul Bolton, Governors of Texas (Corpus Christi, 
Texas: The Corpus Christi Caller-Times, 1947), p. 32.
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CHAPTER III
CONFLICT: THE TEXAS-NEW MEXICO 
BOUNDARY DISPUTE - 1850
Situation
Before 1850 Roberts had limited his political speak­
ing and activities to local affairs of the Democratic Party 
in Texas. But certain events which he felt threatened the 
sovereignty of the state and the institution of slavery 
compelled him to speak out and thereby to begin his public 
agitation against the Federal Government and the people 
of the North. The Wilmot Proviso, designed to prohibit 
slavery in any territory acquired from Mexico/ and the Free-
Soil Movement of 1848 enraged the Texas states' rights advo­
cates and made them aware of the growing anti-slavery move­
ment in the North. It was the Texas-New Mexico boundary 
dispute, however, that aroused these Texans to action.^ 
Nationally, the most significant issue in the controversy 
of 1850 involved the admission of California as a free state
and the question of slavery in the territories, but in Texas
■^Billy Don Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion 
in the Lone Star State: Texans' Attitudes Toward Secession 
and The Union, 1848-1861" (Ph.D. dissertation, North Texas 
State University, 1972), p. 66.
48
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the most significant issue was her boundary dispute.2 
Boundaries have often had a peculiar significance in the 
development of Texas. This was never so true as in the 
years that followed the Mexican War when Texas became em­
broiled in the territorial dispute which was governed by 
the political and economic objectives of sectionalism.
It is the purpose of this chapter to explain and evaluate 
the rhetorical strategies which Roberts used in the Texas- 
New Mexico boundary dispute.
Historical-Political Background
In 1836 the Republic of Texas had claimed that its 
southern and western boundary followed the Rio Grande from 
its mouth to its source and then followed a line running 
due north to the forty-second parallel. . This area included 
the present state of Texas plus parts of the present states 
of New Mexico, Oklahoma, Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming. Mex­
ico declared that it would concede this boundary if Texas 
would decline- annexation. When Texas chose annexation in 
1845, Mexico invaded the area which lay between the Rio 
Grande and the Nueces Rivers, and President Polk declared 
war against Mexico. In 1846 federal troops occupied Santa
2
Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1953), p. 89.
3
W. H. Goetzmann, "The United States-Mexxcan Boundary 
Survey, 1848-1853," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 62 
(October 1958):164.
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Fe since it controlled the most practical route to Cali­
fornia.
As soon as Texas Governor J. Pinckney Henderson 
learned of the occupation in New Mexico, he sent a letter 
of protest to the Federal Government asserting the exclusive 
and unquestionable right of Texas both to the soil and to 
the jurisdiction in that region. He received assurance that 
Texas rights would be respected and that the provisional 
government was temporary but the Federal Government took 
no immediate action.
By the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, concluded on Feb­
ruary 2, 1848, Mexico relinquished all of the territory 
claimed by Texas. Therefore the boundary of Texas was no 
longer open to diplomatic negotiation.
The second governor of Texas, George T. Wood, sent 
letters of protest to President Polk and General Zachary 
Taylor but received no reply. Governor Wood was incensed 
at their treatment and in November, 1849 asked the third 
legislature for ample power to defend the rights to this 
territory with the whole resources of the state. Wood also 
threatened disunion.
The third governor of Texas, P. H. Bell, was equally 
emphatic that the rights of Texas be maintained. In April, 
1850 Governor Bell appointed a commissioner, R. S. Neighbors, 
to organize the counties of Presidio, El Paso, Worth, and 
Santa Fe. Federal officers again opposed a representative 
of Texas at every point. In June the governor again protested
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to the president but, receiving no reply, reported the situ­
ation to the people and called the legislature to convene 
in August to decide what action Texas should take.4
Meanwhile, in the U.S. Congress, the disposition of 
the acquired Mexican territory furnished the occasion for 
the impassioned debates on the Wilmot Proviso which paved 
the way for the angry contest over the Texas-New Mexico 
boundary. The dispute was important because it assumed the 
proportions of a national problem. Texas had been admitted 
as a slave state, but that portion of its territory lying 
north of 36°3O', when made into a separate state, was to 
become a free state. If the limits claimed by the state 
were not changed, it was possible to carry slavery as far 
north as the forty-second parallel of north latitude. This 
action would repeal the Missouri Compromise as far as Texas 
was concerned.
In February, 1850 Henry Clay had added to the contro­
versy when he presented his compromise bill which included 
a resolution proposing that the Federal Government assume 
the debts of Texas if she relinquished the claim to the New 
Mexico territory. The states' rights men throughout Texas
4
Seymour V. Connor, Adventure in Glory (Austin, Texas: 
Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965), pp. 235-253; Frank W. Johnson,
A History of Texas and Texans, 5 vols. (Chicago: The American 
Historical Society, 1914), 1:449-497; Ledbetter, "Slavery, 
Fear, and Disunion in the Lone Star State," pp. 74-76; Robert 
Kingsley Peters, "Texas: Annexation to Secession" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1977), pp. 46- 
63; and Ralph W. Steen, History of Texas (Austin, Texas:
The Steck Company, 1939), pp. 255-258.
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Texas and the South stood firmly behind Calhoun in his ob­
jections to the Compromise Bill.
The anti-slavery forces in Congress wanted not only 
to forbid the extension of slavery into the newly acquired 
territory, but to reduce the area of Texas as much as possi­
ble, thereby converting to free soil a portion of the area 
acquired by annexation. These efforts of the anti-slavery 
group brought to Texas the support of her sister slave states 
and gave the states' rights men renewed encouragement.
On June 3, 1850, a convention of southern states, in­
cluding Texas, met in Nashville, Tennessee, to discuss 
southern grievances, to draw up methods to stop northern 
aggression and to issue ultimatums accompanied by a threat 
of secession. The Nashville, or Southern, Convention de­
veloped from John C. Calhoun's attempts to unite the slave 
states against northern anti-slavery agitation. The Conven­
tion espoused the cause of Texas and recognized the terri­
torial controversy as the major issue in the question of 
future southern rights.^
The resolutions passed by the Convention justified 
the legal right of Texas to the territory claimed. Resolu­
tion sixteen declared that it was the duty of the whole 
South to oppose the "northern fanatics" who were attempting
5Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 57- 
103; Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and 
Compromise of 1850 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1964), pp. 1-9, 110-138; Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Dis­
union in the Lone Star State," pp. 64-74, 76-77; and Peters, 
"Texas: Annexation to Secession," pp. 63-69.
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to rob Texas of territory that was rightfully hers.6 Reso­
lution seventeen stated that the South had the like right 
to expect that Texas would not accept any sum of money for
the territory and thus allow the enemy to establish a
7
stronghold of abolition.
The Nashville resolutions and Governor Bell's report 
to the people on the Santa Fe situation became known to 
Texans at about the same time. The majority of Texans were 
aroused but were not prepared for disunion and therefore 
were either apathetic toward or opposed to the resolutions 
passed in Nashville. Sam Houston, now a Texas senator and 
a staunch Union supporter, had opposed Calhoun's "Southern 
Address" and now fought publicly against the resolutions. 
Strongly favoring Calhoun's ideas for creating a militant 
slave states' party and the Nashville resolutions, Roberts 
and the other states' rights extremists instigated indigna-
O
tion meetings throughout the state.
Roberts later justified the meetings. He stated that 
the northern people were "clamoring for free-soil territory 
upon a moral sentiment, clamoring for the prevention of the
6"The Nashville Resolutions," San Augustine (Texas) 
Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850, p. 1.
^Ibid.
o
Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone 
Star State," p. 69, and Oran Milo Roberts, "The Political, 
Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas For Its First 
Fifty Years of Statehood, 1845-1895," in A Comprehensive 
History of Texas, 1685-1897, ed. Dudley G. Wooten, 2 vols. 
(Dallas, Texas: William G. Scarrf, 1898), 2:27-29.
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sale of slaves in the District of Columbia, and clamoring 
against Texas, damaging its rights to the territory held 
by military authority." Therefore Texans held "an intense 
apprehension that a great wrong was about to be inflicted 
upon the state." He believed that the meetings were neces­
sary in order to provide for the expression of "resentful 
g
indignation." Roberts helped to organize the indignation 
meeting in San Augustine and it was there that he delivered 
his speech on the Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute.
Physical-Sociological Milieu
Subsequent to previous notice, a large public meeting 
was held at the Courthouse in San Augustine, Texas in San 
Augustine County on Friday, July 19, 1850. The purpose of 
the meeting was to consider the proper course which Texas 
should take in "the existing c r i s i s . I t  was only natural 
that Roberts gave his first political speech of any impor­
tance in San Augustine for it was there where he had lived 
since he came to Texas in 1841. He had practiced law and 
held court for many years in the very courthouse where the 
meeting was held. He was in his natural environment.
It was also appropriate that a meeting of this kind 
be held in San Augustine. Because of its location, San
9
Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 28-29.
■^San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850.
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Augustine, referred to as the "Athens of Texas," was consid­
ered the leading cultural, educational, and professional
12center of East Texas. San Augustine University, which 
Roberts helped to establish in 1842, was one of the first 
universities in Texas. It became the University of Eastern 
Texas in 1847 and was succeeded by the San Augustine Masonic 
Institute. The courts of San Augustine, in which Roberts 
had worked, played an important part in molding early Texas 
law. The Red-Land Herald, published in San Augustine, be­
came an influential voice in Texas politics and was an im-
13portant outlet for the states' rights philosophy.
The climatic conditions, agricultural development, 
and constant immigration from the older southern states con­
tributed to the establishment and practice of slavery in 
the county. The plantation system in this area was wide­
spread and the social and economic conditions were practi­
cally identical with those existing in the older slave 
14states. In 1850 the population was 3,648 of whom 1,561 
15were slaves. It was no wonder that Roberts and his states'
12Paul Bolton, Governors of Texas (Corpus Christi, 
Texas: The Corpus Christi Caller-Times, 1947), p. 1, and 
James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: Nixon- 
Jones Printing Company, 1885), p. 274.
13George L. Crocket, Two Centuries in East Texas 
(Dallas, Texas: The Southwest Press, 1932) , p. 233.
14Charles W. Ramsdell, Reconstruction in Texas (Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1910), pp. 11-12.
^T. C. Richardson, East Texas: Its History and Its 
Makers (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1926),
p. 1226.
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rights friends chose San Augustine as a place to express 
their views against the Federal Government and the North 
on the Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute.
Audience
Roberts knew well his immediate audience. Most were 
prominent leaders of the Democratic Party in East Texas and
many were lawyers and judges with whom he worked. The reso­
lutions committee was composed of some of the most influen­
tial Democrats in San Augustine County.^
By far the most prominent member of Roberts' audience 
was another San Augustinian, J. Pinckney Henderson, the 
first Governor of the state of Texas. Henderson, a native 
of North Carolina, had fought in the Mexican War while he 
was governor and had achieved the rank of major general.
In the Texas Republic, he had served as Secretary of State 
and Minister to Britain and France under Houston. Because 
of his intense pro-slavery feelings, Henderson had been the 
only Texas delegate actually to attend the Nashville Conven­
tion. After his tenure as governor in 1847, he returned
17to his private law practice in San Augustine. Henderson
16San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850,
p. 2.
17Bolton, Governors of Texas, pp. 1-2? Richardson,
East Texas, p. 1229; and Ernest Wallace, Texas in Turmoil 
(Austin, Texas: Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965), p. 32.
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was present in order to give a report on the Nashville Con-
18vention following Roberts' address.
In general Texans had expressed little interest in
the Nashville Convention. Fewer than one in one hundred
19had bothered to vote for the convention delegates. The
attitude of most Texans toward the convention was one of
20"silent inattention." The radical states' rights men like 
Roberts and Henderson, however, favored the Nashville Reso­
lutions and wanted Texas to show their public support of 
them. The Democratic Unionists, under the influence of Sam
Houston, actively opposed the convention and the resolu- 
21tions.
Because he had arranged to have his speech and the 
Nashville Resolutions published in the Red-Land Herald, 
Roberts knew that in addition to his immediate audience, 
he was speaking to the rest of Texas, the South, and the 
North. No doubt he realized that his San Augustine audience 
was a great deal more friendly toward his thesis than was 
his larger audience. Therefore, following the practice of 
an agitator as described by McEdwards, Roberts used this
18San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850,
p. 2.
19Randolph Campbell, "Texas and the Nashville Conven­
tion of 1850," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 75 (July 
1972):9.
^Clarksville (Texas) Northern Standard, 13 April 1850.
21Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone 
Star State," p. 72.
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meeting of his friends and followers as "a convenient and 
free soapbox from which to prod the larger audience of the 
general public.
Roberts' Rhetorical Goals
In his speech, Roberts stated that his purpose and
the object of the San Augustine meeting was "to take into
consideration the proper course to be pursued by Texas in
23the present crisis." Actually Roberts had decided already
what the proper course of Texas should be and what he wanted
the meeting to accomplish. Probably it was Roberts who had
written the resolutions ready at hand for the resolutions
24committee to present.
Roberts later explained that because of the unjust
treatment of Texas by the Federal Government in the boundary
dispute and the unjust advantage the northern anti-slavery
forces took of the situation, he felt "that a demonstration,
however unequal to that of the United States, was necessary
to make an issue that would attract the attention of the
25whole country for its settlement." Roberts made his
22Mary McEdwards, "Agitative Rhetoric: Its Nature and 
Effect," Western Speech 32 (Winter 1968):38.
23Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," in San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 
1850, p. 1.
24Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. 
Roberts" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 
1932), p. 61.
25Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 28.
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immediate goal to express publicly his "resentful indigna­
tion" toward the U. S. government and the North and to gather 
support for the Nashville Resolutions, thereby solidifying 
Texans and southern slavccrats into a unified force to be 
reckoned with. He believed that this demonstration of unity 
and the threats of secession might influence the President 
to withdraw the federal troops in Santa Fe. If this could 
be effected, then his long range goal of extending slavery 
and stopping free-soilism could be achieved.
Roberts may also have had a less obvious rhetorical 
goal. He may have used the San Agustine address.,as;.an ear­
ly opportunity to present himself as a viable candidate who 
could speak for all of the people of East Texas. Toberts 
had previously foresworn any ambition for political office.
In 1851, however, just eight months after the San Agustine
meeting, he officially declared himself a candidate for Con-
2 6gress from the Eastern District of Texas.
Strategies
Petition
Roberts and the other radical Texans realized that 
they could not resort to the more drastic strategies which 
would lead to secession and possibly to civil war unless 
they could first show an attempt at communicating through 
normal channels. Otherwise, by showing that petition had 
not occurred, the Federal Government could discredit them
2 6San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 15 March 1851.
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as "irresponsible firebrands" who rejected "the normal de­
cision-making processes in favor of disturbance and disrup- 
27tion.” No matter how unlikely it was that the Federal 
Government would adjust or capitulate to their petitions, 
Roberts probably knew that, in a show of reasonableness, 
they must make the effort. They must prove that they had 
met with avoidance and suppression in their efforts at sup­
plication. If Roberts and his friends could show that the 
pleas and requests of Texans and southerners were not heeded, 
they could build support for their more drastic strategies.
Roberts used petition in his speech in two ways.
First he reminded the audience that not only had the gover­
nors of Texas used petition but Texas senators and repre­
sentatives in Congress had attempted through legal channels,
to vindicate her claim for quite some time and that "logical
28defense of this sort has been exhausted." Roberts thereby 
attached his support and reinforced the case already pre­
sented by the governors and congressmen.
Secondly Roberts offered two alternatives for settling 
the dispute equitably, the first of which he obviously 
favored:
First, let the general government, by direct action, 
remove every impediment now existing or supposed in
27John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric 
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 17.
28Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 1.
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all our territory to its free occupation by any 
citizen of this union with any property capital 
and industrial habits which he may choose to in­
troduce there. Thus the people would have the 
opportunity of enjoying their property together 
in common until they could build up states with 
such domestic institutions as would suit their 
own interests and inclinations. These states 
should then be admitted into the Union without 
any question other than that required by the 
Constitution.2 9
In an apparent attempt to appear objective and conciliatory,
Roberts presented a second proposal:
Or, secondly, . . . the government should at once 
make an equitable division of the common property 
by a line east and west to the Pacific from the 
states— allowing the citizen to settle either side 
of the line according to his discretion; but with 
a full guarantee to those south of the line that 
slavery may exist until states are formed and de­
termine this question for themselves. . . . The 
South should demand of the government to do us 
ample justice by its action before another state 
shall be severed from the common territory and 
admitted into the Union.3
Roberts showed his prejudice against the second alternative
when he prefaced it by stating that it could be considered
"if this newly acquired disgust and prejudice of the North
towards an association with Africans, African slaves, and
31slave owners must be humoured."
Many Texans who could not yet accept the idea of seces­
sion from the Union were earnest in their use of petition
32and were open to compromise. Roberts and his states'
29
Ibid.
30Ibid., p. 2 
Ibid.
32Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion m  the Lone 
Star State," p. 72-73.
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rights cohorts, however, knew what they wanted and what they
were willing to do to get it. They supported Governor Wood
when he proclaimed:
Every inch of that territory belongs to our state 
and we will defend it to the last extremity and, 
if surrendered, it must be when Texas has no sol­
diers to defend it. There will be no messenger 
. of her defeat.
What appears to be petition in Roberts' address, then, may
be a ploy or pretended use of logical and normal channels
in order to pave the way for other strategies.
Promulgation
Having met with avoidance and suppression by the Fed­
eral Government, Roberts and the Texas pro-slavery forces 
progressed to the strategy of promulgation. They used two 
tactics: mass protest meetings and exploitation of mass 
media (the newspapers).
Throughout 1849-1850 the Texas Democrats held protest 
meetings to express their objections to the Wilmot Proviso, 
the Free-Soil Movement, Clay's Compromise Bill, the federal 
troops in Santa Fe and the "hostile" attitudes of the North 
and the Federal Government in general. In a number of these
meetings Texans threatened armed resistance and secession
34if thexr states' rights were violated.
The protest meetings began in Austin and spread 
throughout the state. A meeting in Marshall was organized
33Bolton, Governors of Texas, p. 3.
34Connor, Adventure in Glory, p. 150.
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by Louis T. Wigfall, thought by some to be "the most rabid 
states' rights man in the Lone Star State."'*5 Wigfall took 
it upon himself to send the Marshall resolutions to John C. 
Calhoun for his approval. Those state sovereignty resolu­
tions called public attention to southern rights under the
Constitution and attacked Senator Houston for not defending 
36those rights. At such a meeting in San Augustine in July,
07
1850, Roberts delivered his "indignation" address.
Since the newspapers could reach a larger general pub­
lic than public meetings, Roberts and the pro-slavery Texans 
also used the media to spread their states' rights views. 
They accomplished their campaign through the friendly Texas
newspapers including the San Augustine Red-Land Herald which
38supported Roberts and the Marshall Texas Republican which
39supported Wigfall. The Austin Texas State Gazette, the
Clarksville Northern Standard, the Houston Gazette, and the
40Houston Telegraph also helped to spread their message.
The Houston Telegraph, the oldest and perhaps most
35Alvy L. King, Louis T. Wigfall (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 53-54.
36Ibid.
37San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850.
3 8Bailey, "Life and Public Career of 0. M. Roberts,"
p. 59.
39King, Louis T. Wigfall, p. 61.
^Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, p. 18.
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extensively read newspaper at the time, summarized the
states' rights stand promulgated through the newspapers.
Texas must assert her claim to her whole limits, 
as defined by her statutes previous to annexation, 
or she can no longer be entitled to the rank of . 
a sovereign state. . . . The title of Texas to 
Santa Fe was as valid as its title to Port Isabel,
Laredo and the intermediate towns on the Rio Grande.
. . . Texas will maintain her rights. If the gen­
eral government assumes the position of Mexico 
(before annexation), Texas will be at war with 
her. The result is inevitable. . . .  We are con­
fident that the people of Texas will to a man sus­
tain them (Governor Wood's recommendations) with 
the whole resources of the State. The banner of 
the Lone Star shall again be unfurled— not for 
offense, but for defense, and those who are fore­
most to cry aloud for annexation will be foremost 
to sever the country from the Union that embraces 
but to crush and destroy.41
The staging of mass protest meetings and the capitali­
zation of the newspaper campaign helped to keep the agita­
tion alive and to plant the seed of secession as an alter­
native to submission to federal acts. By employing the tac­
tics of promulgation, Roberts and his group tried to win more
public acceptance of their "ideology, system of values and
42beliefs, and policies."
Image Building^
Brembeck and Howell suggest that the major contribut­
ing factors to a speaker's credibility are the prior knowl­
edge of or experience with the source, the content of the
^ Houston (Texas) Telegraph, December 1849 as found 
in Johnson, A History of Texas and Texans, p. 496.
42Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol , P. 18.
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message, and the similarity between the source and the re- 
43
ceivers. Roberts enhanced his credibility and added to 
his image by his status, by his speech, and by the interac­
tion between him and his audience.
During his travels as a lawyer and a district judge, 
Roberts had "observed the character and habits of the people 
of all classes and occupations . . . which afforded him a 
knowledge of the wants and wishes of the people."44 He not 
only knew his listeners well, but he knew that they also re­
spected him. He had been the first judge of the Fifth District
of Texas which had "required legal talent and judicial capa-
45city of the highest order."
While on the district bench, he had become acquainted
with members of the bar and also with men of the jury. He
later recorded an extensive list of lawyers, several of whom
were at the San Augustine meeting, who had practiced before
46him and whom he considered to be his friends. One contem­
porary account described Roberts' reputation:
His urbanity to the gentlemen of the Bar, the jury, 
and the parties litigant has never failed to secure 
respect. In his social intercourse with our citizens,
Judge Roberts has won general esteem. He will leave 
behind him a host of friends, and— so far as we know
43Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persua­
sion: A Means of Social Influence, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 255-267.
44Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 276.
45Ibid., p. 277.
46Roberts, Diplomas, Law Licenses, etc., Roberts Papers, 
Archives, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
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— not a single enemy. We are not wont to flatter, 
and would scorn to deal in fulsome, sycophantic, 
unmerited adulation. What we have said is, in 
our opinion, justly due to a modest and worthy 
man.47
Another contemporary, Judge R. T. Wheeler, attesting to 
Roberts' esteem, wrote: "I hear of your increasing reputa­
tion with as much pride and satisfaction as if it were my 
own. I often hear your conduct put in contrast with that
A Q
of other judges in a manner exceedingly favorable to you."
In an attempt to enhance further his credibility and
establish honorable motives, Roberts told his audience that
the issue was so important that he felt that it was his duty
to speak out. He asserted:
Were this a mere party question of politics I would 
have to decline the request of my fellow citizens 
to participate in it, but being national in its 
character— involving some of our dearest rights 
as citizens of Texas, and as citizens of this 
glorious confederacy of states, I do not feel my­
self warranted in withholding my views when thus
solicited.49
With this statement Roberts also glorified himself by indi­
rectly reminding his listeners that because of his position 
as a judge, he did not involve himself with mere party ques­
tions of politics. He also reminded them that he was soli­
cited by his fellow citizens inferring that a large number
47Partial editorial as found in Roberts, Scrap-Book, 
1848-1891, Roberts Papers.
48R. T. Wheeler to Roberts, 23 February 1847, Roberts
Papers.
49Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 1.
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of people were anxious to hear his views on the issue. He 
further portrayed himself as a national man as well as a 
state man when he said that the issue involved some of their 
dearest rights as both Texans and U.S. citizens and when he 
compared himself with such great men as Washington, Madison, 
Rutledge, and S h e r m a n . I n  so doing, Roberts reinforced 
the necessary traits of "competence and trustworthiness" de­
scribed by Monroe and Ehninger^1 or "expertness and trust-
52worthiness" described by Brembeck and Howell.
In conclusions to his speech, Roberts again stressed 
his objectivity and concern for the truth. He also implied 
that he was a leader who could think and speak for the peo­
ple. He said:
I present these views of your rights and duties 
as Texans and American citizens, being the result 
of my most measured reflection, not formed with 
reference to party doctrines or party considerations, 
but under the most painful anxiety to seek the 
truth— to ascertain and defend our rights, and 
to aid in preserving the U n i o n . 53
Even if he had not come to the occasion with an excel­
lent reputation, Roberts emphasized that he was a man of 
good character and good will. Because he held high status, 
because he reinforced his image, and because he shared
50Ibid., p. 2.
^Alan H. Monroe and Douglas Ehninger, Principles of 
Speech Communication, 6th brief ed. (Glenview, Illinois: 
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1969), pp. 339-341.
52Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 256.
^Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 2.
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similar attitudes and interests with his immediate audience, 
Roberts accomplished the "high quality interaction" es­
poused by Brembeck and Howell as integral to credibility.54
Objectification
Both the strategies of vilification, or individual
blame, and objectification, or group blame, are generally
55found in agitative rhetoric. However, perhaps in an ef­
fort to maintain his dignity and remain above reproach, 
Roberts did not employ the strategy of vilification. He 
preferred instead to use the similar tactic of objectifica­
tion to degrade and stigmatize the opposition. Instead 
of calling individual names, he placed the blame for the 
current crisis on the Federal Government and the people 
of the North, especially those involved in the Free-Soil 
Movement. He used such terms as "the general government," 
"northerners," "the North," "free-soilism," and "the pro­
gressive influence which have produced the state of things"
56to stigmatize the targets of his objectification.
Echoing John C. Calhoun's sentiments in his March 4, 
1850 speech on Clay's Compromise Bill, that it was the 
northern agitators and not the slaveholders who were
54Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, pp. 184-185.
55Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 26-34.
55Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 2.
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57responsible, Roberts proclaimed that in case a conflict 
between the North and the South should occur, the aggres­
sions of the North would be cause. He shifted the blame 
to the opposition when he stated that "if such a thing 
should happen, it would emanate from the dominant propagan­
dist spirit of the North, inimical to our domestic institu- 
58tions." Roberts continued to attribute the blame to the
Federal Government, the "progressive" North, and the Wilmot
Proviso for any future confrontation when he argued:
The state of things now existing and being proposed 
in New Mexico, California, Oregon, Minnesota, and 
other portions of our public territory, together 
with the progressive influence which have produced 
the state of things, will, if acquiesced in and 
tolerated by Texas and her sister states, as cer­
tainly lead to the result [a North-South conflict] 
as the Wilmot Proviso or any other direct action 
of the government.59
At another point Roberts censured the advocates of 
free-soilism for attempting to deprive the South of equal 
benefits of the New Mexico territory. He indirectly ac­
cused the free-soilers of having selfish motives when he 
stated:
Removing the obstacles to free-soilism from every 
foot of territory north and west of Texas . . .
57John C. Calhoun, "Speech on the Slavery Question," 
The Works of John C. Calhoun, ed. Richard K. Crall£, 6 vols. 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1888), 4:543-544.
5 8Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 1.
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would, in its practical effects, exclude the citi­
zens of the South from an equal participation in
its benefits.60
In his later historical explanation of the territorial
dispute, Roberts reaffirmed his belief that the North and
not the people of Texas were to blame in the dispute. In
his history of Texas written in 1898 he stated:
If the government should afterwards fail to sur­
render that part of her territory to Texas, it 
would be from a want of confidence in the good 
faith of Texas in complying with her assumed ob­
ligation, or from a disposition to gratify the 
free-soil sentiment, or from both considerations 
operating together to the prejudice of the rights 
of Texas.®1
Being a true states' rights man, Roberts never equivocated 
in his objectification of the North. He would always be­
lieve that "there was a settled design to withhold the terri­
tory from Texas," that "Congress had long been pressed by 
the North in order to make more free States, so as to in­
crease their power in the government" and that the North 
saw that "an opportunity existed of accomplishing this in 
the territory acquired from Mexico." He believed that it
was "that consideration which enlisted most of the Northern
62States against our claim on political ground."
60Ibid.
61Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 23.
62Ibid.
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Legitimation
Roberts used the strategy of legitimation in his ef­
fort to "explain, vindicate, and justify"63 his and his 
followers'; actions in the dispute and any future actions 
which may come about as a result of the opponents' avoidance 
and aggression in the matter. He accomplished this goal 
in three ways. First he referred to the previous efforts 
of Texas governors and congressmen: "Our claim has been
vindicated by our Governors and our Representatives and
64Senators in Congress." Then he showed how these petitions 
had been avoided by the Federal Government: "They received 
no reply. . . . Efforts of this sort have been exhausted."6  ^
Secondly he referred to "the aggression of the federal 
troops" in the disputed territory inferring that any reac­
tion from the South would be retaliatory and defensive,
66taken only after provocation from the Federal Government. 
Thirdly he relied on consitutional law to justify the Texas 
claim to the territory in question.
Being a lawyer and a judge, Roberts relied most exten­
sively on his knowledge of constitutional law to legitima­
tize the claim. He contended that the territory was the 
common property of all of the people of the Union and that
^Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 40.
64Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary
Dispute," p. 1.
65Ibid.
66Ibid.
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if Texas' claim was originally legal then it was still le­
gal. He justified the right of Texas to take slavery into 
the territory and answered the anti-slavery free-soilers:
The constitution regards this territory as proper­
ty of the United States— common property of all 
the citizens of the Union, politically confederated.
All have an equal right and should have an equal 
opportunity to enjoy it. It is a species of prop­
erty whose value cannot be realized by sale and 
division of the proceeds in money amongst the states 
or citizens of the Union. . . . The true value of 
the territory can only be realized through its occu­
pation by the citizens of this Union.67
He then reasoned from this premise that "while it thus re­
mains common property" no citizen should "be subjected to 
a total change in his habits of life, his mode of industry,
C Q
and his capital." He then claimed "that if the right 
of Texas to this territory were at all doubtful originally 
it is not now fitting for the United States to dispute it.'^9 
In 1898 he reiterated his 1850 "legal" justification 
that the Constitution was the law to be followed in the 
dispute and that the United States had "no power to change 
and curtail the boundary-line as claimed by Texas when all
70claim of Mexico to the territory was extinguished by war."
He also justified their preparation for violence by stating 
that it should not have been surprising "that the people of
67Ibid.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 22.
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Texas very soon became thoroughly aroused to the protection
of their rights by the adoption of such means as were in
71their power as a State in the Union." Here he legitima­
tized the fact that Governors Henderson, Wood and Bell had
vowed to use whatever measures were necessary for the occu-
10patxon of Santa Fe with whatever force it took.
Roberts had a keen, legal mind and knew the Constitu­
tion well. His regional biases, however, led him always 
to interpret that law from a strict constructionist view.
Mythication
Although Roberts did not employ the strategy of myth­
ication as profusely at this time as he did in his later 
speeches, he did use history as an instrument to claim that 
precedent and truth were on his side. Roberts regarded
white southerners as what Smith calls "the chosen people,
73the saviors, and the beautiful."
Roberts assured his audience that the truth was on 
their side because they, and not the northerners, were the 
upholders of the Constitution and the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo. He exalted his audience by comparing their patri­
otic actions to those of the Founding Fathers. He stated 
that it was the Texans who were the true Americans because 
they were "scrupulously preserving the rights and political
71Ibid., p. 23.
72Johnson, A History of Texas and Texans, p. 497.
73Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 37.
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equality of all its members in the same vigour and purity
as when Washington, Madison, Rutledge, Sherman, and its
other founders, standing side by side, shaped it by their
wisdom and infused into it the brotherly affection of their
74patr iotic hearts."
Roberts did not use the words "white superiority" 
in this speech but stood firmly on the principle. He be­
lieved that the black man was clearly inferior and that 
the white man had every right to enslave him for the white 
man's own benefit. When Roberts spoke of "men," he was 
speaking of white men. He referred to black men as "Afri­
cans," "African slaves," "property," "capital," "domestic 
institution" or just "slaves."
Just as Roberts used "men" to stand for white men, 
he used "patriots" to symbolize southern white men. He 
glorified the southern white race by referring to those
chosen people as "the true patriots," "true American citi-
75zens," and "a great people famous among men. Roberts 
invoked myths for his audience through emotionalized histor­
ical links in order to intensify their commitment to the 
states' rights cause.
Solidification 
Roberts tried to reinforce the cohesiveness of his
followers primarily through appeals to fear and pride. He
^Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 2.
75Ibid., pp. 1-2, passim.
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pointed out what Texans, and by extension southerners, had
to lose by giving up their rights to the disputed land even
through sale. He warned:
What you gain as Texans, you will lose as citi­
zens of the Union— not in money, but in rights much 
dearer to us. What would be the consequence of 
this sale: The immediate and direct consequence
affecting you as Texans would be the establishment 
of a free state in New Mexico, reaching down to 
34° North Latitude upon the very borders of your 
settlements.76
Perhaps thinking of his larger audience also, he attempted 
to solidify all slave owners as he continued to appeal to 
their fears:
Are you prepared for this? Would you not lose as 
much by the insecurity of your slave property as 
you would gain by a good bargain in the sale of 
your lands?77
Throughout the speech he tried to unify his listeners 
by appealing to their sense of justice and pride. He told 
them that even though the Union is worth preserving, "that 
union is not to be perpetuated by the submissive degrada­
tion of a citizen, a state, or a section." He stated that
to submit would be "the most palpable and gross injustice
7 8to the South" and that "Tamely to yield is disgraceful."
Perhaps Roberts' greatest effort at solidification 
came when he tried to rally support for the Nashville reso­
lutions and thereby ionite Texans even more closely with
76Ibid., p. 1.
77Ibid.
78Ibid.
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79the other southern states. Using the "bandwagon appeal,"
he entreated the Texans to join the South and to follow
the lead which "the Nashville patriots" had taken:
The Nashville convention has claimed for your occu­
pation south of 36°30'/ which, is not more than one- 
fourth of all the public domain. . . . These Nash­
ville patriots have claimed less than you are truly 
entitled to from a thrilling desire to preserve 
the harmony of the nation. How then can you„fail 
to support the claim they have made for us?
Eere Roberts was reinforcing the solidification efforts
of the Nashville convention delegates who had vowed to give
Texas "the assurance of cordial and resolute support from
81every slaveholding state." Roberts and the other more 
devout states' rights men in Texas were solidly behind the 
Nashville resolutions. But they knew that they must effect 
a more significant show of unity among a majority of citi­
zens in order to pose a real threat to the North. This 
was Roberts' major purpose in the speech.
In 1850 the secessionists were in the first stages 
of agitation. They had not developed the symbols, in-group 
publications, and slogans which they would utilize in 1860 
after ten years of "irritation" and "aggravation." In 1850 
they relied on the Lone Star Flag as their major symbol 
and "state sovereignty" as their major slogan. Their in­
group publications were the pro-states' rights newspapers
^Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 235.
80
Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p.2.
81"The Nashville Convention," San Augustine (Texas) 
Red-Land Herald, 27 July 1850, p.l.
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such as the Texas State Gazette, the Red-Land Herald and 
the Texas Republican.
The language which Roberts had used to dignify his 
followers also served to solidify them. He tried to unify 
them by referring to the southerners as "patriots," "true 
Americans," and "great" and "famous" people as opposed to 
"fanatics" and "Northerners" with a "progressive influence" 
and a "domineering and presumptuous spirit." Here again, 
by using favorable terms, he attempted to increase the co­
hesiveness of his supporters in order to gain their approval 
of the Nashville resolutions.
Polarization
In his attempt to move uncommitted Texans into the 
active ranks of the states’ rights group, Roberts continu­
ally polarized the North and the South in order to force 
the disinterested into making a choice. To accomplish this 
end he used two main tactics: the exploitation of a "flag 
issue" and the exploitation of a "flag group or organiza­
tion."
Roberts chose not to develop the complex issues in­
volving the balance of power between the Federal Government 
and the states or the moral right to hold slaves. Even 
when he expounded on the issue of the legal rights of Texas 
to the land in question, he was leading to a more emotional 
flag issue. The flag issue which Roberts used to induct
82Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, p. 27.
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those who might be sympathetic, but uncommitted was argued 
as follows: It is a moral and economic injustice to take 
from us, forcibly and against our will, the land that is 
rightfully ours. With this claim, he pointed out the im­
morality, injustice, and aggression of the federal action 
and the economic effect that the prohibition of slavery 
in the territories would have on Texas and the South. To 
lead to his flag issue Roberts continually used the terms 
"rights" and "injustice." He also stated that the present 
situation was designed to "exclude the citizens of the 
South" from the economic benefits of the territory, that 
the Texans were having to disgracefully "yield their rights 
as a sacrafise [sic] to that domineering and presumptious
spirit," and that it "would be unjust and humiliating" if
83"the Southerner be required to abandon his slaves."
Whether his flag issue was based on fact mattered not. Smith
states that "agitations are often made on what people be-
84lieve reality to be."
Bowers and Ochs explain that if the agitator can eli­
cit a strong reaction to the emotionally charged flag issue,
then he can further recruit the uncommitted by condemning
85a flag group or organization. Roberts achieved this goal
83Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 2
84Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 31.
85Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, p. 27.
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primarily through the use of objectification as explained by 
86
Smith and discussed in a preceding section of this paper. 
Roberts portrayed the target organization (the Federal Gov­
ernment) as militant, unfair aggressors and the target group 
(the northern free-soilers who were influencing the govern­
ment) as arrogant, selfish propagandists. These were groups 
not to be emulated or followed.
Hoping to woo neutral or uncommitted Texans, then, 
Roberts gave them a choice by polarizing the North and the 
South. They could either "tamely submit" to the "northern
fanatics" or they could join the ranks of the "true American 
87citizens." To Roberts the choice was obvious, and he 
presented the alternatives so that the choice would be ob­
vious to his uncommitted listeners (or readers).
Escalation/Confrontation
Governor Wood was the first Texas leader to threaten
violence over the boundary dispute, vowing that he would
88use "the whole power and resources of the state." Governor
Bell followed with threats to use "such measures as are
necessary for the occupation of Santa Fe with a force ample
89to quell the rebelious spirit now prevailing there."
86Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, pp. 29-33.
87Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 2.
88Johnson, A History of Texas and Texans, p. 496.
89Ibid., p. 497.
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Roberts and other states' rights leaders followed with more 
agitative rhetoric in the hope of goading the Federal Govern­
ment into either capitulation or violence. To Roberts there 
was no middle ground. Others in the North and the South 
were open to adjustment and compromise through the sale 
of the territory, but not the rabid states' rights men. 
Because of the slavery issue, they wanted full jurisdiction 
over the territory and they were willing to fight for it 
if necessary.
The Federal Government under Presidents Polk and Tay­
lor and the Free-Soil Party of the North were just as deter­
mined as the southern slavocrats. Taylor was especially
anti-Texas and had no intention of permitting the Texans
90to acquire New Mexico. Most of the free-soil advocates,
"an enthusiastic throng of antislavery leaders," were com­
mitted not only to the containment of slavery, as their 
name suggests, but to the eventual destruction of that prac­
tice which was so abhorrent to them. Through their plat­
form, they were determined to convince the President and 
Congress that it was the duty of the Federal Government
to relieve itself of all responsibility for the existence
91or continuance of slavery. Roberts and the Texans indeed 
had an active opposition.
90Connor, Adventure in Glory, pp. 250-251.
91Norman A. Graebner, ed., Politics and the Crisis of 
1860 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 
p. 13.
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In the San Augustine address, Roberts escalated the
existing tension by utilizing the tactic of "threatened
disruption" as described by Bowers and Ochs.92 Smith also
refers to this tactic when he explains that an agitator
often has only to threaten a provocation in order to cause
93the opposition to respond vigorously. Roberts threatened 
disruption when he warned that "it is time for action" and 
"delay will prove fatal." He explained: "The people of 
Texas must decide: admit false claim for fourteen years 
or dare to maintain their rights by all means in their pow­
er." He continued to support the governor's threats when 
he stated: "The people should respond to the governor's 
call and at once furnish him with ample means to take pos- 
ession of and organize the territory under our laws" and 
"The South should demand of the government to do us ample
justice by its action before another state shall be severed
94from the common territory and admitted into the Union."
Roberts not only irritated the establishment by call­
ing them derogatory names and warning them of violent retal­
iation, but he also antagonized them by accusing them of 
having selfish motives. Besides calling them "presumptuous" 
and "domineering" for their anti-slavery stance, Roberts 
accused them of having less than honorable motives in trying
92Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, p. 36.
93Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 31.
Q A
Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 1
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to exclude the South from equally enjoying whatever benefits 
the new territory would yield.
Since the Nashville Resolutions were clearly anti­
government and threatened secession, his favorable refer­
ences to them also served to sting the North. Roberts' 
call for the acceptance and perpetuation of these resolu­
tions added fuel to the fire.
To amplify his threats, Roberts employed the if-then
95argument described in persuasion texts. Again Roberts
echoed Calhoun's ideas in the Senator's March 4, 1850 ad-
96dress to Congress when he stated: "If such an event [a
conflict with the North] is to happen, then the sooner we
97can make the issue and know our fate, the better."
As far as Roberts was concerned there was only one
way to avert a conflict, and that was by "the active inter-
98vention of the general government." If the government 
did not act in an acceptable manner, and within an accept­
able time, Roberts made it clear that he was prepared for 
the ultimate confrontation— war. Armed resistance to 
Roberts was not an end in itself but a means to an end.
95Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, pp. 223-227.
^Calhoun, "Speech on the Slavery Question," p. 573. 
Calhoun had stated: "If you are unwilling we should part 
in peace, tell us so, and we shall know what to do, when 
you reduce the question to submission or resistance."
97Roberts, "Speech on the Texas-New Mexico Boundary 
Dispute," p. 1.
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He appears to have followed the ethics of "the end justi-
99
fies the means." Since he viewed his goal as a just and 
noble one, war would be, to him, an ethical and honorable 
means of attaining a moral goal.
Effects
Roberts' speech in San Augustine was successful with 
his Immediate audience. He had analyzed them well and knew 
what they wanted to hear. Sicne they were a homogeneous, 
pro-slavery audience who held the judge in high esteem, 
he was able to move them.
Just as Roberts had asked them to do, his San Augus­
tine audience unanimously accepted the eight resolutions 
which expressed full support of the Nashville platform.100 
As stated in the resolutions the meeting "concurred in and 
approved the political sentiments and propositions con­
tained in the Nashville Resolutions and adopted them as 
its platform in relation to the subject matter discussed." 
The meeting pledged itself "to act upon the recommendations 
of the Nashville Convention in regard to the alienation 
of any part of Texian territory." It requested that the 
previously chosen delegates attend the next Nashville Con­
vention, that the other Texas counties hold meetings to 
give an opinion on the Nashville Convention, and that the
99Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, pp. 238-239.
100San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 27 July 
1850, p. 2.
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delegates attend the next meeting, it approved the action 
of Governor Bell in convening the legislature for the pur­
pose of carrying out his enforcement policy, asked that 
the legislators be requested to cooperate with him in every 
way for the enforcement of Texas' rights and title to the 
Santa Fe Territory, and furthermore to invite aid from the 
South if necessary to sustain Texas' claim in that terri­
tory.10* By this action Roberts' immediate rhetorical goal 
was achieved.
Roberts' use of legitimation, objectification, mythi- 
cation, solidification and image building were the tactics 
most successful with this audience. He proved he could 
justify the states' rights, pro-slavery stand with what 
his listeners accepted as logic and fact. He reinforced 
their previously held ideas that the northerners were to 
blame in the dispute and that the southerners were the real 
American patriots who were merely trying to defend what 
was rightly theirs. He was able to tie them even more close­
ly to the rest of the South through the resolutions. He 
also proved that he could be an effective spokesman for 
the states' rights Democrats and possibly an effective rep­
resentative for their cause in Congress.
It is difficult to determine what impact ex-Governor 
Henderson's presence had on the final results of the meet­
ing. He was just as well known and well liked by this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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group as was Roberts. Certainly his presence and his sup­
port contributed to Roberts' rhetorical success and to 
Robert's reputation as a states' rights leader.
Roberts' rhetorical efforts in 1850 were not as suc­
cessful with his larger audience because of several extenu­
ating circumstances. Because the Texas boundary dispute 
was directly tied to the slavery controversy, it had become 
a national as well as a state concern. Since February Clay, 
Calhoun, Webster, and other U.S. Congressmen had been de­
bating Clay's Compromise Bill including the resolution 
regarding the sale of the New Mexico land.
In September, two months after Roberts' speech in 
San Augustine, James A. Pearce, Senator from Maryland, moved 
to eliminate any reference to the New Mexico territorial 
issue from Clay's bill. He then introduced a bill which 
would establish the present boundary between Texas and New 
Mexico and in return compensate Texas with the sum of ten 
thousand dollars. This settlement was attractive to most 
Texans; if the state accepted, it would lose the disputed 
territory but would be able to pay off the large debt that 
it retained from the Republic and still hold millions of 
acres of unoccupied land in the northern and western part 
of the state. The Pearce Bill passed in late September 
and, in a popular referendum later that year, Texans accepted
the compromise by a vote of 4,400 to 1,900. Many Texans
102remained apathetic, not even voting in the referendum.
102Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, pp. 136-153.
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Roberts and the states' rights group looked upon the 
compromise as conditional and would abide by it only so 
long as the North honored the Fugitive Slave Act. Roberts 
himself called it "a sort of bribe.” He favored standing 
by the text of the resolutions adopted at San Augustine.1®3 
Disappointed over the public acceptance of the Pearce Bill, 
he and his friends still desired to "unite the South over 
the Texas question;: and continued to maintain that "each 
citizen of the Union" had the "Constitutional rights to 
enter the common territory of the United States with his 
property.n1®^
Since they were in the minority, the Texas states' 
rights Democrats were forced publicly to accept the compro­
mise. Having to accept the defeat as a historical fact, 
Roberts later described the results from his view.
Many citizens of Texas looked upon it [the Pearce 
Compromise] as a sort of bribe to surrender a prin­
ciple of right, and their feelings were wrought 
up to the highest pitch of desperation. With the 
great body of citizens, however, it was regarded 
as the best that could be done under the circum­
stances. 1®5
In gauging Roberts' effect upon the general public 
in the territorial dispute, the influence of Sam Houston 
should not be ignored. Texans still looked upon Houston
10 3Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 29.
10 4
Henry Sublett to Roberts, 13 October 1850, Roberts
Papers.
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 29.
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as the hero of San Jacinto. He was twice President of the 
Republicf was at this time one of their two U.S. senators, 
and would be their sixth governor in 1859. Because of his 
stand on the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854 and his anti-seces­
sion stand in 1860-61, Houston would lose much of his in­
fluence as the secessionists gained power. In 1850, how­
ever, Houston, who vowed to "deny the power of all the Ul- 
traists in the world to rend the union in twain," was more 
influential than were Roberts and the states' rights con­
servatives. Therefore, he was able to wield more influ­
ence on the general public during the territorial conflict.
As to his political aspirations, Roberts decided that 
perhaps the time had arrived to become involved. He was 
disappointed in the outcome of the territorial dispute, 
but he had enjoyed being in the political arena. He be­
lieved that his service on the bench and his efforts in
the dispute had enhanced his reputation among the Demo- 
107crats. In March, 1851, he announced his candidacy for 
10 8Congress. Because the compromise had been popular among 
Texans, there was a tendency to oppose any candidate who 
had not concurred in the terms of that settlement. In con­
sequence Roberts' opponents were able to use his San
^^Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1954), pp. 78-220.
^Seymore White to Roberts, 8 March 1851, Roberts
Papers.
*| A  O
San Augustine (Texas) Red-Land Herald, 15 March
1851.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
1 ()  Q
Augustine address to brand him a disunionist. He cam­
paigned actively against that charge in order to become 
a viable candidate for Congress. Still adhering to his 
southern rights philosophy but reversing his opposition 
to the compromise, he published a card of announcement 
which included the general principles on which he stood:
I am in favor of a prompt and energetic support 
of the rights of the South, by all honorable and 
consitutional means.
I am in favor of a rigid adherence to the late ad­
justment of the slavery question.
I am in favor of a retrenchment in the expenses 
of the General Government, so.far as is consistent 
with its vigorous and effective action.
It shall be my effort to prevent, so far as my 
power may extend, a recurrence of the dangerous 
excitement and angry controversy which has just 
swept over the country. H O
He disavowed any inclination toward disunion.
While I have been and am still in favor of uniting 
the South in sentiment, for the purpose of repel­
ling free soil agression, I am unequivocally op­
posed to any measure or measures which have for 
their object the dissolution of the Union. And 
while I believe that the South has lost much in 
the late compromise of the slavery question, still 
I am in favor of abiding by it as it has been set­
tled, and of holding all parts of the Union to a 
strict adherence to it. H i
Roberts' attempt to appear moderate on the subject of dis­
union did not work. His congressional aspirations were 
thwarted when the citizens of Smith County organized a
10 9Seymore White to Roberts, 25 March 1851, Roberts
Papers.
^^Clarksville (Texas) Northern Standard, 12 April
1850.
■L11Ibid., 31 May 1851.
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nominating convention in June to support Richardson Scurry. 
Scurry, heralded as the hero of the Texas Revolution, re­
ceived the backing of the more moderate John H. Reagan and 
the Smith County convention. Some of Roberts' states' 
rights friends urged him to stay in the race, but Roberts 
could see no political advantage in it. He was convinced 
that to stay in the race would mean not only defeat for him­
self but also for the Democratic Party and the success of
112the Whig candidate. Hence, he withdrew from the race.
This disappointment was bitter for Roberts because
he was ambitious. He was ambitious for promotion— to reach
outward, upward, and onward, to occupy a bigger field of
113service. Particularly he aspired to go to Congress.
Yielding again to this ambition he decided to run for Con­
gress in 1853 only to be disappointed once more. When a 
state nominating convention met in Austin in January, 1852, 
it was conrolled by the Houston wing of the party and
Roberts' friends decided to withdraw his name lest they
114do him more harm than good.
Roberts returned to his farm, his law practice, his 
old friends and his old ideas. He did not hold any political
112Roberts, "Some Account of His Aspirations for Po­
litical Life in Congress," Diploma, Law Licenses, etc., 
Roberts Papers.
113Mrs. M. E. Spain, Austin, Texas and Judge H. B. 
Short, Austin, Texas as quoted in Bailey, "The Life and 
Public Career of 0. M. Roberts," p. 73.
114E. M. Doggett to Roberts, 10 January 1852, Roberts 
Papers.
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office, other than his judicial positions, until he was 
elected President of the Texas Secession Convention in 1861.
Other than convincing his immediate audience, Roberts 
failed to achieve his rhetorical goals in the conflict of 
1850. He was unable to stop the sale of the New Mexico 
territory and free-soilism and he was unable to fulfill 
his personal ambition to be a Congressman. He did, however, 
establish himself as one of the leading spokesmen of the 
Calhoun branch of the Democratic party and set the stage 
for his future career in that party. Although he was unable 
to convince the majority of Texans that the time had come 
for secession, he was able to further polarize the North 
and South and draw the lines for future conflict. He and 
the other states* rights spokesmen had made it clear to 
the North that any attack on slavery where it existed would 
precipitate secession and they believed that the threat 
of secession would protect the southern institution of sla­
very. With their uncompromising statements they esca­
lated the tensions which would finally erupt in the violent 
confrontation of 1861.
As a result of the Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute, 
Texas became, for the first time, a member of the secession 
movement of the South and Roberts became one of its leading
^15Galveston (Texas) Weekly News, 6 May 1851.
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spokesmen. Although the movement would not reach its
full height until 1861, the seeds of secession were planted
^^Robert Kingsley Peters, "Texas: Annexation to
Secession," p. 346; and Dictionary of American Biography 
16 (1935) : 13-14.
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C H A P TE R  I V
CONFLICT: THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
KNOW-NOTHING PARTY - 1855-1857
Situation
It seemed that the year 1855 might be a relatively 
quiet year in Texas. There had been a mood of moderation 
in the state since the Compromise of 1850.1 The atmosphere 
changed rather rapidly, however, due to the sudden growth 
of the American or Know-Nothing Party known for its secrecy 
and prejudice against Catholics and foreigners. Roberts 
and the states' rights men detested the party because of 
its affiliation with southern Unionists and northern aboli­
tionists. Although the Know-Nothings held some beliefs in
2
common with the southern Democrats, the states' rights 
group looked upon them as above all a Union party and there-
3
fore a threat. Roberts explained their surprised reaction 
to the newly-formed Know-Nothing Party.
^Anna Irene Sando, "Beginnings of the Secession Move­
ment in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 18 (July 
1914):48.
2
Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Platforms of Political Par­
ties in Texas (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 
1916), pp. 69-71. The Know-Nothing Party also favored strict 
construction of the Constitution and states' rights in addi­
tion to nativism and unionism.
3
Edward R. Maher, "Secession in Texas," (Ph.D. disser­
tation, Fordham University, 1960), pp. 37-38.
9 2
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Democrats in Texas who had not been initiated into 
its mysteries were surprised to find in the early 
part of 1855 that a large body of citizens of all 
shades of political opinion had been drawn quietly 
and noiselessly into these secret societies pretty 
well all over the state. The effect of this dis­
covery upon many distinguished Democrats in Texas 
was like that of a peaceful family asleep in the 
middle of the night being awakened to find their 
house on fire. They at once aroused themselves 
to arrest its progress.
The radical Texans had kept the faith and waited. The emer­
gence of the American Party gave them the opportunity to 
renew their agitation against the North. Once again Roberts 
was in the forefront. This chapter examines the role which 
Roberts played in the campaign against the Know-Nothings 
and for the Democrats in 1855-1857, explains the strategies 
which he used to achieve his rhetorical goals, and evaluates 
the effect which he had in the campaign.
Historical-Political Background 
Following the Compromise of 1850, Texans turned their 
attention to internal problems such as railroads, waterways, 
frontier protection, and public land policy. They hoped 
that the Compromise had settled permanently the sectional 
differences over slavery, but they soon found that the 
issue would not lie dormant.^ In the mid-fifties, certain 
events and party realignments rekindled the fire.
4
Oran Milo Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and 
Judicial History of Texas for Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 
1845-1895," in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, 
ed. Dudley G. Wooten, 2 vols. (Dallas, Texas: William G. 
Scarff, 1898), 2:36.
5Billy Don Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion 
in the Lone Star State: Texans' Attitudes Toward Secession
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On January 4, 1854, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, chair­
man of the Committee on Territories, introduced a bill to 
organize the Nebraska region. Douglas needed southern sup­
port for his bill, which he could not hope to get unless 
the restriction on slavery was lifted. Surrendering to 
southern demands, Douglas amended the bill to specifically 
repeal the Missouri Compromise and to create two territories
g
— Nebraska and Kansas. Texans overwhelmingly supported 
the act as it finally passed. The southern principle had
7
won and Texans considered it "a great victory for the South." 
The act reassured the South of its power in the national
8government and its ability to control the Democratic Party. 
This attitude contributed to the relatively calm atmosphere 
in Texas between 1850 and 1855.
Although southerners regarded the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
as the final word on the issue of slavery in the territories, 
the North did not agree with their reasoning. The North 
believed that the Kansas-Nebraska Act had been maneuvered
and the Union, 1846-1861" (Ph.D. dissertation. North Texas 
State University, 1972), pp. 92-93; Maher, "Secession in 
Texas," p. 31; and Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Move­
ment in Texas," pp. 47-49.
g
Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1953), 
pp. 192-205; Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, 2 vols. (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), 2:92-100; and Harold 
S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in South Carolina, 
1852-1860 (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 
1950), pp. 58-74.
^Austin Texas State Gazette, 13 May 1854.
O
Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, pp. 302-305.
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through Congress by a few ambitious, self-seeking congress- 
mean and the slave power conspirators of the South and that 
the Missouri Compromise, a principle almost as sacred as
q
the Constitution itself, had been violated.
To the states' rights Democrats the most disturbing 
result of the Kansas-Nebraska Act was the formation of the 
Republican Party. This party would soon become as uncompro­
mising about stopping the expansion of slavery as the South 
had been about demanding its extension. The Republicans 
were unhappy with the concessions made to the slavery expan­
sionists in the Compromise of 1850, and had finally been 
pushed to the limit by the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Primarily 
because it represented containment as a step toward aboli­
tion, the party frightened most southerners.^0
The other major national party, the Whig Party, had 
never had a large following in Texas and was therefore never 
a real threat to the Democrats. After the Whig defeat in 
the presidential election of 1852 and the disintegration 
of the party on the national level, the former Whigs in 
Texas found themselves with no place to go. The Republican 
Party, into which most of the northern Whigs moved, was
g
Craven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 180-185.
^°Craven, Growth Of Southern Nationalism, pp. 187, 205; 
Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of 
the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1970), pp. 163-165, 308-317; Nevins, Ordeal
of the Union, pp. 322, 461; and Glyndon G. Van Deusen, "Why
the Republican Party Came to Power" in The Crisis of the 
Union, ed. George H. Knoles (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1965), p. 3.
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totally unacceptable to the Texas Whigs and pro-Union men 
because it was entirely a northern party. On the other hand, 
the Texas Democratic Party was too radical for them. Thus, 
because it was pro-Union, the only alternative acceptable 
to the Texas Whigs and strong Union Democrats was the emerg­
ing American Party.11 Because the Republican Party was still 
strictly a northern party and had not gained the strength 
it would have in 1860, and because the Whig Party had disin­
tegrated, Roberts and the radical Democrats used the Texas 
Know-Nothing Party through which to vent their hatred of 
the northern abolitionists.
The party which disturbed the tranquility of Texas 
politics and caused the Democrats to fight for their polit­
ical supremacy in the state was officially designated the 
Native American Party but was more commonly called the Know- 
Nothing Party because when asked, the members replied that 
they knew nothing about the party. It had originated in 
the East but made deep inroads in the South in the early 
1850s. Its greatest attraction to some southerners was its 
Unionism. Although the southern Know-Nothings were not anti­
slavery, they chose to subordinate the divisive question
12of slavery and concentrate on Unionism.
11Randolph Campbell, "The Whig Party of Texas in the 
Elections of 1848 and 1852," Southwestern Historical Quarter­
ly 73 (September 1969):17-25 and Roberts, "The Political, 
Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 36.
12Craven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 238-240; 
Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, pp. 323-332; W. Darrell Over­
dyke, The Know-Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge:
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The Texas Know-Nothings were mainly middle-aged, 
southern-born lawyers, farmers, businessmen and politicians. 
Some, like Ben Epperson of Red River, were consistent mem­
bers of the "loyal opposition." They were mostly Whig, 
Houston Independent, Constitutional Unionist, anti-secession­
ists. Many, such as Epperson, John Hancock, William Stedman, 
James W. Flanagan, and Lemuel D. Evans, were the same indi­
viduals who would later help Sam Houston lead the fight 
against secession in Texas. Geographically they lived in 
South Central Texas and the western portions of East Texas.13 
Although these men chose to concentrate on the triple issues 
of Unionism, xenophobia, and anti-Catholicism, as always,
the real issues to the states1 rights Democrats were slavery 
14and secession.
By far the most respected and the most hated Know- 
Nothing leader in Texas was Sam Houston. Roberts and the 
radical Democrats were still angry at Houston over his vote
Louisiana State University Press, 1950) , pp. 2-3, 34-35; 
and Donald W. Zacharias, "The Know-Nothing Party and the 
Oratory of Nativism," in Oratory of the Old South, ed. Waldo 
W. Braden (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1970), pp. 218-234.
13Litha Crews, "The Know Nothing Party in Texas," (M.A. 
thesis, University of Texas, 1925), pp. 3-10, 120-121; Way- 
mon L. McClellan, ”1855: The Know-Nothing Challenge in East 
Texas," East Texas Historical Journal 12 (Fall 1974): 32-44; 
Walter Prescott Webb, ed. Handbook of Texas, 2 vols. (Austin, 
Texas: The Texas State Historical Association, 1952), 1:971; 
and Ralph A. Wooster, "Analysis of Texas Know Nothings," 
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 70 (January 1967):414-424.
^Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement in 
Texas," p. 50.
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against the Kansas-Nebraska Act. They had harshly denounced 
him, accusing him of aligning with the antislavery elements 
in the country and betraying the South.15 At their next 
convention in Austin they passed a resolution which "cordial­
ly” endorsed and approved the votes of senator Thomas J.
Rusk and representatives George W. Smyth and P. H. Bell upon 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act but "most decidedly” disapproved 
of the vote of senator Sam Houston.16 When Houston affili­
ated himself with the Know-Nothings in late 1854, the south­
ern Democrats denounced him as a true traitor to Texas and
to the South and labeled him an ally to abolitionists and 
17free soilers. Houston inflamed the radical Democrats even 
further in his "Independence Letter" when he defended the 
Know-Nothings by stating: "I believe the salvation of my coun­
try is only to be secured by adherence to the principles
18of the American Order." Because Houston was a master at
stump speaking, Roberts and the other fire-eating Democrats
19considered him their number one Know-Nothing target.
15Marshall Texas Republican, 25 March 1854 and Austin 
Texas State Gazette, 13 May 1854.
16Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas,
p. 68.
17Austin Texas State Gazette, 11 August 1855 and 
Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer (Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1954), p. 238.
18Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds., The 
Writings of Sam Houston, 8 vols. (Austin, Texas: University 
of Texas Press, 1943), 6:192-199.
1^James L. Golden, "The Southern Unionists, 1850-1860" 
in Braden, Oratory in the Old South, pp. 258-290.
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Before the summer of 1855, the Democrats paid little 
attention to the Know-Nothings in Texas. In the latter part 
of 1854, brief notices of the organization of Know-Nothing 
councils appeared in the newspapers from time to time. In 
December they won the city elections in Austin and San An­
tonio. In March, 1855 they took advantage of a badly di­
vided Democratic organization in Galveston and won the may-
20or's race there. It was not until after June 11, 1855, 
that Roberts and his friends became "thoroughly aroused."
On that date the Grand Council of the Know-Nothings met at 
Washington-on-the-Brazos and secretly nominated candidates 
for state and congressional offices. They nominated Lieuten­
ant-Governor . David C. Dickson for governor. The Democrats 
immediately called a meeting on June 16, labeled the "Bomb­
shell Convention" and declared war on the Know-Nothings.
They also had to drop Dickson's name from their ballot since 
they had nominated him as their candidate for Lieutenant- 
Governor at their Democratic Convention in April at which 
time they had also nominated Governor E. M. Pease for re- 
election. This meeting denounced all secret political fac­
tions, declared the Know-Nothing Party an enemy of the gov­
ernment, pledged its support to Pease for governor and P. H. 
Bell for Congress, and described Dickson as the candidate
20Crews,."The Know Nothing Party in Texas," p. 79; 
Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 37; and 
Wooster, "Analysis of the Texas Know Nothings," p. 414.
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of another party. Two weeks later they announced the name
of H. R. Runnels for lieutenant-governor.21
Before 1855 the states' rights group in Texas had been
a more or less loosely knit group of Democrats who shared
common beliefs on slavery and state sovereignty. With the
advent of the American Party, they became more organized
and more vocal. From the summer of 1855 until the demise
of the Know-Nothing Party in 1857, Roberts and the radical
Democrats waged an active verbal campaign against Houston
22and his Know-Nothing colleagues.
The major leaders of the states' rights Democrats in
1855 were George W. Paschal, H. R. Runnels, F. R. Lubbock,
A. J. Hamilton, James Willie, A. W. Terrell, W. S. Oldham,
John W. Harris, S. 0. Sneed, R. Brownrigg, John Marshall,
J. Pinckney Henderson, Franklin W. Bowden, Louis T. Wigfall,
Malcolm D. Graham, John H. Reagan, John T. Mills, George W.
23Chilton, Mat D. Ector, Thomas J. Rusk, and Roberts. The 
factor which held together such diverse personalities as the
21Austin Texas State Gazette, 18 June 1855; Clarks­
ville (Texas) Northern Standard, 7 July 1855; Ernest Wallace, 
Texas in Turmoil (Austin, Texas: Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965), 
pp. 37-39; and Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in 
Texas, pp. 37-41, 63-64.
22Nancy A. Head, "State Rights in Texas: The Growth 
of an Idea, 1850-1860" (M.A. thesis, Rice University, 1960), 
pp. 45-53 and Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Ju­
dicial History of Texas," p. 37.
23Head, "State Rights in Texas," pp. 31-53 and Roberts, 
"The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," 
p. 38.
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moderate, Union-loving John H. Reagan24 and the rabid, fire-
25eating Louis T. Wigfall was their loyalty to the Democrat­
ic Party which stood on the doctrine of states' rights, 
strict construction of the constitution and nonintervention 
of the Federal Government on the question of slavery.26 The 
leading spokesmen who rallied the Democrats into a vocal 
states' rights association against the Know-Nothings were 
Wigfall, Reagan, Bowden, Henderson, Rusk, and Roberts.27 
In early July, Roberts and other states' rights leaders
wrote to Senator Rusk asking him to join them in taking "an
28open and bold position" in denouncing the Know-Nothings. 
Because he and Houston had served in the Senate together,
Rusk was generally hesitant about involving himself in 
fights between Houston and the states' rights Democrats.
He disapproved of the Know-Nothings, however, and contributed
24Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor: The Life of John 
H. Reagan (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962) 
and John H. Reagan, Memoirs, ed. Walter F. McCaleb (New York: 
The Neale Publishing Company, 1906).
25Donald T. Garnett, "Senatorial Speaking of Louis T. 
Wigfall, 1860-1861" (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State Uni­
versity, 1975) and Alvy King, Louis T. Wigfall (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970).
26Galveston (Texas) News, 23 June 1855 and Winkler, 
Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 64-68.
27 .King, Louis T. Wigfall, pp. 60-61; Proctor, John H. 
Reagan, pp. 90-95; and Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, 
and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 38-39. Also see Roberts 
Correspondence, 1855-1857, Roberts Papers, Archives, Univer­
sity of Texas, Austin, Texas. Note especially J. M. Clough 
to Roberts, Tuesday Evening 26 [1855].
28
Louis T. Wigfall, J. T. Mills, 0. M. Roberts,
P. Murrah, and J. P. Henderson to T. J. Rusk, 3 July 1855, 
Rusk Papers, Archives, University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
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to the campaign as much as his senatorial duties would allow. 
Rusk spoke for all of the states' rights Democrats when he 
stated:
No party can be safely trusted with power who does 
not openly avow their principles. The oaths which 
it is understood they take are illegal, tyrannical, 
and at open war with the fundamental principles 
of our government. . . .  At the north, as all elec­
tions show, they are abolitionists. At the south 
they profess to be pro-slavery men.29
These Democratic leaders began immediately to organ­
ize the campaign. Roberts described their involvement:
During the summer of 1855 there were Democratic 
mass meetings in different parts of the state, 
in some of which there were thousands of citizens 
assembled, and the best speaking talent of the 
State was called into requisition to speak against 
this new secret party and to expound the principles 
of the Democratic Party in opposition to it. This 
was the first great uprising of the people of the 
State since annexation to give their attention 
to the political questions of the day. The grand 
displays of oratory and of argument constituted, 
a source of political education, which excited 
in the people a lively interest.30
Roberts and the regular Democrats did not hesitate to "rise
to challenge them and expose to the people their abhorrent
31Know-Nothing doctrines." Naturally Roberts concentrated 
his time and energy in his home area of East Texas. During 
the slimmer of 1855, he delivered his "Speech in Opposition to
29Galveston (Texas) News, 24 July 1855; Mary Whatley 
Clarke, Thomas J. Rusk (Austin, Texas: Jenkings Publishing 
Company, 1971), p. 193; and Cleburne Guston, Towering Texan:
A Biography of Thomas J. Rusk (Waco, Texas: Texian Press,
1971), p. 155.
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 37.
^Clarksville (Texas) Northern Standard, 18 August 1855.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
103
Know-nothingism" several times in the counties of Rusk, San
32Augustine, and Harrison.
Physical-Sociological Milieu 
Typical of Roberts' speaking against the Know-Nothings 
was his speech given at the Rusk County Courthouse in Hender­
son, Texas on August 24.33 Just as in 1850, Roberts was 
comforatble in this environment. He had held court in the
Rusk County Courthouse since he had been elected district 
34judge in 1846. In fact Roberts had moved from San Augus­
tine to Henderson in the fall of 1854.33
Rusk County, very much like its neighbor San Augustine 
County, was also in the cotton belt and populated by many 
persons from South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri. 
In 1855 it had hundreds of plantations. Its slave population
was 3,620, and there were more slaves than horses. It was
36second only to Harrison County in the number of slaves.
32
Handwritten note by Roberts on p. 1 of handwritten 
speech text, Roberts Papers and Austin Texas State Gazette,
16 September 1855.
34James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: 
Nixon-Jones Printing Company, 1885), p. 276.
35J. M. Ardrey to Roberts, 24 December 1854, Roberts 
Papers. Roberts lived in Henderson until he moved back to 
his farm near San Augustine in December, 1855.
36T. C. Richardson, East Texas: Its History and Its 
Makers (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1926),
p. 1211.
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Because of its position near the Louisiana border, it formed, 
along with San Augustine and Nacogdoches, the interior gate­
way to Texas for commerce and immigration and therefore af­
fected the positions and actions of all of T e x a s . T h e  
Wire Road, running across the county northeast to southwest, 
was a busy thoroughfare with regular stagecoach lines carry­
ing freight and passengers from Marshall and Jefferson to
38Crockett and points south and west.
Rusk County often honored important states' rights
leaders. When the county was divided from the Nacogdoches
district in 1843, it was named after Senator Thomas J. Rusk,
who had come from South Carolina where John C. Calhoun had
helped him to secure an education and acquire his license
to practice law. Henderson, the county seat, was named after
James Pinckney Henderson, another of Roberts' friends, in 
391845.
The town of Henderson was "a place of much size and 
note, having many fine brick buildings, schoolhouses, 
churches, and other public edifices.” The Rusk County Acad­
emy, Henderson Female College, Fowler Institute, and Mount
37George L. Crocket, Two Centuries in East Texas 
(Dallas, Texas: The Southwest Press, 1939), pp. 331-353.
O O
Webb, Handbook of Texas, 2, 517.
39Zachary T. Fulmore, The History and Geography of 
Texas As Told in County Names (Austin, Texas: S. R. Fulmore, 
Publisher, 1926), pp. 85, 215; Richardson, East Texas,. 
p. 1215; and Webb, Handbook of Texas, 2:517.
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Enterprise Male and Female Academy operated there before
the Civil War.40
Roberts was again speaking in his natural environment.
It was agreed that Roberts would concentrate especially on
the counties of Rusk and San Augustine since this area was
where he had held court and where he would wield the most 
41
influence. He, no doubt, chose the courthouse because, 
like the San Augustine site, it was "unpretentious” and yet 
had a certain "grace and quiet dignity," which gave it dis­
tinction as the habitation of justice and the center of muni-
42cipal activities. This, undoubtedly, was the setting which 
Roberts preferred and which was most conducive to the digni­
fied image which he wished to convey.
Audience
Robert:* knew well his Rusk audience, composed mostly
of lawyers and other businessmen who were the Democratic
leaders of Rusk and the surrounding counties. Because his
friends M. D. Graham and Frank Bowden were also present at 
43the meeting, it is likely that they were the ones who
40Garland R. Farmer, The Realm of Rusk County (Hender­
son, Texas: The Henderson Times, 1951), pp. 3-19? Richardson, 
East Texas, pp. 1211-1217? and Dorman H. Winfrey, A History 
of Rusk County, Texas (Waco, Texas: Texian Press, 1961), 
pp. 18-37.
41J. Pinckney Henderson to John H. Reagan, 4 August 
1855, Reagan Papers, Archives, University of Texas, Austin, 
Texas.
42Crocket, Two Centuries in East Texas, p. 110.
43Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 September 1855.
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introduced Roberts perhaps pointing to the judge’s loyalty 
and service to the people of that area. Although the gather­
ing was larger than his San Augustine crowd,44the citizens 
who attended knew Roberts as their district judge and there­
fore respected him. During his travels as the fifth district 
judge, Roberts had become well acquainted with the citizens 
of Rusk and the entire area. For years they had thrown open 
their doors to extend whatever hospitality they could render 
to him and usually without charge. Their humble fare had 
been more palatable to him than the most artistic hotel 
dishes. Their universal friendliness had more than compen­
sated him for the fatigues and inconveniences of his journeys
throughout the district and he had gained a thorough knowl-
45edge of the character, habits, and wishes of the people.
Sam Houston was also popular with these East Texans.
Because of his influence, many Know-Nothing councils were
organized in the counties of East Texas. They generally
voted not for the party but for the man, and Houston could
46usually count on them. "
In addition, Texans were still unprepared for secession 
and were still unreceptive to radical threats of disunion. 
The citizens of Rusk, just as most East Texans, had been
44Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas,” p. 37.
45 ■ •
Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, p. 276.
4^Crocket, Two Centuries in East Texas, p. 332 and 
Wallace, Texas in Turmoil, p. 43.
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placated by the Kansas-Nebraska Act and were politically 
apathetic. Few of them were officially affiliated politi­
cally because the Democratic Party was not yet fully organ­
ized as a unified official party . ^  Because the area was 
a Houston stronghold and because the Know-Nothings were gain­
ing in strength, Roberts and the states' rights leaders knew 
that it was especially important to canvass the East Texas 
counties including Rusk, Harrison, and San Augustine in or­
der to turn the people there against "Old Sam" and the Know- 
48Nothings.
Roberts' Rhetorical Goals
Roberts stated in his speech that his goal in speaking
was "to set forth the facts pertaining to the situation"
and to consider "the merits of Know-nothingism as exhibited
49in its source, its affinities, and its associations." He
later explained that his purpose in speaking against the
Know-Nothings had been "to warn the people against the party
as an insidious enemy," "to arrest its progress," and "to
50expound the principles of the Democratic Party." By
47Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion, " pp. 90^-91, 
110-111 and Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, 
p. 41.
48Frank Bowden to Roberts, 22 June 1855, Roberts Papers.
49Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothmgism," 
pp. 1, 11.
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 36.
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casting the Know-Nothings in a bad light in contrast to the 
Democrats, Roberts could help recruit voters into the Demo­
cratic ranks, garner votes for Pease and Runnels (and later 
for Runnels and Lubbock), and thereby ensure the supremacy 
of the Democratic Party in Texas. By implication he could 
also continue his antagonism toward the North.
Although unstated, another of Roberts' goals in speak­
ing against the American Party was to damage Sam Houston's 
reputation. Roberts and Houston were ideologically opposite. 
Roberts was a Calhoun, states' rights, pro-secession, radical 
Democrat; Houston was a Jackson, Union, anti-secession, con­
servative Know-Nothing. Although they both believed in the 
sovereignty of Texas, Houston felt that Texas could maintain 
its independence in the Union and did not have the right 
to secede. Roberts felt that it had every right to withdraw 
if justified. Although they were political associates when 
Roberts first came to Texas,^ twelve years later they were 
now enemies. Roberts, showing his aversion for Houston, de­
scribed him as a political opportunist who won support by 
personality rather than by deeds, who named himself the cham­
pion of the Union, and who called anyone who opposed him 
a disunionist. Roberts especially criticized Houston for 
his "combativeness" and "invectiveness" and for the way "he 
ridiculed.his opponents personally with withering sarcasm,
51Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas, pp. 274-275.
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and looked down upon them, when seated to hear him, with
52a scornful contempt."
Houston's biographer Llerena Friend claimed that his 
states' rights opponents of long standing were eager to get 
in one more blow against Houston in the Know-Nothing cam­
paign "even though the instruments they used must long since 
have been blunted." She also stated that "a fight with Hous­
ton seemed to take the place of hormones or whatever was
53required for rejuvenation of aging Texas politicians."
Roberts and Houston were again on opposite sides just as 
they would be in the secession campaign of 1860 and the se­
cession convention of 1861.
Also Roberts must have realized that his active in­
volvement in the campaign against the Know-Nothings would 
make him personally more visible to Texans. Being a part 
of a successful team could do his political career no harm. 
Since he would twice more declare himself a candidate for 
Congress, he may have felt that his speaking against Know- 
Nothingism would help him in his personal aspirations for 
Congress. The Democrats knew that if they could defeat the 
Know-Nothings they could probably get Senator Houston out 
of office and then replace him with a states' rights Demo­
crat.54 Roberts also realized that both Senator Rusk and
52
Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas,” p. 46.
53Friend, Sam Houston, p. 239.
54Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement in 
Texas," pp. 51-52.
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his wife were in bad health.55 He may have been thinkinq 
of the 1857 congressional election when he went into the 
field against the Know-Nothings in 1855.
Strategies
Promulgation
In order to win public acceptance of their ideology, 
Roberts and the states' rights agitators knew that they must 
"get exposition of that ideology in a form understandable
Cg
to the public." To accomplish this goal, the states' 
rights Democrats staged hundreds of mass meetings and pro­
moted thier associations with the editors of the pro-Demo- 
cratic newspapers.
The anti-Know-Nothing campaign which began in June,
1855 was coupled with the Democratic election campaigns of 
1855-57. The Democrats concentrated on their opposition 
to Know-Nothingism primarily in the summer and fall of 1855, 
but as election time neared, they combined their purposes 
of defeating Houston and the Know-Nothings and of electing 
their presidential, gubernatorial and congressional candi­
dates. In their efforts they staged "mass meetings of democ­
racy," throughout the state. Ordinarily the states' rights 
leaders would write to the leading Democrats in the target 
county or vice-versa and arrange a well-publicized "mammoth"
^Clarke, Thomas J. Rusk, p. 20 6.
56......  John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 18.
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meeting of Democrats and interested citizens.57 At these 
meetings, they informed thousands about the tenets of the 
Know-Nothing doctrine and the principles of the Democratic 
Party.58
By far the most effective tactic in promulgating 
their Democratic principles and their arguments against the 
American Party was their utilization of the leading Texas 
newspapers. Newspaper comment in response to Houston's 
Kansas-Nebraska vote had been relatively restrained, but 
condemnation of the American Party was more vigorous. The 
major papers which aided the states' rights leaders in 
spreading their gospel were the Texas State Gazette, the 
Clarksville Northern Standard, the Marshall Republican, the 
San Antonio El Bejareno, the Richmond Texan, the Galveston 
News, the Dallas Herald, the San Antonio Texan and many other 
smaller and lesser-known papers. Four of the most influen­
tial papers were edited by staunch states' rights advocates: 
John Marshall, editor of the Gazette, M. D. Ector, editor
of the Republican, Charles De Morse, editor of the Northern
59Standard, and James W. Latimer, editor of the Herald.
57J. M. Clough to Roberts, Tuesday Evening 26 [1855], 
Roberts Papers.
58Roberts, ,:The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 36-38.
59Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 236-243; Larry J. Gage,
"The Texas Road.to Secession and War: John Marshall and the 
Texas State Gazette," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 62 
(October 1958);191-226; Maher, "Secession in Texas," pp. 
38-41; and Proctor, John H . Reagan, pp. 90-95.
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They began the campaign through their papers before the 
speakers organized and took the field. They had begun writ­
ing editorials against the Know-Nothings and Houston as early 
as June, 1854.^®
The editorials and articles were generally barbed.
The Centerville Leon Pioneer wrote, for example, that Houston 
was "Sam, that gentleman, who, in imitation of Minerva's 
favorite bird— the owl— stays housed in holes, hollows, and 
shady places during the light of day, coming out and stalk­
ing round only under the covers of mystery and darkness"
and that Houston resided "in some dark abode . . .  on the
61shady side of Whiggery . . . "  The Texas State Gazette
printed that "when he [Houston] talks of the pulsations of
the American heart, we will point to the vote of his own
town and that of his own State! The voice of America is the
62voice of its cherished Democracy." The Gazette also proph­
esied that Houston would soon meet Benton's fate because 
"the people of Texas cannot be allied to the abolitionists
63and free soilers upon the Nebraska or any other question."
The Clarksville Standard carried Roberts' accusation that 
Houston was a "man of expedients" who was "governed more
^Friend, Sam Houston, p. 236; and Austin Texas State 
Gazette, 17 June 1854.
61As quoted in Austin Texas State Gazette, 3 June 1855.
62Ibid., 12 May 1855.
^2Ibid., 11 August 1855.
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64
by policy than by principle." The Corsicana Prairie Blade
v?rote that "Houston yet goes unwhipped of political justice
yet holds his place in the Senate from a State whose inter-
65
est he has twice betrayed." A typical item in the Texas
Republican was Reagan's denunciation of the Know-Nothings:
Their proceedings are secret . . . their princi­
ples excluding all whose opinions differ from their 
own . . . .  What do you think of a party that would 
advocate the violation of the Constitution? What 
sort of consistency was there in Know-nothing doc­
trines that would deny religious and political 
liberty to Catholics . . . and yet would not offer 
to impose a like disability upon Jews or Mohamedans 
[sic], hethens [sic], infidels, or atheists . . .  
or upon Millerites . . .  or Mormons.
Anson Jones, a former president of the Texas Republic, 
asked the Galveston News for space to speak out against 
Houston claiming that Houston had opposed the annexation 
of Texas. David G. Burnett and Mirabeau B. Lamar, also ex­
presidents of the Republic, contributing their share, pre­
pared pamphlets describing Houston's character and coward­
ice.67
The loyal Know-Nothing papers, the San Antonio Herald 
and the Texas State Times, spread the doctrines of Houston 
and the Know-Nothings and refuted the charges of the
6^Ibid., 16 September 1855.
65Ibid., 6 October 1855.
gg .......
Marshall Texas Republican, 4 August 1855.
cn
Friend, Sam Houston, p. 239.
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Democrats. A popularly quoted derogatory description of
the states' rights leaders, most of whom had emigrated from
other states, read:
. . . A tide of new men, and with them new mea­
sures, have been constantly rolling into Texas, 
and much of the primitive patriotism of the coun­
try is supplanted by a set of politicians who know 
but little, and care but little, about the hard­
ships of the men of former days, except so far 
as an allusion to their deeds can enhance their 
own base designs. . . . It is a matter worthy of 
observation that a large majority of those who 
attempt to mould and lead public opinion in Texas 
at the present time are those who have set down 
to the banquet after all the dangers and toil of 
preparing it was over . . .
. . .Cliques and clans have sprung into existence 
and become so numerous that everything wears the 
aspect of 'confusion worse confounded.' It was 
not so in the olden times, and consequently the 
present state of affairs must be the result ofq 
the rank demagogueism of political hucksters.
Houston often condemned the states’ rights papers and their
editors through the Know-Nothing publications. He called
the Galveston News "a low, dirty sheet" whose editor was
"too mean to steal" and "too drunk to help himself" and
wished that these enemies would "fester in the putrescence
of their own m a l i g n i t y . T h e  Times and the Herald were
71loyal but they were outnumbered.
68Austin Texas State Times, 26 March 1855; San Antonio 
(Texas) Herald, 13 November 1855; and Maher,•"Secession in 
Texas," p. 38.
69Austin Texas State Times, 30 June 1855.
^Ibid., 1 August 1855.
71Maher, "Secession in Texas," p. 38.
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Image Building
In 1855 Roberts enjoyed an excellent reputation with
his colleagues and his constituents. He was considered a
distinguished member of the East Texas aristocracy, but it
was an aristocracy of deeds and service and not of wealth 
72
and. heritage. A decade of adjudicating differences of 
opinion and mingling with the citizens of the area had en­
hanced Roberts' reputation as a man of wisdom and good judg­
ment to whom they could turn in times of crisis. Senator 
Rusk seemed to speak for all who respected Roberts when he 
stated: "I am glad that one so fully posted up and so fully
imbued in the principles of the party as yourself takes so
73deep an interest m  the matter."
Credibility studies in communication have deduced that
when the status or prestige of the persuader is higher than
that of his receivers, the speaker is more effective in
74changing attitudes. Roberts seems to have been well aware
of this phenomenon. One of his boyhood dreams had been to 
become a judge so that he could be "superior" to other men. 
Now that he had reached that status he seemed determined to
72John Salmon Ford, Rip Ford's Texas, ed. Stephen B. 
Oates, (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1963) , 
p. 56.
73Thomas J. Rusk to Roberts, 1 October 1855, Roberts
Papers.
74Winston.L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persua­
sion: A Means of Social Influence, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 258.
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use it to its full advantage to further his own political 
philosophy.
Although he may have had some misgivings about active­
ly engaging in politics, Roberts felt compelled to come for­
ward again. In his usual manner, he stated simply that he 
believed that it was his duty to set forth the facts pertain­
ing to the topic. Roberts' friend, Judge Reagan, justified 
this sense of duty more elaborately when he stated: "The 
preservation of our government and the great principles on 
which it rests are threatened. No citizen in such a crisis 
should be excused from raising his voice in its defense.
The people must be aroused to this impending danger, the
75Democratic party saved from defeat." After giving his 
lengthy interpretation of the history of Know-Nothingism, 
Roberts continued to claim objectivity: "I have thus far, 
fellow citizens, considered the merits of Know-nothingism 
as exhibited in its source, its affinities, and its associa­
tions, as you would learn the character of a stranger by his
76nativity, his family, and the company he keeps." He had, 
of course, considered the "merits" of Know-Nothingism from 
the southern, states' rights view which he and the majority 
of his audience shared.
75John H. Reagan to Democratic Committee of Cherokee 
County, 25 September 1855, Reagan Papers.
76Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism,"
p. 11.
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Because of his high status with the audience, because
of his intellectual approach to the topic, and because of
77the "attitude similarity" which he shared with his lis­
teners, Roberts was relatively assured of adding to his 
positive image as a Democratic leader and a defender of 
civil and religious freedom, in addition, if his strategy 
of image building was successsful, he could further enhance 
his image as a potential United States congressman.
Objectification 
To the end of his life Roberts blamed the North for
78everything from local boundary disputes to the Civil War.
In 1855 he blamed the North for the "abhorrent doctrines" 
of the Know-Nothing Party. He reasoned that Know-Nothingism 
was a twin to abolition, that both Know-Nothingism and abo­
lition were offsprings of northern Federalism and there­
fore the North was at fault once again for the evils that
79plagued the state .
He directed his objectification specifically at "the 
Federalists," who were "the same foes as the Nationalists, 
Republicans, and Whigs," and the "peculiar Pilgrims," who 
were the "extreme puritans." All "Federalists" ("the Fed­
eral party, " "Federalism" ) were "misdirected" primarily
77Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 258.
• 7 0  ..........................
See his lectures and addresses in Our Federal Rela­
tions: From a Southern View of Them (Austin, Texas: Eugene 
Von Boeckmann, Printer, 1892).
79Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism," 
pp. 9-10.
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because they based their political philosophy upon a "lib­
eral construction of the Constitution" wherein they viewed
the Constitution "as the mere out-line of a government which
80they have a right to perfect." He summarized his objec­
tions to the federalists' expediency:
. . .  These prominent measures are all expedients;
— expedients originating in distrust of the suf­
ficiency of the Constitution . . .; expedients to 
infuse into the government extraneous elements 
which the popular idea of the day points out as 
calculated to strengthen, improve and perpetrate 
it. This is Federalism. . . .81
The other "odious" misguided ancestors of Know-Nothingism 
were the Puritans. While Houston was making light of Ger­
mans and other foreigners, Roberts was pointing out the 
"strange peculiarities of his "ancestors," the Puritans.
To describe them he quoted Macaulay:
'The extreme Puritan is known from ether man::by his 
gait, his garb, his lank hair, the sour solemnity 
of his face, the upturned white of his eyes, the 
nasal twang with which he spoke, and above all by 
his peculiar dialect. . . . The dress, the deport­
ment, the language, the studies, the amusements 
of this rigid sect were regulated on principles 
resembling those of the Pharasees. . . .'82
Next he pointed out the connection between the Know-Nothings' 
and the Puritan's doctrines of religious intolerance. He 
may also have been referring indirectly to the acts of vio­
lence by Know-Nothings toward foreigners and Catholics in 
the Northeast when he stated:
80Ibid., P- 1.
81Ibid., P- e.
82Ibid., P* 6.
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They [Puritans] punished irreligion as a civil of­
fence [sic]. They banished dissenters under the 
penalty of death . . . .  They whipped one Anabab- 
tist [sic] unmercifully (Holmes) and put to death 
four quakers, one of them a woman— for religious 
offences. They destroyed people they called 
witches. These were the acts of their public 
tribunals. . . . They banished Roger Williams for 
preaching the doctrine of full toleration in reli­
gion . . . .  Such were the Puritan fathers.83
Since Massachusetts was the "breeding ground for Fed­
eralism and Puritanism," Roberts placed blame on that state 
especially for its integration of government and religion 
and finally made the connection to Know-Nothingism:
Even the Supreme Court decides that religion is 
a part of the common law of Massachusetts and that 
a false oath taken in a church proceeding is per­
jury. Massachusetts raging with her defeat, turned 
into herself. Her politicians, second, third, 
fourth, and fifth rate, harangued and lectured, 
her preachers harangued and lectured, her schoolmen 
taught and lectured, her women took the stump, her 
negroes preached and lectured and all invoked their 
old Puritan nationality. The fire from the old 
spark blazed out from the masses and caught from 
community to community, from state to state. Know- 
nothingism is an offshoot of this same old stock 
of Puritan nationality . . . . 84
He deplored Know-Nothingism because it "aspires to be some­
thing more than a fragment of the Massachusetts idea. It
85aspires to be the American Party."
Since abolitionists based their opposition to slavery 
to some extent on moral and religious grounds, Roberts was 
especially critical of the northern preachers whose "pulpits
83Ibid., pp. 6-7.
84Ibid., p. 8.
85Ibid., p. 10.
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had been prostituted to political discussions and denuncia­
tions." He blamed them for the northern opposition to the 
Kansas-Nebraska Bill, their support of nullification of
the Fugitive Slave Law, and the election of an abolition
86senator— Wilson.
Roberts clearly objectified the North, the Puritans, 
the Federalists, Massachusetts, northern preachers and the 
Know-Nothings, but he masked it as historical exposition. 
Other Democrats in the campaign were not so conservative 
in their language and style. Wigfall, for example, who 
was probably Houston's chief speaking rival, used objecti­
fication and vilification in a much more direct and fiery 
manner. Wigfall was known to be one of the most effective 
speakers against Houston. He "clamored incessantly"
against "Old Sam" and was more obnoxious to Houston than
87any of his other opponents. Henderson, Oldham, and Lub­
bock also followed Houston throughout the state fervently
88attacking his character, personality, and policies.
Roberts was not without opposition in the use of ob­
jectification. In an attempt to discredit the Democrats, 
Houston "vented his spleen without stint, without point, 
without reason, without refined language," calling them
86Ibid., pp. 8-9.
Q7
Friend, Sam Houston, p. 196 and King, Louis T. 
Wigfall, p. 60.
OQ
Friend, Sam Houston, p. 251.
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"thieves, rascals, and assassins." He also called the 
Democrats "canting demagogues, and hypocritical politi­
cians," "obnoxious . . . ambitious . . . treasonable . . .
90nullifiers and disunionists." The Know-Nothings also 
referred to Roberts and the Democrats as "village politi­
cians" and "place-hunting demagogues" and hurled insults
91and sacriligious comments against them.
In his opposition to Know-Nothingism, despite the 
widespread use of the tactic by both sides in the campaign, 
Roberts again had chosen to employ objectification, or 
group blame, rather than individual name-calling, or vili­
fication. Roberts may have decided to use the safer strat­
egy of objectification because "it provides the agitator 
with greater protection from scrutiny and it does not re­
quire him to change his grievances to fit changing person- 
92nel." The collective object of Roberts' attacks was al­
ways the North, including its various doctrines and repre­
sentatives. With only minor modifications he repeated the 
same basic arguments to fit the crisis. Roberts may also 
have chosen to use objectification rather than vilification 
because just as his idol, Calhoun, deprecated the use of
89Marcus de La Fayette Herring to Roberts, 15 July 
1857, Roberts Papers.
90Williams and Barker, The Writings of Sam Houston,
6 , 209-234.
^Zacharias, "The Know-Nothing Party," pp. 230-233.
92Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolutxon 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), pp. 29-30.
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93
personal attack, Roberts also considered his opponents 
to be gentlemen like himself and therefore scorned the use 
of individual name-calling.
Legitimation
Instead of vilifying Sam Houston or directly refuting 
specific Know-Nothing practices, Roberts again chose to 
justify the practice of slavery and to explain the compact 
theory of states. Since the secessionists had not yet re­
sorted to violence in defense of their position, Roberts 
continually justified any future actions which he or his 
followers would take if their states' rights were violated.
He accomplished legitimation through the tactic of "exposi-
94tory persuasion," a tactic which Calhoun often used.
Rather than naming the opponent's accusation and debating 
it, Roberts, too, preferred to explain, to exemplify and 
to illustrate causes and to trace consequences. He often 
made his constitutional and historical explanations without 
naming the specific issue at hand. The effects which he 
inferred through his causal reasoning, however, were obvious. 
Although he often made one explicit call for change in be­
lief or action in the form of a rhetorical question, the
93Herbert L. Curry, "John C. Calhoun," in History 
and Criticism of American Public Address, ed. William Nor­
wood Brigance, 3 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1943), 
2:660.
94Bert E. Bradley and Jerry L. Tarver, "John C. Cal­
houn's Rhetorical Method in Defense of Slavery," in Braden, 
Oratory in the Old South, pp. 169-189.
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majority of Roberts' speeches were in the form of exposi­
tory lectures explaining the theory of strict construction. 
In his 1855 speech, he spent more time in exploiting the 
principles of democracy than in demeaning Know-Nothingism. 
The speech is in reality an analysis of the comparative 
principles of American political parties and a partisan 
exposition of the states' rights views. As he stated it, 
however, his purpose in speaking was simply "to set forth 
the facts" and "consider the merits of Know-nothingism."
Roberts began the body of his speech by explaining 
that "There have always been two political parties in the 
United States" and that the difference was that "the Demo­
cratic party is founded on a strict construction of the 
Constitution, the Federal party upon a liberal construc­
tion.
But to be more explicit— the Democratic party, hav­
ing full confidence in the capacity of the people 
to govern themselves, and in the sufficiency of 
the Constitution as the fundamental rules of a suc­
cessful government, seek to shape the government 
exactly in conformity to the rules prescribed in 
the Constitution and to exclude from the govern­
ment every element, which may be infused into it, 
for which no rule is therein prescribed. Such a 
construction protects the Union by the full exer­
cise of all the powers certainly delegated. It 
protects the States by leaving their rights unin­
vaded. This is democracy. ^
Roberts continued his one-sided "exposition":
95Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism,"
p. 1.
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The Federal party views this Constitution (judging 
from their measures) as the mere out-line of a gov­
ernment which they have a right to perfect. By 
construction and indirection they have enlarged some 
rules of the Constitution and abridged others, and 
thereby infused elements into the actual government 
of the country for which there is to be found no 
certain plain rule in the Constitution.97
To prove this general statement, Roberts gave several speci­
fic examples.:
To illustrate— the Federalists thinking a national 
bank a great public good, and finding no specific 
authority in the Constitution, put together several 
clauses and, by inference, analogy, and construc­
tion, derive the power of making corporations, when, 
as it is well known the convention refused to give 
that power.98
Roberts continued his exemplification of liberal construc­
tion:
The Federalists thinking to strengthen the nation 
by domestic manufacturers and finding no specific 
authority in the Constitution to encourage any par­
ticular species of industry— accomplish their object 
by the manner in which they levy the duties upon 
imports . . . and by which they infuse into the 
actual government an extraneous element— the right 
to tax one mode of industry to pay for building 
up and sustaining another.99
He continued:
The Federalists elect a President under a pledge 
not to exercise the full veto power pertaining to 
his office— but only to stay 'unconstitutional laws 
and hasty legislation.' By this they sought to 
abridge and limit one of the rules of the Consti­
tution, and cripple if not paralize [sic] one of 
the great departments of the government; and which, 
had it succeeded, would have altered and changed
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
99Ibid., p. 2
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the government from that for which the original
compact founded.^00
Through contrasting examples, Roberts also explained 
that "Virginia is the strong type of the Democratic idea 
and "Massachusetts is the strong type of the Federal 
idea."103' Even though it was obviously biased, the majority 
of the speech was presented as an informative lecture on 
the origin and history of Know-Nothingism. In truth it 
was a legitimation of the states' rights leaders' doctrines 
and practices.
While the other states' rights speakers were vilifying
and objectifying Houston and the Know-Nothings on specific
issues such as secrecy and prejudice against foreigners
and Catholics, Roberts chose mainly to legitimize the states'
rights philosophy through exposition of the Constitution.
Since legitimation is "essential to the momentum and inspi-
102ration of the movement," Roberts contributed to the cause 
by "educating" his audience in order to convince them of 
the viability of his solutions.
Mythication
In order to glorify his cause, Roberts used appeals 
to history, forefathers, the race, and destiny. He personi­
fied "Democracy" as an archetypal hero who holds "the
101Ibid., pp. 2-11.
102Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 40.
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defensive shield, the Constitution, from the attacks of 
the antagonist, "Federalism.” Although "the struggle is 
perpetual" and the enemy is "hidden under the guise of dif­
ferent names, . . . Democracy has been victorious in every 
great struggle." To carry out the allegory, Roberts listed 
the historical enemies which the hero, "Democracy," had 
slain.
The Federal bank is obsolete. The Federal protec­
tive tariff is abolished. The great American sys­
tem of internal improvements is repudiated and con­
demned. The veto power is protected. The Alien 
and Sedition Law was buried and until lately re­
mained in almost infamous disrepute. The Federal 
antislavery element which had been infused into 
the government by the Missouri Compromise line is 
ejected and the Kansas and Nebraska Territorial 
Bill founded on the principles of the Compromise 
of 1850. . . . Every point has been carried— every 
political foe of the national character has fallen 
before us. . . . The abolitionist has been driven 
back growling to his cover. . . .  He retreats but 
to recruit his forces and review the conflict in 
the open field. . . .103
Roberts further instilled dignity in his followers and
showed that "history is on our side" when he completed the
allegory by stating: "If such parties as these fall, who
104will dare to stand before this triumphant Democracy?"
Roberts also romanticized Virginia as "the ideal model 
of the Democratic idea," burning brightly in the fervor 
of her principles, and sending abroad the rays of her light 
to animate the followers of her school. Virginia sent out
103Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism,"
pp. 3-5.
104Ibid., p. 5.
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her people to the South and West. These descendents, he 
implied, were the chosen people— southern, white, and Demo­
cratic. He and his audience, therefore, had reason for 
self-congratulations for being part of this chosen race.
Because of their mystical nature, the Know-Nothing 
speakers used a great deal of religious symbolism.105 
Rather than employing religious symbolism himself, Roberts 
chose to refute the religious doctrine and practices of 
the Puritans, whom he presented as the forerunners of the 
Know-Nothings. He compared the Puritans to the "Pharasees 
[sic] who, proud of their washed hands and broad phylactines 
taunted the Redeemer as a Sabbath breaker and a wine-bibber." 
The Redeemer, or Christ, then, would be on "our side." Con­
tinuing his tactic of anti-mythication, Roberts described 
the Puritan's doctrine of religious intolerance and their 
failure to separate church and state:
According to Bancroft they established a republi­
can government— basing the right of suffrage and 
the right of holding office upon church membership.
They punished irreligion . . . .  They banished 
dissenters . . . .  They whipped . . . for reli­
gious offenses. They destroyed people . . . .
When they banished Roger Williams for preaching 
the doctrine of full toleration in religion, and 
for countening that they might with equal propriety 
select 'a doctor of physick or a pilot' according 
to his skill in theology and standing in the church 
as to select magistrates from the members of the 
church— the reason given for it is not very differ­
ent from some reasons given at this day for similar 
conduct, [sic] 'And the judgment was vindicated 
not as a punishment for opinion or as a restraint 
of conscience, but because the application of the 
. . new doctrine ... . seemed about to subvert the
105Zacharias, "The Know-Nothing Party," p. 233.
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fundamental State and government of the country.1 
The government was an incident to their religion 
and subordinate to it. As a consequence their 
preachers were their politicians. . . .10 6
Since "Know-nothingism is an offshoot from this same old 
stock of Puritan nationality," Roberts reasoned that it 
was just a modern version of that strange and intolerant 
religion. It was merely another northern-bred enemy, hidden 
under the guise of a different name, for Democracy to strug­
gle with and slay.
Solidification
The Know-Nothings, also called the Order of the Star
Spangled Banner, presented the Democrats with a very real
and unified opposition. They often marched with bands,
107flags, and mottoes. At their all-day barbeques, polit­
ical debates, flag raisings, street preachings, and parades, 
they used such slogans as "Sam is wide awake," "Samuel is
right," "We go for the Union, the whole Union, and nothing
10 8but the Union," and "Americans should rule Americans."
In order to solidify his followers into a more cohesive
group, "thereby increasing their responsiveness to group 
10 9wishes," Roberts used the method of "card stacking," 
or the distorted presentation of an issue in a one-sided,
106Ibid., pp. 7-8.
107
Nevins, Ordeal of the Union, p. 323.
^^Zacharias, "The Know-Nothing Party," pp. 226-227.
10 9Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol , p. 20.
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unfair manner.1*® To appeal to the pride of his followers, 
he presented Democracy (the Democratic party) as wise, vir­
tuous and always victorious. Likewise he depicted Virginia 
as the perfect, ideal paragon for other states to follow. 
Roberts then attempted to persuade the Texans to ride the 
"bandwagon" with Virginia and other southern states when 
he declared:
Virginia now as ever stands forth the bold and fear­
less advocate of Democracy— not taken by surprise, 
not fascinated with mere names— and unarmed by the 
gathering storm of isms which rises up— blackening 
— in front of her. The democracy everywhere en­
couraged by her example are rallying around her 
standard, with their principles purified by the 
contest.
Roberts followed this appeal for unity with rhetorical ques­
tions: "Where does Texas stand? Can she forget the hand 
that raised her from her forlorn gloom, and led her back
into her old home? Will she follow Massachusetts' Puritan
112Federalism or Virginia Democracy?" Roberts had already
suggested the answer throughout his speech by pointing out 
that the Virginia Democracy had already, in 1855, triumphed 
politically over the Native Americans. He was referring 
here to Governor Wise's denunciation of the American Party 
earlier that year. Roberts explained that occurence later 
in more detail:
11®Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 235.
111Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism,"
p. 11.
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When in its spread it [Know-Nothingism] reached 
Virginia, Governor Wise denounced it as anti- 
American, anti-democratic, and un-Constitutional, 
with such power of earnest eloquence as called 
attention to it all over the South, and succeeded 
in breaking the wave of sentiment in its favor 
that was strongly drifting southward.113
Just as he had asked his 1850 audience in San Augustine 
to follow the lead of the "Nashville patriots," he-asked 
his 1855 listeners in Rusk to follow the lead of the Vir­
ginians. Once again he called for a united southern front.
Also to reinforce the cohesiveness of their followers,
Roberts and the states' rights group used slogans, symbols,
and in-group publications, symbolic tactics which are es-
114sentially reinforcing. The Democrats referred to the
Know-Nothings as "Sam," "Old Sam," "Sammy," or "Samuel"
to encompass both the party and its leader. "Old Sam must
be beaten" or "Old Sam has got to go" became common slogans
115among the regular Democrats. Probably the most common 
derogatory slogan had to do with sending "Old Sam," "Sam," 
"Sammy," or "Samuel" up the river. The Texas Republican 
printed a typical bit of doggerel entitled "Up Salt River 
Sammy Must Go" which could be sung to the tune of "Old Rosin
113Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 36.
^^Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, p. 20.
^■\l. M. Clough to Roberts, 26 February 1856, Roberts 
Papers.
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the Bow."116 Various literary attempts appeared in the
newspapers such as:
His day has passed,
His course is run,
And therefore let the old man
Wrap the drapery of his couch around him
And lay down to gentle dreams.H 7
From the beginning of the secession movement in Texas 
through the Civil War, including the campaign against the 
Know-Nothings, the defiant symbol of the states' rightists 
was the Lone Star Flag. In 1855 it stood ready to be un­
furled once more to replace, if it must, the Star Spangled
lift
Banner of the United States.
The in-group publications were basically the same 
newspapers who promulgated the states' rights cause such 
as the Texas State Gazette, the Marshall Republican, the 
Clarksville Standard, and the Galveston News. A few pam­
phlets and broadsides were also distributed or published. 
Pamphlets were composed by such men as Burnet and Lamar 
and broadsides were often distributed or printed in the 
newspapers. One broadside, published in San Antonio in 
1855 ridiculing Houston as a Know-Nothing, was entitled 
"Sam Recruiting." The broadside pictures "Old Sam" with 
a pig-like head, wearing one black boot and one white boot,
116Marshall Texas Republican, 5 January 1856.
117Dallas (Texas) Herald, 8 December 1855.
118E. Williams to Roberts, 18 January 1856, Roberts
Papers.
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and carrying a net for gudgeons, J a mask of Washington,
Sam's great "American" heart, a knife and a gun for logic
and reasoning, a clerical collar, secret oaths and various
120other Know-Nothing paraphenalia. As can be seen, many 
of the solidification tactics were also used for the purpose 
of-vilification of Sam Houston or objectification of the 
Know-Nothings.
Polarization
In 1855 Roberts used the American Party to divide fur­
ther the North and the South. In order to wedge the gap 
even wider, he placed Federalism, northerners, and Know- 
Nothings on one side and Democracy, southerners, and Demo­
crats on the other. He then proceeded to blame one group 
for all the evil that had happened and was happening in the 
country and to praise the other group for all the good. 
Though presented in the manner of a historical lecture, the 
cards were clearly stacked in favor of the southern Demo­
crats so that the uncommitted would have an easy choice to 
make. If they wished to join the triumphant chosen people 
who were the defenders of civil rights and religious freedom, 
they could follow Roberts and the Democrats. If they wanted 
to join the strange, intolerant, defeated descendents of
J'^^Someone who • is easily duped. A gullible persbn.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 584.
120Broadside published in San Antonio, 1855 printed 
in Friend, Sam Houston, p. 243.
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Puritanism, they could follow Houston and the Know- 
Nothings .
Roberts applied the strategy of polarization by using 
abolition and religious tolerance as flag issues and the 
Know-Nothings as a flag group. Roberts realized that his 
audience was pro-slavery and anti-abolition. He also real­
ized that Know-Nothingism, by being affiliated with Union­
ism and northern abolitionism (however remote the latter 
connection might have been), was especially vulnerable to 
attack. Roberts stated this flag issue clearly following 
his description of the abolitionist:
This, fellow citizens, is the American issue—
Disguise it as you will— defer it as you will—  
this is the issue which sooner or later, like 
Aaron's serpent will swallow up all the rest.
Shall the Federal antislavery element be again 
infused into the government, to discountenance, 
circumscribe and finally compromise into a lin­
gering death this Southern institution? The 
interests to be affected are sectional, but the .2t_ 
principles involved in the question are national.
Knowing that most of his listeners were slaveholders or at 
least pro-slavery in sentiment, he appealed to their fear 
of abolitionists to develop this issue. He warned them 
that if Democracy was not once more triumphant over Federal­
ism that they could fear for their rights, especially the 
rights to their own southern institutions. He warned them 
the abolitionists had retreated only to recruit their 
forces, that they had given notice of open war and were
121Roberts, "Speech in Opposition to Know-nothingism,"
p. 5.
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there, always ready for open conflict with the South—  
always ready to take away what was rightfully theirs. 
Although the speech as a whole was a historical comparison 
of Democracy and Federalism, slavery was the issue to which 
he was leading. To Roberts it was the main issue in any 
conflict with the North.
Roberts' second major flag issue was religious intol­
erance. The Know-Nothings' doctrine of anti-Catholicism 
made them susceptible to Roberts' charges here. Through a 
historical comparison with the cruel and intolerant Puritans, 
he depicted the Know-Nothings in the same unfavorable light. 
Within this issue he could also discuss the idea of mixing 
religion and politics and charge them with violating the 
fundamental principle of the separation of church and state. 
Here he accused them of excessive emotion (and therefore 
lack of reason) by their prostitution of the pulpit with 
political discussions and their prostitution of politics 
with religious issues. The Know-Nothings, therefore, were 
not only intolerant and cruel to those of other religions 
but they were also emotionally over-zealous and politically 
unwise, he reasoned. Although Roberts gave a great deal of 
attention to this second issue, obviously it is directly 
connected, and subordinate, to the first.
In 1855 the flag group, the Texas Know-Nothing Party, 
was for Roberts merely a scapegoat. Undoubtedly he did ab­
hor their prejudicial doctrines and their narcissistic se­
cret society, but it was their Unionism and their ties to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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northern abolitionism which he objected to most. In real­
ity, most southern Know-Nothings were pro-slavery.‘L22 How­
ever, Roberts would have had his audience believe that the 
Know-Nothings were abolitionists in disguise or at the very 
least aiders and abetters of abolitionists.
Roberts used derogatory language to objectify his 
opposition and laudatory language to legitimitize his cause 
and to solidify his audience. This selective use of de­
scriptive language also served to polarize the two opposing 
groups and to force a conscious choice between them. To 
describe Federalism, northerners, and Know-Nothings, he 
used such terms and phrases as "mere outline," "indirection," 
"extraneous," "unconstitutional," "abridge," "cripple," 
"paralize" [sic], "altered," "expedients," "obsolete," 
"abolished," "repudiated and condemned," "infamous disre­
pute," "fallen," "odious," "defiantly," "like Aaron's ser­
pent," "Federal antislavery element," "discountenance, cir­
cumscribe and finally compromise," "ruins," "peculiar," 
"rigid," "prostituted," "raging," "second, third, fourth, 
and fifth rate," "harangued and. lectured," "preached and 
lectured," "Catholic proscription," "abolition and Know- 
nothingism," "the gathering storm of isms," "blackening," ; 
and "forlorn gloom." To describe Democracy, southerners, 
and Democrats, he employed such words and phrases as "pro­
tects the states," "uninvaded rights," "burning brightly,"
122Wooster, "An Analysis of the Texas Know Nothings," 
p. 423.
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"victorious," "triumphantly," "constitutional neutrality," 
"this Southern institution," "full toleration," "freedom of 
religion," "bold and fearless advocate of democracy," "ral­
lying around her standard," "principles purified," and "the 
hand that raised her . . . and led her back into her old 
home." Hoping to turn his audience away from Houston and 
the Know-Nothings and from any "Federal" sentiments which 
they may have, Roberts used more language of condemnation 
than language of praise to polarize the two groups.
To assure the proper choice by the uncommitted, 
Roberts told them where their sentiments should lie. While 
polarizing Massachusetts and Virginia, Roberts stated that 
Massachusetts spread out her population to the North and 
East and Virginia sent out her population to the South and 
West. The apparent reasoning here was that since they were 
of the South and Southwest, they were the descendents of 
Virginia who was the strong type of the Democratic idea; 
therefore they were or should be Democrats. Again the 
choice was made easy for the neutral or uncommitted lis­
teners .
Escalation/Confrontation
Because Roberts was speaking to the North indirectly 
through his attacks on the Know-Nothings and because his 
speech was presented in the form of expository persuasion, 
he did not make any overt threats of disruption. His the­
sis and his language, however, served to escalate the
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tensions through the use of "calculated antagonism."123 By 
blaming the North for the Know-Nothing's "abhorrent" doc­
trines and practices, he focused on the broader conflict 
between the North and the South, rather than just between 
the Texas Know-Nothing Party and the Texas Democratic Party. 
As he later explained: "this [Know-Nothing] party origi­
nated in the hot-bed of political innovations in the North- 
124era States." Judging by his speech, their northern roots 
irritated him more than their specific doctrines. Most of 
his time was spent in tracing Know-Nothingism to its geo­
graphical, political, and religious roots— the North. In 
so doing he could "reveal their deep-seated prejudices by
exposing the rationalizations they use to cover their 
125views." Despite the fact that most of the Texas Know- 
Nothings were pro-slavery, Roberts maneuvered them into an 
anti-slavery position through association. As he clearly 
stated, the real issue was slavery and to him the Know- 
Nothings were simply abolitionists who had again reared 
their ugly heads in disguise. The true targets were Feder­
alists in any form. By making the North the target for his
Charles Lomas, The Agitator in American Society 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968),
p. 120.
124Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 36.
Lomas, The Agitator in American Society, p. 120.
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strategies of objectification, anti-mythication, and polari­
zation, he kept the antagonism alive.
He also attempted to antagonize the northern states 
with his solidification efforts. By using Virginia as a 
model of the Democratic idea and asking Texas to follow her 
and the other southern states, Roberts was again calling 
for a united southern effort against the North. With a 
stronger, more organized Democratic Party and a stronger, 
more closely affiliated association of southern states, the 
states' rights group could fight a better battle against 
their enemy, the "odious" North. He cautioned them not to 
dare to stand in the way of "this triumphant Democracy" who- 
had slain all its enemies. Here, with the war analogy, he 
again warned the.North that the southerners were willing to 
fight for their rights.
Roberts later admitted to the use of this strategy 
when he explained that in 1855 "Houston's defection from 
the regularly organized Democratic party" and "the increas­
ing efforts of the Northern States and people towards free 
soilism, tended to arouse a more determined and demonstra­
tive antagonism to the North, especially on the part of the
126class of Democrats who were strict constructionists."
Whether directly or indirectly, Roberts' words and actions 
increased the tension and widened the gap between the North
126Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 35.
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and the South through his "more determined and demonstrative 
antagonism to the North."
Effects
As was the case in 1850, Roberts' rhetorical strate­
gies were successful with his immediate audience. Follow­
ing his suggestion for greater unity and organization, they 
formed the Democratic Association of Rusk County and asked
Roberts to aid in writing the by-laws for the organiza- 
127tion. Rusk County also overwhelmingly supported the
Democratic nominees in the gubernatorial elections of 1855 
and 1857.128
His efforts were also successful with his larger au­
dience. Roberts himself wrote that "the grand displays of 
oratory and of argument" presented by. "the best speaking 
talent of the State," among whom he listed himself, had
"turned the current of public sentiment strongly against
129this secret party." Indeed the states' rights Democrats 
were able to destroy the Know-Nothing Party by 1857.
127Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 September 1855.
1 2 8journal of the Senate of Texas, 6th Legislature,- 
p. 47 and House Journal of the State of Texas, 7th Legis­
lature, p. 15, Texas State Archives, Austin* Texas. In 
Rusk County in 1855, the vote was 1,069 for Pease-and 663 
for Dickson. In 1857 the vote was 1,009 for Runnels and 
748 for Houston.
IpQ
Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 37.
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In the state elections of 1855 the Know-Nothings 
managed to elect a dozen legislators and one U.S. congress­
man, Lemuel D. Evans, but as a whole were soundly defeated 
and Pease and Runnels were elected governor and lieutenant- 
governor. The Democrats held a large barbeque in Austin to 
celebrate their victory. Here they passed a resolution 
calling for a Democratic state convention to unite the Demo­
crats of Texas for the upcoming presidential campaign. The 
convention, which met January 15-18, 1856, was the first 
fully organized and representative Democratic convention in 
the state and marked- the beginning of a strong states' 
rights Democratic Party in Texas. They denounced the Know- 
Nothings, defended the states' rights doctrine, acclaimed 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act a triumph over fanaticism, defended 
the right to carry slaves into the territories, and in­
structed their delegates not to support anyone who did not
approve of the nonintervention policy of the Kansas- 
l 30
Nebraska Act.
The 1856 general elections were also disastrous for 
the Texas Know-Nothings. The party's presidential nominee, 
Millard Fillmore, was badly defeated by the Democratic can­
didate, James Buchanan, and candidates in the state races
131were overwhelmed, in most cases by a three-to-one ratio. 
Significant for the Democrats in this race was the candidacy
130Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, 
pp. 39-41, 64-68..
l^Wooster, "Analysis of Texas Know Nothings," p. 417.
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of John C. Fremont, the Republican anti-slavery candidate.
Public officials, newspapers, and Texans in general reacted
to the Republicans with panic and near-hysteria. The
states' rights leaders predicted disunion and war if
Fremont should win. Houston urged Texas to acquiesce if
Fremont were elected, but Roberts believed that the only
alternative for Texas if a Republican were elected was se- 
132cession. This was a warning of things to come.
In the 1857 state elections, the Democrats defeated
the Know-Nothings by an overwhelming majority. Roberts
called it "the most exciting political.canvass that had
133ever before that time occurred in the State of Texas."
All of the states' rights candidates won their races. 
Houston, who ran for governor as an independent but with 
Know-Nothing support, lost to H. R. Runnels by almost nine 
thousand votes. F. R. Lubbock defeated Jesse Grimes for 
lieutenant-governor. In the congressional races, John H. 
Reagan defeated Lemuel D. Evans and Guy M. Bryan was elect­
ed without opposition to the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Upon Thomas J. Rusk's death, J. Pinckney Henderson was 
elected to the U.S. Senate on November 9, 1857. Since 
Houston's term in the senate would expire before the meet­
ing of the legislature in 1859, Judge John Hemphill, chief
132Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the 
Lone Star State," pp. 112-115 and Sandbo, "Beginnings of the 
Secession Movement in Texas," pp. 54-56.
133Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 44.
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justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, was elected to suc­
ceed Houston. Henderson died in 1858 and Matthias Ward was 
appointed to complete Henderson's tenure. Louis T. Wigfall 
was elected to that seat in 1859. Also in 1857 Roberts was 
elected associate justice of the Supreme Court of Texas and 
Judge R. T. Wheeler, an associate justice since the begin­
ning of statehood, was elected chief justice. John Marshall, 
editor of the Texas State Gazette, was elected chairman of 
the Democratic State Convention, a position he held until 
he left for the war in 1861. Roberts' friend, Franklin W. 
Bowden, died in June of 1857. Although their ranks had 
been thinned by death, the states' rights Democrats were
firmly in control of state politics when Runnels took of-
134
fice December 21, 1857.
With the defeats of 1856 and 1857, the Know-Nothing 
Party declined both locally and nationally. Following 
Houston's defeat, the party virtually disappeared in Texas. 
The political life of the Texas Know-Nothing Party had been 
brief but not without lasting effects. The very existence 
of a strong opposition party had forced the Democrats to 
develop an effective political organization. The Know- 
Nothing Party had also provided, temporarily at least, a 
rallying point for unionists and nationalist sentiment in
134Ibid., pp. 46-48; Johnson, A History of Texas and 
Texans, p. 522; and Ledbetter, "Fear, Slavery, and Disunion
in the Lone Star State," pp. 126-129.
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the state. *’■' Primarily because of their split over the 
slavery issue, the national American Party became inactive 
and, with the breakup of its.last stronghold in Louisiana 
in 1860, the American Party passed into history.136
Houston had fought hard in 1856-57, but the Democrats 
proved too much for him. They took every opportunity to 
remind the people of his Kansas—Nebraska stand, his associa­
tion with the Know-Nothings and his anti-secession views; 
they accused him of being a traitor and- a friend of aboli­
tion. The public viewed Houston favorably but they viewed 
his Know-Nothing message unfavorably resulting in "a state 
of incongruity." Since they viewed both Roberts and his
message favorably and since "any changes in evaluation are
137always in the direction of increased congruity," Roberts 
was able to get the people to turn against Houston on this 
issue. Houston was defeated in 1857 but would return, to 
take advantage of Democratic mistakes in 1858-59.
The speeches which Roberts made in East Texas had 
proved to be most effective in defeating Know-Nothingism
138and turning the general public into the Democratic party.
136Crews, "The Know Nothing Party in Texas," pp. 171- 
172 and Wooster, "Analysis of the Texas Know Nothings," p. 
417.
1360verdyke, The Know-Nothing Party, pp. 291-292.
Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion, p. 138.
138L. T. Wigfall, Chester M. Adams, J. M. Clough, P.
Murrah, T. A. Patillo, and R.. W. Laughery to Roberts 11 Oc­
tober 1856 and M. D. Ector, J. G. Graham, L. P. Hollings­
worth, J. H. Parsons, and M. D. Graham to Roberts 16 October 
1856, Roberts Papers.
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One associate wrote that "no individual had labored more 
earnestly or spent so much time and energy toward the over­
throw of the Know Nothing Party and the triumph of democracy
139as did Roberts." Because of the results of the campaign 
and because of Roberts1 leading role in the campaign, it 
would appear that the strategies which he used to defeat 
the Know-Nothings, to strengthen the Democrats, and to fur­
ther antagonize the North had been successful. Although 
the Texas Know-Nothings were predominantly pro-slavery, 
Roberts placed them directly into the same camp with their 
"source"— the puritanical, federalist, abolitionist North. 
Thereby he could blame not only the Know-Nothings but also 
the northeners who had "hatched" them. He defended the 
anti-Know-Nothing campaign and the states' rights doctrine 
in general with a scholarly explanation of "constitutional 
Democracy." He romanticized and unified all Democrats and 
southerners primarily through a lengthy historical descrip­
tion of Virginia as the model of Democracy and by calling 
upon Texans to take pride in following that example. By 
sharpening the contrast between Federalism and- Democracy, 
Know-Nothings and Democrats, northerners and southerners, 
and Massachusetts and Virginia, he was apparently able to 
indoctrinate his audience and to win converts for the Demo­
cratic party. Too, Roberts was able to build further a 
positive image of himself— an image of a gentleman-scholar,
139
M. T. Johnson to Roberts, 20 July 1856, Roberts
Papers.
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well versed in history and law. By couching his arguments 
in the form of exposition and by refusing to engage in per­
sonal vilification, he projected the image of an objective 
and ethical lecturer. His position, his demeanor, and his 
speech all added to his already well-established reputation 
with both his audience and his colleagues. In addition, 
Roberts was able to help propagate the states' rights doc­
trine through his association and influence with John Mar­
shall, editor of the Gazette and other Texas editors.
Through the implementation of these strategies,
Roberts achieved his stated rhetorical goals. By warning
the people against the "insidious" American party, he had
helped to arrest its progress. He had helped to recruit
converts into the party and to unify the Democrats into a
formal political organization. By helping get himself and
his friends elected to high political positions, he saw to
it that the newly organized Democratic party was controlled
by the states' rights wing. He, in addition to Wigfall,
Henderson, and others, had damaged Houston's reputation and
added to his defeat in the gubernatorial race of 1857. The
fact that his friends Reagan, Bryan, Henderson, Hemphill,
and Ward were all elected or appointed to congressional
posts may have been a personal disappointment to him. At
any rate Roberts received the wholehearted support of his
140colleagues in the race for associate justice and won
Roberts received numerous letters of support in 
late 1856 and early 1857 from hundreds of Democrats often 
with lists of names attached. Roberts Correspondence 1856- 
57, Roberts Papers.
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that position over four other candidates141 even though the 
ex-Know-Nothings campaigned against him in retaliation.142 
With this victory, Roberts' campaign against the Know- 
Nothings was complete. He had stepped one rung up the ju­
dicial ladder and added to his reputation as an intellectu­
al, outspoken leader of the Democratic Party.
l^lAustin Texas State Gazette, 4 April 1857.
142H. W. Sublett to Roberts, 2 February 1857 and 
A. T. Wiley to Roberts, 8 January 1857, Roberts Papers.
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CHAPTER V
CONFLICT: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE TEXAS
SECESSION CONVENTION - I860
Situation
By 1859 most of Roberts' old states' rights col­
leagues had died or were in Washington serving in the U.S. 
Congress.1 Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Roberts became the leader of the states' rights-secession
movement in Texas and "the axis around which secession 
2
moved." He delivered the speech in 1860 which was the 
turning point in public action, drew up the call for the 
secession convention, led the campaign for that purpose and 
was later elected president of the Texas Secession Conven-
3
tion. Because Roberts was more influential in the seces­
sion movement than any other man in Texas at that time, 
justifiably he may be called the father of Texas secession.
^usk, Bowden, and Henderson were dead. Reagan and 
Bryan were serving in the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Hemphill and Wigfall were in the U.S. Senate.
2Robert Kingsley Peters, "Texas: Annexation to Seces­
sion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1877), p. 
346.
3
John S. Ford, Memoirs, 8 vols. (Typescript, Archives, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1887), 5: 954-958 and 
Ernest William Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession Con- 
vention of Texas (Austin, Texas: Austin Printing Company, 
1912), pp. 7-16.
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It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the secession 
speech made by Roberts on December 1, 1860 and the campaign 
surrounding it in order to determine the agitational strate­
gies used by Roberts and the effect of those strategies on 
the course of Texas history.
Historical-Political Background
Between the years 1857 and I860, Texas and the nation 
witnessed the Kansas-Nebraska controversy, the rise of the 
Republican Party, the Dred Scott decision, and Hinton 
Helper's Impending Crisis. Northern men passed personal 
liberty laws to protect fugitive slaves and southern men 
talked of ways to reopen the African slave trade. William 
Walker filibustered in Nicaragua and John Brown made his
4
infamous raid on Harper's Ferry, Virginia. For a while 
during this period, northerners and southerners alike con­
tinued to settle their differences by "talking them out 
instead of shooting them out." Their arguments, however, 
had become crystallized and stereotyped and were "expressed 
in terms of divergent and irreconcilable interpretations of 
alleged facts supporting a series of relatively standard-
E
ized conclusions," Northerners claimed that southerners 
were committing the immoral act of human bondage and were
4James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States From 
the Compromise of 1850, ed. Allan Nevins (Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 116-190.
5J. Jeffery Auer, ed., Antislavery and Disunion, 1858- 
1861 (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1968), p. vii.
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threatening the Union. Southerners retorted that northern­
ers were plotting to steal their property and ruin their 
social and economic order. Unfortunately events occurred 
in 1859-60 which were irreversible and conflicts arose which 
were irreconcilable. Roberts explained these fateful issues 
from his southern view of them:
The first session of the Thirty-sixth Congress con­
vened on December 5, 1859. The discussions between 
the anti-slavery agitators and the advocates of the 
maintenance of the Union under the Constitution, with 
all its obligations and guarantees of the institutions 
of the South, engrossed the time of its members to 
the exclusion of nearly everything else during the 
whole session. . . . The Southern members cited those 
proceedings of the Northern states which virtually 
nullified the law passed by the general government 
for the protection of slave property. They also 
claimed that these acts of the Northern states were 
directly contrary to the solemn obligations imposed 
on them for the delivery of fugitive slaves, and de­
clared them to be sufficient ground to justify the 
Southern states in seceding from the Union. . . .
At the very time of these discussions [thirteen North­
ern states] had enacted laws which either nullified 
the act of Congress for the rendition of fugitives 
from service or rendered useless any attempt to exe­
cute it. . . . Ohio and Iowa had refused to surren­
der fugitives charged with murder and with inciting 
servile insurrection in the John Brown raid upon 
Virginia. . . . The bitter discussions in Congress 
upon the slavery question, in which the fatal divi­
sion of the Democratic Party was manifested, excited 
the serious attention of Democrats in Texas in the 
early part of the year I860.6
In Texas, after the states’ rights wing gained control 
of the Democratic Party in 1857, there was no longer any
6Oran Milo Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and 
Judicial History of Texas for its Fifty Years of Statehood, 
1845-1895," in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, 
ed. Dudley G. Wooten, 2 vols. (Dallas, Texas: William G. 
Scarff, 1898), 2: 73-75.
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Whig or Know-Nothing organization, nor were there any Repub­
licans. The major political issues were states' rights and 
protection of the frontier. With the radicals in control, 
threats of secession became louder.
Governor Runnels used the increased Indian raids to 
further antagonize the Federal Government. Instead of pro­
viding adequate state support, he proclaimed that the Feder­
al Government was responsible for protecting the Texas fron­
tier from the Indians and that they were deliberately fail­
ing to do so. Runnels realized that he would lose the fron­
tier vote but did not think that the loss would be enough 
8to defeat him.
Another event of which most Texans did not approve
was the Democrats' move to reopen the African slave trade.
Runnels, Lubbock, and John Henry Brown, secessionist editor
g
of the Belton Democrat, led this drive for two years. 
However, Roberts felt that reopening of the slave trade was 
an impossible goal and that it would affect adversely the 
drive to retain slavery in the states and to expand slavery 
in the territories. He did not disapprove of the principle
7
Anna Irene Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession 
Movement in Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly 18 
(July 1914): 58 and Ernest Wallace, Texas in Turmoil 
(Austin, Texas: Steck-Vaughn Company, 1965) , p. 45.
®John S. Ford, Rip Ford's Texas, ed. Stephen B. Oates 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1963), pp. 240- 
248.
Q
Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement m  
Texas," pp. 59-63.
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of the idea, merely the impracticality of it.10 Runnels 
and the slave trade supporters attempted to make it a part 
of the party platform at the next Democratic convention but 
the party rejected it by a majority of 228 to 81.11 Al­
though they did not approve the slave trade resolution, the 
Democrats took the extreme southern position in all other 
matters. They supported the Dred Scott decision, demanded 
federal protection of slavery until a territory applied for 
statehood, favored the acquisition of Cuba, demanded fron­
tier protection from the general government, requested the
President to procure an arrangement with Mexico for recover-
12ing fugitive slaves, and renominated Runnels and Lubbock.
Shortly after the Democratic convention, Sam Houston 
announced that he would run for governor as an Independent 
Union Democrat. He stated his platform simply: "The Con­
stitution and the Union embrace the principles by which I 
will be governed if elected. They comprehend all the old
Jacksonian National Democracy I ever professed or officially 
13practiced." During the campaign Houston capitalized on
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 52-53.
^Marshall Texas Republican, 20 May 1859.
12Emest Winkler, ed. , Platforms of Political Parties 
in Texas (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1916), 
pp. 77-79.
^Houston to George W. Paschal, 3 June 1859 in The 
Writings of Sam Houston, eds. Amelia W. Williams and 
Eugene C. Barker, 8 vols. (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas Press, 1943), 7: 340.
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Runnel's failure to protect the frontier, his drive to re­
open African slave trade, and his extreme secessionist 
views. Texans, still not prepared for disunion, elected 
Houston by almost the same margin Runnels had defeated him 
in 1857. Houston won not only the solid Union vote but 
also that of moderates who disliked the extreme states' 
rights leaders. Many supported him for personal and senti­
mental reasons. A. J. Hamilton, an Independent and a Hous­
ton supporter, was elected to Congress from the Western Dis­
trict. John H. Reagan, now considered to be a moderate 
pro-Union Democrat, won from the Eastern District. Although 
a states' rights leader in 1855 and again in 1860, Reagan 
was at odds with the radical Democrats in 1859 over the 
slave trade and filibustering schemes. The radicals were
14out and the moderates were m  control for the time being.
All hopes for moderation and Unionism were short­
lived, however, with John Brown's attack and the ensuing 
election of Louis T. Wigfall to the U.S. Senate.^ With 
Wigfall in the Senate and Roberts on the Texas Supreme 
Court, the pendulum began to swing back toward the radical 
Democrats.
■^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 53-56; Sandbo, "The Beginnings of 
the Secession Movement in Texas," pp. 63-69; and Wallace, 
Texas in Turmoil, pp. 46-47.
■'■■’Alvy King, Louis T. Wigfall (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1970), pp. 70-78; Roberts, "The Po­
litical, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 
57-58; and Sandbo, "The Beginnings of the Secession Move­
ment in Texas," pp. 66-67.
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By the time of the Democratic Convention in Galveston 
on April 2, the states* rights leaders had abandoned all re­
straint. They were determined and demanding. They boldly 
asserted that Texas possessed the right to revoke the pow­
ers she had delegated to the government of the United States 
and to resume her place among the powers of the earth as a 
sovereign and independent nation. They also warned that the 
election of a Black Republican president would provide "am­
ple cause to dissolve the Union," demanded federal protec­
tion for their frontier, and declared that the government 
was founded for the benefit of the white man and that they
would "resist the designs by northern leaders to abolish
16the distinctions between the races."
In an attempt to offset the Democrats' activities, 
the Unionists held a convention at the San Jacinto Battle 
Ground on April 21. They asked all conservative men every­
where to unite "in crushing out every species of fanati­
cism," vowed to stand behind "the Constitution and the 
Union," and nominated "General Sam Houston as the Peoples' 
candidate for the Presidency." Houston accepted but he soon 
discovered that John Bell was the favored candidate of the 
Constitutional Union Party and on August 18, 1860, withdrew 
his name.*^
•^Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, 
pp. 80-84.
■^Ibid., pp. 85-88 and Williams and Barker, Writings 
of Sam Houston, 8: 121-122.
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The simmer of 1860 was a violent period in the history 
of Texas. Hostile feelings were heightened by fires, negro 
uprisings, wholesale poisonings, and violent retaliation.
The secessionists saw northern abolitionist plots behind 
every fire and run-away slave. Vigilance committees, mili­
tary companies, and county patrol systems were formed; anti­
slavery sympathizers were beaten and many were hanged. Many 
"Castles" of a mysterious order known as the Knights of the 
Golden Circle were organized to help the secessionist cause. 
The Knights' goals were to make slavery safe, to acquire 
Cuba and Mexico for the South, and to aid the military when 
Texas left the Union. The fires, uprisings, and violence
waned by mid-September but they would be used as weapons by
18both sides in the future.
In the fall of 1860, the secessionists justified their 
activities by listing their grievances against the North. 
They cited the refusal of the North to obey the Fugitive 
Slave Law, the invasion of Kansas with rifles supplied by 
Republicans, John Brown's raid, and the abolitionist activ­
ities in their own state in the summer of 1860. These 
events contributed to the Texans' change of attitude, but 
one event turned the tide completely. Since 1856 souther­
ners had warned that the election of a Black Republican
^Billy D. Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in 
the Lone Star State; Texans' Attitudes Toward Secession and 
the Union" (Ph.D. dissertation, North Texas State Universi­
ty, 1972), pp. 205-219 and Wallace, Texas in Turmoil, pp. 
56-58.
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would mean a declaration of war. In November the Texans 
went to the polls firmly convinced that the Republicans were 
dedicated to the destruction of their rights both morally 
and legally. They gave Bell 15,463, Breckinridge 47,548, 
and not one vote to Lincoln or Douglas. Despite the Texan 
(and the southern vote), Abraham Lincoln, the Black Repub­
lican they so despised, was elected President on November 6 , 
191860. Craven describes the southern reaction to these 
events.
There had been serious crises in national af­
fairs at other times and Southerners had, more 
than once, threatened secession. But never before 
had there been such an atmosphere of desperation 
and finality . . . .
Up until John Brown's raid, there had been much 
Southern protest and indignation because of Northern 
criticism of slavery and because of denial of equal­
ity in the territories and in the distribution of 
governmental favors. But there had been little panic 
and much confidence in the Southern politicians' abil­
ity to protect his section, confidence in Northern 
friends, and in the Democratic party. Now all was 
changed. . . . The Republican party, a strange mix­
ture of moral values and sectional economic interests, 
had triumphed in a national election. Stephen A.
Douglas had been forced to interpret his squatter 
sovereignty in accordance with the views of his 
Northern supporters, and the South's desperate gam­
ble at Charleston to control the Democratic party 
. . . had failed. The game had been lost and sub­
mission or secession were the only choices left.20
•^Ledbetter, "slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the Lone 
Star State," pp. 222-224; Frank W. Johnson, A History of 
Texas and Texans, 5 vols. (Chicago: The American Historical 
Society, 1914, 1: 530; Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, 
and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 85-86; and Sandbo, "Be­
ginnings of the Secession Movement in Texas," p. 73.
20Avery 0. Craven, "Why the Southern States Seceded," 
in The Crisis of the Union, 1860-1861, ed. George H. Knoles 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), pp. 
63-64.
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In Texas the secessionists had already made their 
choice; they were determined not to submit to Republican 
rule. Led by Roberts, C. R. Johns, George Flournoy, Rip 
Ford, and W. P. Rogers, they lost no time in calling for 
disunion. They launched an immediate campaign to convince 
the people to choose separation over submission. They tried 
to get Governor Houston to convene the legislature or to 
call a special convention. Houston refused. His answer, 
which remained basically the same throughout the contro­
versy, was brief: ' "So long as the Constitution is main­
tained by the Federal authority and Texas is not made the
21
victim of Federal wrong, I am for the Union as it is."
Because of Houston's attitude, Texas had more diffi­
culty than any other state in the lower South in securing
22provision for a secession convention. But Roberts was 
just as determined to lead Texas out of the Union as Hous­
ton was to keep it in. In November, Roberts called a num­
ber of meetings of the secessionist leaders in his office 
in Austin. If he could not secure a convention through 
normal channels, he would have it another way, however 
extralegal or revolutionary it might be. On December 1 he 
delivered an important speech urging the people of Texas
21Sam Houston, Williams and Barker, Writings of Sam 
Houston, 8 : 236.
22Dwight L. Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 144 and Ralph 
A. Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South (Prince­
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 121.
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to vote in a public election for a secession convention.^
On December 3, with the assistance of George Flournoy,- W. P. 
Rogers, and John S. Ford, Roberts prepared a document call­
ing on the voters of each representative district to elect
on January 8 two delegates to a state convention to convene
24in Austxn on January 28, 1861. Roberts then led an ener­
getic campaign for the secession convention.
Physical-Sociological Milieu
At a Union meeting in Austin on November-28, Judge
James H. Bell, the other associate justice of the Supreme
Court, announced that he would make a pro-Union speech on
the following Saturday. Roberts immediately gave notice
25that he would speak at the same time and place. Chief 
Justice Otis T. Wheeler did not approve of judges involving 
ing themselves in partisan politics and therefore refrained 
from speaking. It was known that he sympathized with 
Roberts and the secessionists but he had not yet made a
23
Roberts, "TheImpending Crisis," Speech of Judge 
0. M. Roberts of the Supreme Court of Texas at the Capitol,
1 December 1860 as printed in Roberts, Our Federal Rela- 
tions: From a Southern View of Them (Austin, Texas: Eugene 
Von Boeckmann, 1892), pp. 21-49. Amended versions of the 
speech were published in the Texas State Gazette, 8 , 15, 22 
December 1860 and in pamphlet form.
^Roberts, "To the People of Texas," The First Call 
Upon the People of Texas to Assemble in Convention, Novem­
ber 1869, Roberts Papers, Archives, University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas.
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 91.
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public statement. Bell and Roberts decided that it was 
not to be a debate. Each was to express his own opinion 
without reference to that of the other.27
On December 1, 1860 a large audience gathered in Rep­
resentative Hall of the Capitol building to hear Bell and 
Roberts. At this same site in 1861 Roberts presided over
the Secession Convention and in 1878 delivered his inaugu-
28ral address as governor.
In 1860 Austin, Texas was the hub of political activ­
ity in Texas. Although Travis County was heavily Unionist, 
Austin, the capital city, was headquarters for the seces­
sionists and now Roberts' home. Roberts stated that it was
"the centre from which flowed out daily news and encourage-
29ment to both sides m  the contest." At this time, how­
ever, secessionists had to.concern themselves with all of 
Texas, not just with Austin.
The year 1860 was a memorable one in Texas. With tem­
peratures reaching 112 degrees in July, it was the hottest 
year ever known in the state. It was a presidential elec­
tion year and the political excitement was intense. The
2®Ford, Memoirs, p. 952.
27Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 91.
28Dictionary of American Biography 16 (1935): 13-14.
2^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 92 and "The Capitals of Texas," The 
Quarterly Journal of the Texas State Historical Association 
2 (October 1898): 121.
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excitement, unrest, apprehension, and fear of unseen danger 
worsened after Lincoln's election.3®
In this milieu, Roberts made his call-for-secession 
speech on December 1. Judge Bell spoke first, not mention­
ing Roberts or the secessionists. Bell delivered a two and
one-half hour pro-Union dissertation, arguing that seces-
31sion was xnexpedxent. Since Bell believed in state sov­
ereignty, he did not argue against the right of secession; 
therefore his speech did not serve the purpose which the 
Unionists had intended. After Judge Bell had spoken,
Roberts took the stand. He spoke for an hour and a half 
justifying secession and outlining a practical course of 
action in preparation for disunion. The hour was late and 
many people had left during and after Bell's speech,.but 
Roberts was firmly resolved to finish what he had vowed to 
do.32
Audience
Roberts described his listeners as "a respectable and 
attentive audience composed of adherents of the opposing 
parties." Many members of the Texas House of Representatives
30Llerena Friend, "The Texan of 1860," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 62 (July 1958): 14.
31Speech of Hon. Haines H. Bell of the Texas Supreme 
Court, 1 December 1860 as found in Roberts Papers, Archives, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas.
3^Ford, Memoirs, pp. 955-956 and Roberts, "The Polit­
ical, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 91- 
92.
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and Senate were present. The listeners who stayed to hear 
Roberts were mostly secessionists, for many of the Union­
ists had left the hall. The Union leaders, Houston, ex-
Govemor Pease, and George Paschal, remained throughout
33Roberts' speech. The secession leaders C. R. Johns,
George Flournoy, W. S. Oldham, Edward Clark and scores of
34others also attended.
Roberts was not speaking only to this immediate audi­
ence, nor was he speaking exclusively to Austinites or cit­
izens of Travis County. Due to the preceding events in the 
state and his present status, he was now in a position to 
speak to all Texans. He was fortunate that in 1860 Texans 
had more separateness in their geography, commerce, and 
history than union sentiment. Too, they had a large eco­
nomic interest in the crisis. Agriculture was their liveli­
hood and slavery was the means which maintained this liveli­
hood. In 1860 they owned 604,215 slaves, over thirty per­
cent of the entire population. They feared that the Federal 
Government was going to take away their means of liveli­
hood. 35
As an agitator for change, undoubtedly Roberts knew 
that it was time to take advantage of the Texans' feelings
34Roberts, Our Federal Relations; From a Southern View 
of Them, p. 21.
3^Friend, "The Texan of I860," pp. 1-3.
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of discontent which Lowenthal and Guterman describe as 
36"malaise." Texans had not been ready for disunion a year 
before, but events such as John Brown's raid, incendiary 
plots in their own state, and Lincoln's election brought on 
feelings of distrust, dependence, exclusion, anxiety, and 
disillusionment. All of the elements needed for a success­
ful agitational campaign as described by Smith were present: 
(1) a persistent spokesman, (2) a feeling of unrest in the
community, (3) means of communication, and (4) a single pur- 
37pose. The people needed leadership and a specific plan
of action and Roberts was prepared to give them both.
Because his friend and fellow secessionist, John Marshall,
38would publish his speech in the Texas State Gazette and
would print and distribute four thousand copies of it in 
39pamphlet form, Roberts knew that his larger audience would 
hear him.
Roberts' Rhetorical Goals 
Roberts' specific goal in speaking on December 1 was 
to persuade all Texans to vote for delegates to a secession
3*>Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, Prophets of De­
ceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), p. 15.
0 7
Arthur Lee Smith, Jr., "Samuel Adams' Agitational 
Rhetoric of Revolution" (Ph.D. dissertation, U.C.L.A.,
1968), p. 1.
Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," Austin Texas State 
Gazette, 8, 15, and 22 December 1860.
39Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 92.
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convention in a public election to be held on January 8.
His long range goal was Texas’ secession. Roberts was con­
fident that the states' rights men could control such a con­
vention, vote Texas out of the Union, and join the other 
southern states in a confederate union. He later explained 
that his goal was "to plainly show the grounds, in the con­
duct of the Northern States and people, that would justify 
Texas in any remedy that might be adapted, and to point out
the different remedies she had a right to adopt, even that 
40of secession."
In his speech, perhaps anticipating a possible charge
of conflict of interest, he stated: "It is time for all men
to speak out. I shall not hesitate to express my opinions 
41freely." [italics mine] After offering the possible 
courses of action open to Texas, Roberts revealed his rhe­
torical purpose:
I trust that Texas, before the fourth of March 
next, will have assembled her wisdom, taken her posi­
tion, and be in readiness to cooperate with her sis­
ter Southern States, whether it be in or out of the 
Union.
. . .  An effort is being made to hold a conven­
tion on the 8th of January. I hope that it will be 
done. . . .42
Roberts, of all the secession leaders in the state, had the 
knowledge and the esteem to legitimatize secession success­
40Ibid., pp. 91-92.
41Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," p. 21.
42Ibid., p. 49.
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fully. If he could convince the public that the North was 
to blame for the crisis and that his course of action was 
both justified and constitutional, he could further polar­
ize the two sections and solidify the Texans in a common 
cause. He firmly believed that if he were successful,
Texans could keep their pride, their sovereignty, and their, 
slaves.
As to his personal goals, Roberts had set aside his
congressional aspirations in 1859 when the Democrats sent
Wigfall to the Senate. He had wanted that seat and had
asked some of his political friends, including his law
partner, W. W. Short, to help him. They chose instead to
send Wigfall, the fierier and more vociferous debater, to
the Senate and asked Roberts to stay in Texas to lead the
43secession battle against Sam Houston. Even after Wigfall 
was selected, Roberts attempted to disqualify him by point­
ing out that the Texas Constitution specifically stated 
that during the time for which he was elected, no member of
either house could be eligible to any office which was made
44by either branch of the legislature. A committee studied 
the objection, but reported that the provision did not ap­
ply to the selection of a United States Senator. Rather 
bitterly Roberts replied: "If it does not apply to the
43Judge H. B. Short, nephew of W. W. Short, quoted in 
Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. Roberts" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1932), p. 99.
44Wigfall was a member of the Texas House of Repre­
sentatives and U.S. Congressmen were still elected by the 
state legislature at this time.
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election of a Senator in Congress, it may be difficult to
ascertain to the election of what other officer it would be
more applicable." Roberts also reported that although many
Democrats objected to Wigfall, "it was the caucus nomination
of Wigfall and the obligation imposed thereby that prevented
the name of any other Democrat from being submitted to the
45legislature at this election." Apparently Roberts recov­
ered from the incident, subdued his senatorial ambitions for 
awhile, and threw himself headlong into leading the secession 
movement at home.
Strategies
Petition
At a meeting two days after Lincoln's election,
Roberts advised the secessionists that he thought the best 
action to take was to petition Governor Houston to convene 
the legislature to decide on a course of action for Texas. 
Knowing that the legislature was controlled by Democrats, 
he felt confident that they would vote for secession.
j
Roberts suggested that public meetings be held where peti­
tions could be signed and then sent'to Houston. He further 
suggested that if they failed in that, they could organize 
a party for secession by the next August election when a 
governor and members of the legislature could be elected 
who were all favorable to secession. Then he proposed a 
third possibility: if the people over the state could be
45Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 57-58.
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persuaded to exhibit the spirit of resistance sufficiently,
they might be able to take a more direct route to secession_
a convention elected by the people. The consensus of opin­
ion among the leaders was that it would be unwise to take 
any advance step as long as there was a chance that the 
governor would call the legislature. They decided first to
hold meetings where they would make speeches encouraging
46the people to sign petitions.
Within a few days petition meetings sprang up over 
the various parts of the state. Houston was bombarded with 
letters, resolutions, privately signed petitions and news­
paper petitions entreating him to call a special session. 
Roberts explained the petition efforts and Houston's 
refusal:
Petitions signed by numerous citizens and gotten up 
at public meetings came pouring into the executive 
office asking the governor to convene the legislature 
in special session to determine a course of action 
for the State. Many such petitions were brought to 
him by committees appointed to present the same to 
him in person. . . . This being often repeated pro­
duced the impression that he was determined not to 
call the legislature together, notwithstanding that 
it had been reported that he had said that he would 
convene the legislature if a majority petitioned for 
it, the improbability of which was regarded as a con­
dition which negatived the call.47
A contemporary contributor to the Texas Almanac also de­
scribed the petition move and Houston's reaction:
4®Ford, Memoirs, pp. 943-949 and Roberts, "The Polit­
ical, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 86- 
89.
^Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 86.
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The governor was petitioned from all parts of 
the state to convene the legislature in order.there­
by to obtain a full and fair expression of the wishes 
of the people as to what measures should be adopted 
in the critical condition of the country. These pe­
titions, though endorsed by nearly all the public 
journals of the State and by numerous meetings in 
all the old and more populous counties, and in many 
new ones, embracing about four-fifths of all the 
counties and at least nine-tenths of the voting pop­
ulation of Texas, had no avail with our Executive,
• who still refused to allow the people this customary 
method of declaring our sentiments.^®
On November 20,.. the secessionists made their last
effort at petitioning Houston. They sent a committee from
the city of Houston which included two of Governor Houston's
old personal friends, Ashbel Smith and W. P. Rogers. The
states' rights leaders thought that perhaps Houston would
listen to Smith and Rogers. But Houston again stubbornly
49refused to budge from his position.
Having met with avoidance and denial, the separatists 
decided that it was time to act upon one of Roberts' other 
suggestions. While the Houston committee was still in 
Austin, they held a consultation and decided to make a cit­
izen's call for a secession convention through meetings 
held in different parts of the state. At the others' re­
quest, Roberts immediately drew up a call and sent it to . 
Houston, Waco, and Corsicana. However, in order to accom­
odate those who had not been able to attend the earlier 
meeting and sign the call, another call was drawn up
48The Texas Almanac, 1857-1873 (Waco, Texas: Texian 
Press, 1 9 6 7 ) p. 4fcd^
49Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 87.
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similar to the first with the addition of ten signatures. 
Roberts intended to sign the call, but Chief Justice Wheel­
er convinced him that it would not be appropriate action 
for a judge on the Supreme Court bench. They then sent 
this call throughout the state and it met with prompt and 
positive response.^
When news of the strength of the movement for a se­
cession convention reached Governor Houston, he decided to 
make a countermove in an attempt to avert or at least post­
pone the secession convention. On December 17 Houston an­
nounced that he would convene the legislature on January 21, 
1861, one week before the designated time for the secession 
convention. Houston made this unexpected move in the hope, 
if not the expectation, that the convention would be can­
celled to await the action of the legislature. Within min­
utes after Roberts heard what the Governor had done, he was 
writing letters to counteract the demoralizing effect which 
the news might have on the convention movement. He assured 
the other secessionists that it would produce no conflict 
and that they should proceed with their plans to elect del­
egates to the convention. That evening the secession lead­
ers met and worked out a plan to make it appear that the 
action of the Governor was the very thing they wanted done. 
They published such a statement in an extra edition of the 
Texas State Gazette with the Governor1s proclamation
5®Ford, Memoirs, pp. 949-957 and Roberts, "The Polit­
ical, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 87.
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attached and sent it out over the country. Ford reported 
that Houston, upon reading the Gazette, exclaimed in a fit
of anger: "The Scoundrels! They would contaminate Christ's
52sermon upon the mount if they could." The states' rights 
men had turned the tables on Houston and foiled his first 
overt attempt at suppression.
Houston tried a second diversionary move to forestall 
or otherwise suppress the convention. Using an old resolu­
tion passed under the Runnels administration in 1858, on 
December 27, 1860, Houston called an election of delegates 
to a convention of southern states, a proposal from South 
Carolina which he had previously rejected. He also wrote
S^The document prepared by the secessionists read as 
follows:
"Good News for the People
At last Governor Houston responds to the People 
so far as to call the Legislature together!
The Executive, as well as the State authorities, 
will now move in harmony with the great mass of the 
people!
The legislature is called by Proclamation to 
meet on the 21st of January next. This is in full 
harmony with a call of a convention on the 4th Mon­
day of January, to be composed of delegates elected 
by the people on the 8th of January next, in pursu­
ance of a call already made. The Legislature will 
ratify the action of the People, and the call of a 
Convention. There will be no conflict.
We call upon the people not to be misled by 
false pretexts— to move on in the exercise of their 
sovereign power. It belongs to them to determine 
whether their rights can be best secured in or out 
of the Union.
Let every patriot go to the polls and exercise 
his sovereign right on the 8th day of January."
(Ford, Memoirs, pp. 959-960.)
5^Ford, Memoirs, p. 962.
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letters to the governors of the other southern states advis­
ing them of his actions. His letters were ignored and no 
election was ever held.53 The secessionists described his 
tactic as "a puerile effort to mislead the people" and "a
flagrant trampling of the law underfoot by the Executive
54and his toadies."
The secessionists could now declare that they had
tried all normal discursive means of persuasion and had been
met with both the control methods of avoidance and attempted
5 5suppression— tactics described by Bowers and Ochs. Since 
Houston refused to adjust or to capitulate to the petitions 
he received, the secessionists could justify the use of more 
drastic measures in order to secure their rights.
Promulgation
In order to convince the public to elect delegates 
to a secession convention, Roberts and the secessionists 
organized a comprehensive informational campaign. They sent 
out mass mailings, organized protest meetings and rallies, 
and exploited the newspapers. Immediately after the Novem­
ber meeting of secession leaders, Roberts wrote letters to
5 3 Ford, Memoirs, p. 958 and Roberts, "The Political, 
Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 89-90.
5^Marshall Texas Republican, 5. January 1861 and 
Dallas (Texas) Herald, 9 January 1861 printed in Llerena 
Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer (Austin, Texas: 
University of Texas Press, 1954), p. 334.
55John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric 
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 39-56.
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all of the important Democratic leaders in the larger 
counties informing them of his plan. Then he mailed the 
resolutions, or call, which he had drawn up asking the peo­
ple to vote for secession by sending delegates to the con­
vention. After December 1, he mailed out approximately
four thousand copies of his secession speech made at the 
56Capitol. Wentworth Manning reported that "many thousand 
copies of his [Robert^] speech were printed in pamphlet 
form and Texas was seeded down with them and many were sent 
out of state.
Roberts and the states' rights leaders also organized 
meetings, barbeques, rallies, and demonstrations throughout 
the state to inculcate their message. The meetings in the 
summer of 1860 showed the fearful and violent mood in Texas 
at the time. Because they felt that abolitionists were be­
hind the fires, poisonings, and slave escapes, Texans held 
hundreds of mass meetings in which they organized vigilance
committees and safety patrols to uncover the "abolitionist
58plots" and mete out the proper justice.
In the fall, the meetings concentrated on the peti­
tioning of Houston. Roberts received many reports of such
^Roberts, Our Federal Relations, p. 21 and "The Po­
litical, Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," pp. 
87-88.
5 7 Wentworth Manning, Some History of Van Zandt County 
(Des Moines: Homestead Company, 1919), p. 143.
"^Austin Texas State Gazette, 11 August 1860 and 
Sandbo, "Beginnings of the Secession Movement in Texas," 
p. 168.
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meetings throughout the state. From Palestine Reagan re­
plied to Roberts concerning the planning of such meetings:
The people of this County will hold a mass meeting 
next Saturday and will petition Governor Houston to 
call the legislature together at once to take such 
action as our condition requires. All of the other 
counties in this section will do the same.5^
R. B. Hubbard reported to Roberts on the meeting in Smith
County:
On Saturday last, we had the largest mass meeting 
ever held in Smith County. . . .  We passed Resolu­
tions expressing a determination to resist the admin­
istration of Lincoln and memoralising the Governor to 
call the Legislature. . . . There is scarcely any op­
position here to our action. All parties, forgetting 
the bitter rivalries of the late contest [the Know- 
Nothing campaign], are united together in the common 
cause. The whole of Eastern Texas is aroused— and 
Northern Texas. If the West stands firm, therefore 
we can act as becomes an outraged— a sovereign people, 
above, in spite of Houston's brief authority [sic].®0
G. B. Sexton wrote about the meeting in San Augustine:
Yesterday, one of the largest, most united meet­
ings I have ever seen was held here. Col. Alex New­
ton presided and was the first to sign the petition 
to the Governor to convene the Legislature. . . .  I 
hear accounts of large and enthusiastic meetings and 
demonstrations in Tyler, Henderson, Marshall, etc.61
After the secession leaders were convinced that Hous­
ton would not heed their petitions, they turned the meetings 
into anti-Lincoln, anti-Houston, pro-secession .rallies, dem­
onstrations, and public debates. At some of the rallies.
John H. Reagan to Roberts, 20 November 1860,
Roberts Papers.
60R. B. Hubbard to Roberts, 26 November 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
61G. B. Sexton to Roberts, 1 December 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
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speakers asserted that it was the duty of Texans to resist 
the inauguration of a sectional. Republican president even 
at the point of a bayonet. At many meetings like the one 
held in De Witt County, the citizens passed resolutions de­
claring that if Lincoln were elected, the South must dis-
62solve all political connections with the North. The
Breckinridge and Lane Club was organized on September 10
63and became strong in Austin and throughout Texas. Rip
Ford reported that Austin was the scene of much feverish
activity where groups of secessionists constantly marched
up and down the streets waving torches and carrying signs
condemning Lincoln and the abolitionists. At one’ secession
rally, Roberts spoke in favor of secession while over in
the Capitoi, Governor Houston still argued that they must
64all submit to Lincoln's victory at the polls. Roberts, 
Ford, and others planned a huge parade in Austin on Janu­
ary 5. Frank Brown described that day:
At mid-morning it moved off from the Capitol, 
with parade marshall Ford in front on a white stal­
lion, followed by a blaring band, then a long line 
of carriages full of screeching ladies who waved 
Lone Star Flags, and finally a mass of yipping po­
litical leaders and agitators on horseback.
Down Congress Avenue went the blatant mob, swinging 
around the corner to Eighth Street and stopping at
®^Wallace, Texas in Turmoil, p. 56.
63Larry J. Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and 
War: John Marshall and the Texas State Gazette," South­
western Historical Quarterly 62 (October 1958): 200.
^Ford, Rip Ford' s Texas, pp. xxxv-xxxvi.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
last at the intersection of Eighth and Colorado.
There, while everyone shouted as loud as they 
could for a full ten minutes, a color guard ran 
the Lone Star flag up a 130-foot flagpole espe­
cially erected for the o c c a s i o n . 65
A unique form of political rally, "the serenade," became
popular in Austin in December. The serenaders marched to
the homes of the city and state officials and were rewarded
6 fiwith political and patriotic speeches.
In 1860 Roberts again used the secession newspapers 
to spread the secessionists' message. These publications 
included the Austin Texas State Gazette, the Houston Tele- 
graph, the Galveston News, the San Antonio Herald, the Mar­
shall Texas Republican, the Dallas Herald, and the Clarks­
ville Northern Standard. Edited by John Marshall, Roberts' 
friend and chairman of the Democratic Party in Texas, the 
Texas State Gazette was by far the most influential news­
paper in the state. Through the Gazette, Roberts led a bat­
tle of words against Lincoln, Houston, Unionism, Republican­
ism, abolition, and "Helperism" and in defense of Brecken- 
ridge, southern rights, Democracy, and secession. The se­
cessionists' attacks became increasingly bitter as inaugu­
ration time neared. While praising the bold, fearless se­
cession "patriots," the agitators condemned the "insidious
65Frank Brown, Annals of Travis County and the City 
of Austin from the Earliest Times to the Close of 1875 (MS, 
Archives, University of Texas, Austin, Texas), Chap. 21, 
pp. 4-5.
66Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War," pp. 
203-204.
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and wicked Union shriekers who were waiting for the overt 
act from the Black Republicans." Also important to the se­
cession leaders, the Gazette printed their major speeches
in full and often published the speeches of important south-
6 7ern leaders to promote the cause of secession.
In reaction to the secessionists' campaign, the oppo­
sition Texas Unionists also had their tactics of promulga­
tion. They held large rallies and demonstrations and used 
the press in an attempt to stop the secession movement and 
keep Texas in the Union. Houston and his strongest support­
ers held meetings at the Travis Union Club, made speeches, 
and led parades and demonstrations. The men who helped 
Houston refute Roberts' messages and promulgate the Union 
message were U.S. House member A. J. Hamilton, George Pas­
chal, and A. B. Norton, editors of the Southern Intelligen­
cer; E. J. Davis, who later raised a Union force during the 
Civil War; James W. Throckmorton, later a delegate to the 
secession convention who voted against secession; and ex- 
Democrats E. M. Pease, former governor, and David G. Bur­
net, ex-president of the Republic. Their major papers were
the Austin Southern Intelligencer, the largest and most in-
6ftfluential newspaper, the Marshall Harrison Flag, the Fort
67Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War," pp. 
191-206 and Donald E. Reynolds, Editors Make War (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1966), pp. vii, 8, 10, 22, 30, 
113, 142, 144-145, 171, 177-178.
68Austin (Texas) Southern Intelligencer, 15 September
1860.
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Worth Chief and the Corpus Christi Ranchero.69 However, in 
spite of the Unionists' ardent efforts, the states' rights 
monopoly over news distribution in the South greatly facil­
itated the work of Roberts and the secessionists.70
Image Building 
Collectively, the southern secessionists had to coun­
ter the image of "Honest Abe." In Texas Roberts and his 
group had to fight the image of "the father of the Republic" 
and "the hero of San Jacinto." But by 1860 Roberts was very 
well known and well respected throughout the state, not just 
in East Texas. Bailey describes his reputation at the time:
Roberts had become by reason of his position 
on the Supreme bench a character of statewide in­
fluence, no longer merely a man of. the 'East.'
The position which he had gained as a party leader, 
furthermore, marked him out as a man whose judgment 
would be sought in a crisis. His political opinions, 
and his views on the great controversy, in this pe­
riod of uncertainty, became in consequence as much 
sought after at the Capital as formerly in his own 
home district.71
Just before and immediately after Lincoln's election,
Roberts received many letters articulating the same ques­
tion: "What shall we do?" John W. Overton, a Democratic 
leader in Smith County, wrote a typical letter to Roberts
gg
Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War," pp. 
195-210; Ledbetter, "Slavery, Fear, and Disunion in the 
Lone Star State," p. 253; and Reynolds, Editors Make War, 
pp. 10, 113, 133, 145.
70Reynolds, Editors Make War, p. 215.
7^Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. 
Roberts," p. 102.
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saying that the people of Smith County were ripe for action
and that they wanted "the serious counsel of their ablest
72
and wisest men." Even the moderate Reagan listened to 
Roberts. Reagan wrote Roberts that his views were now in 
accord with Roberts' and that his cooperation might be count­
ed upon in any important step which might become necessary 
to the "common safety and security if Lincoln be elected.1,73
Bolstered by the confidence of the people in his opin­
ions, Roberts decided to make a major speech on secession 
despite Chief Justice Wheeler's caution. Wheeler felt that 
the people would act without leadership, and in spite of the 
influence of Houston and the Unionists, would resist Repub­
lican rule. Roberts had more confidence in the influence 
of men .in high position. He pointed out to Wheeler that 
Governor Houston, A. J. Hamilton, representative from the 
West, and now Judge Bell were making powerful efforts to 
reconcile the people to submission to a Republican president. 
Roberts told Wheeler that he believed "that someone whom the 
people had entrusted with high position should stand forth, 
and tell men that they were right in resisting; that it was
due to them, and to the cause that they should be thus en-
74couraged and fortified." Roberts- apparently felt that he
72John W. Overton to Roberts, 5 November 1860, Roberts
Papers.
73John H. Reagan to Roberts, 1 November 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
74Ford, Memoirs, p. 953.
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was that "someone" and made his decision to "take the stand 
and champion the cause of secession." Iiis decision was no 
doubt made easier by the encouragement of such men as Demo­
crat leader T. J. Chambers who wrote:
We look to you for light to guide and news to 
direct us onward. In ordinary times, I should re­
gret to see the storms of political strife riffle, 
in the slightest degree, the sacred ermine of our 
judges, but when our institutions are shaken to 
the deepest foundation, it becomes not only their 
privilege, but their duty, to speak out boldly and 
enlighten us with their learning and wisdom.
Roberts rarely used the personal pronoun "I" except 
in his introductions and conclusions, but to build his es­
teem, he always told the audience in some manner that he 
had been requested by. the public to speak. Here, in 1860, 
he stated: "A public expression of my views, in reference 
to the impending crisis, has been solicited by gentlemen 
of all parties. . . .  I shall not hesitate to give my opin­
ions freely." After giving his views, he apparently thought 
it sufficient to state that "I hope that it [the holding of
the convention] will be done" in order to actuate the public
^ . . 7 6to vote for secession.
The tone in the speech, however, was no longer re­
strained as the language shows. He had been thoroughly an­
tagonized both by the actions of the North and by Lincoln * s 
election and was confident in the rightness of his course.
"^*F. J. Chambers to Roberts, 22 November 1860,
Roberts Papers.
76Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," pp. 21, 49.
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He had always arisen in times of crisis to admonish the 
people as to what they must do. They could also count on 
him now. He knew what they were feeling and thought that 
he could express those feelings for them. Because of his 
esteem, his wisdom, and his apparent sincerity, Roberts 
could probably have convinced most Texans on his word alone. 
He had become, by 1860, the exhorter whom Edwin Black de­
scribes as "the agent of truth to his auditors and the val-
77idator of their emotions."
Obj ectification
The source of Roberts' grievances was as usual the
"fanatical North," the group which was "responsible for all
the misfortune that had befallen the agitator's [Roberts']
78votarists." In 1850 northerners were to blame for the 
Texas-New Mexico boundary dispute and in 1855 they were to 
blame for the rise of the Know-Nothing Party. But now they 
had gone too far. Besides backing abolitionist plots in 
Texas, the North had elected a Black Republican president 
who obviously intended to ruin their social and economic 
order and their entire way of life. Texas was in danger, 
Roberts warned, and he intended to show that it was the 
northern people and the Republican Party who were to blame.
7?Edwin Black, Rhetorical Criticismr A Study in Method 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 146.
78Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution (Bos- • 
ton: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 29.
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Again, he did not vilify Houston nor did he vilify Lincoln. 
In fact he did not even mention the Texas Unionists. Per­
haps he viewed the Texas Unionists as merely the "local" 
opposition who were in the minority even though some of 
them were very influential. Perhaps he did not mention 
them because Houston and some of the Unionists were in the 
audience. For whatever reasons Roberts went directly to 
what he believed was the source of all their grievances.
To degrade and stigmatize the North and the Republi­
cans, he referred to them in such terms as "the revolution­
ary party of the North," "this aggressive party," "persons 
entirely ignorant of our condition and interest," "a few 
powerful Northern states," and "furious fanatics." He la­
beled their actions as "unauthorized aggression," "endless,
wrangling, raging discord," "intermeddling interference,"
79and "disregard of a sacred compact."
Roberts was especially derogatory when he discussed 
the North's agitation and harboring of fugitive slaves. 
Facetiously he hypothesized:
Suppose the Northern States., believing slav­
ery to be a siri and a great social and political 
evil, and having nursed and cultivated a virulent 
antipathy towards this institution, should permit 
a set of fanatics to prowl along the borders of 
the free states,watching an opportunity to decoy 
a slave from his master, and have him conveyed by 
the aid of his associates and the connivance of 
the sympathizing community, beyond the reach of
^Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," pp. 21-49 passim.
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his owner; or if the master should pursue his prop­
erty, an infuriated mob of free negroes and worse 
white people, rescue the slave and defy the laws 
of the State and of Congress, and perhaps avail 
themselves of some imprudence of the indignant and 
outraged owner, slay him with impunity, and the 
State permits it, or what is worse, discharge the 
culprits, after a trial which is made a mockery of 
justice by the same mob filling the court-house, 
and making another rescue by the force of perjury.
. . .  Good men there are, . . . who regard robbery 
and murder, and resistance to lawful authority as 
more heinous offenses than owning and pursuing a 
fugitive slave. The hands of those good men must 
be tied so as to let the motley mob execute the 
higher law of public opinion. [italics mine]80
Roberts also stigmatized, as he always did, the Fed­
eralists' (northerners', Republicans') loose or liberal in­
terpretation of the Constitution as the basis of their mis­
direction:
This [liberal construction] induces a contin­
ual effort to find powers in the Constitution that 
are, in fact, not expressed, and were never in­
tended to be delegated. By this means, the powers 
of the government are perverted by being the instru­
ment of accomplishing favorite objects not at all 
embraced within its scope of constitutional action. 
. . .  It is a change by the infusion of extraneous 
elements, . . . through the perversion of its pow­
ers, or through the usurpation of additional powers 
not granted. . . . The preponderance of Northern 
mind has been predisposed thus. . . . Hence Federal­
ism, of which this is the essence, though often 
beaten back, as often renews its form of develop­
ment, and then seeks to engraft itself upon the 
government, and now more than ever, bold, trium­
phant, and arrogant, demands its admission into the 
government. 81
Objects also of his wrath were again the northern 
preachers. He accused them of injecting their moral and
^Ibid., p. 34.
81Ibid., p. 39.
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religious ideas into politics and of impressing themselves 
upon the government of our country. He abhorred the fact 
that "their preachers have been leaders in all the politi­
cal excitements, from the day of Cotton Mather, to the 
present time and this practice has given great prominence 
to political measures, which involved moral or religious 
questions." Not content to spread their fanatical gospel 
at home, these northern preachers also felt it their duty
to go abroad "to array the public sentiment of the world
82against the institution [slavery]."
Roberts asserted that the North had accomplished al­
most all of their goals against the South by plotting "a 
well concerted scheme of'continuous aggression." For years 
they had fomented "agitation, discord, and division." They
had been the "fanatical aggressors" and are therefore to
83blame for the present crisis.
While Roberts was objectifying the North, Houston was 
calling Roberts and the secessionists "villains" and "trai­
tors." In a speech to a Union gathering in Austin, Houston 
denounced Roberts and the disunionists as reckless and mis­
chievous agitators.. He stated: "There is no longer a holy 
ground upon which the footsteps of the demagogue may not 
fall." He then accused the separatists of tearing down the 
altars of our liberties, jeering at the Declaration of
82Ibid., pp. 41, 45.
83Ibid., pp. 37, 41.
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Independence, deriding the farewell counsels of Washington,
and making the Union secondary to the success of party and
the adoption of abstractions. He called them "transplants
from the South Carolina nursery of disunion." He labeled
them "selfish chieftains who would become prey to foreign
powers," "unsatisfied and corrupt politicians who long for
title and power," and "wealthy knaves who have pliant tools
to work upon in the forum and with the pen." In a December
speech, he called them "agitators," "enemies," and "dis-
unionists" who would prejudice the people against him in
advance of his actions. In a letter to his son he declared
that "The Demons of anarchy must be put down and destroyed.
The miserable Demagogues and Traitors of the land must be
84silenced, and set at.naught." In general Lincoln, Seward, 
and the northern people viewed the secessionists as obsti­
nate, arrogant slave-holders who refused to listen to reason..
Lincoln would try to conciliate, but he doubted that the
8 5southerners would listen.
Legitimation
All secessionists justified their right of action on 
the theory of state sovereignty (states' rights, the compact
8^Sam Houston, "Address at the Union Meeting," Austin, 
Texas, 22 September, 1860; "Address to the People of Texas," 
Austin, Texas, 3 December, I860; and Houston to Sam Houston, 
Jr., 7 November, 1860 in Williams and Barker, The Writings 
of Sam Houston, 8: 145-160, 184-185, 206-208.
85Robert T. Oliver, History of Public Speaking in 
America (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1965), p. 306.
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theory of government). They all believed that the Federal 
Government was created by a voluntary union of free, sover­
eign, independent states joined in a spirit of mutual confi­
dence and respect, recognizing the equal rights and privi­
leges relative to the diverse interests and institutions of 
each of the sovereign states. They believed that they could 
also dissolve that union whenever the central government 
tried to destroy a state's independence or ancestral insti­
tutions. Some admitted that a state had no constitutional 
right to withdraw from the Union, and regarded secession as 
revolution. Some based their action upon eternal principles 
of human rights as expressed in the Declaration of Independ­
ence. Others, like Roberts, based their right to act upon
86constitutional grounds.
Constitutional legitimation was Roberts' chief modus 
operandi. He used his vast knowledge of constitutional law 
to explain and interpret the Constitution in a way that 
would justify, vindicate, and legalize his actions to his 
satisfaction and to the satisfaction of his states' rights 
colleagues and the general public. Roberts used constitu­
tional legitimation to justify two major rights of action—  
the right to hold and protect slaves and the right to secede.
Roberts began his speech by stating the effect, which 
was the crisis caused by the election of a "Black Republi­
can" whose administration would bring about the destruction
Dumond, The Secession Movement, p. 120.
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of the states' domestic institutions. He then led the au­
dience to his favored solution through a form of the method 
87of residues. • To the question, "What action then, may the 
people rightfully adopt in so serious a crisis?”, Roberts 
presented four all-inclusive constitutional possibilities.
He then proceeded to show that the last possibility— that 
of assembling a convention through the people— was the most 
satisfactory. He did not overtly state that the other pos­
sible alternatives were unsatisfactory, but because they 
were either impractical or impossible at the time, he al­
lowed the listeners to supply this unstated step in the 
reasoning process. First he stated that the governor could 
convene the legislature to effect a remedy. Everyone knew 
that Houston had stubbornly refused to use this alternative 
even after weeks of petitioning and he would not try this 
move as a countermeasure for almost three weeks. Secondly 
Roberts suggested that the legislature could request Con-' 
gress to call a convention of all the states to propose 
amendments to the Constitution. The unlikeliness of this 
action was apparent. Thirdly he stated that the legislature 
could provide for a convention of delegates representing the 
people in their sovereignty. This measure was impractical 
because the legislature was not due to meet until after 
Lincoln's inauguration and Roberts and the secessionists
®^Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 5th 
ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1981), pp. 231-232.
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wanted to have something accomplished by that time. Then 
he proposed his fourth and last possibility for which he 
supplied abundant advantages: "Or, a convention may be as­
sembled without a call from the legislature, or from any 
department of State government, by concert among the people 
themselves." Roberts then asserted:
Such convention, however assembled, might de­
clare the grievances of the State, appoint dele­
gates to sister States, to devise a plan of common
redress within the Union, or it might indicate 
terms upon which the State could continue quietly 
to perform its duties within the Union. . . .
Should such a convention be assured that it repre­
sented the will of the people, . . .  it may declare 
the people absolved from their fealty to the general 
government and devise such measures as may be neces­
sary to protect their rights and liberties as an in­
dependent sovereign.88
Here, again, the alternatives were presented as objective 
choices. However, since Roberts was a known advocate of 
secession and since the majority of his speech justified 
the right of secession; it was clear which action he fa­
vored.
Before Roberts stated the specific constitutional
provision on which he based the right of secession, he gave
a lengthy explanation of the compact theory of government 
or what he termed "the established theory of our government" 
which in itself provided justification of secession. After 
explaining that the Constitution of the United States was 
"a written compact between independent sovereign states 
which formed a general government of delegated limited
88Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," pp. 22-24.
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powers," he proclaimed that "if this compact, thus entered 
into, be palpalably broken by the deliberate action or non­
action of the States, or of the general government, . . .  it 
may rightfully, acting in its sovereign capacity, pronounce 
the compact at an end . . . ." The official state govern­
ment had this power or a mass of individuals elected by the 
people had this power, he stated. He then referred to the 
Tenth Amendment which provided that the powers not dele­
gated to the United States by the Constitution were reserved 
to the states and contended that "one of the powers reserved 
was that inherent right of the people to make and unmake 
governments, to alter, reform, or abolish their form of
government. This was expressly reserved by the people of
89Texas in their constitution. . . . "  Roberts was referring
here to the first section of the Bill of Rights of the Texas
Constitution which he included in its entirety in his writ-
90ten call for secession.
In a continued attempt at legitimation, Roberts pro­
ceeded to prove that slavery was constitutional and that 
the actions of the northern states toward slavery were un­
constitutional and the cause of the present crisis. Here
89Ibid., pp. 27-28.
90Roberts, "To the People of Texas," p. 1. The sec- . 
tion reads as follows: "All political power is inherent in 
the people, and all free governments are founded on their 
authority and instituted for their benefit, and they have 
at all times the unalienable right to alter, reform, or 
abolish their form of government, in such manner as they 
think expedient. (1st section of the Bill of Rights)."
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Roberts declared that the Constitution of the United States 
furnished provisions which served as treaty stipulations 
between the states and as the fundamental law of each state. 
He listed a number of articles on the coining of money, etc. , 
until he came to the evidence applicable to his point—  
Article IV of the Constitution. He quoted:
No person who shall be held to service or labor 
in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in consequence of any law or regu­
lation therein, be discharged from such service, or 
labor may be due.91
He contended that the observance of the provisions was im­
portant to our system of government in two respects:
1st. That the general government may be allowed 
to perform those functions of government which 
are indispensable to the existence and preserva­
tion of a common government for all.
2nd. That the rights of each State.which it en­
joys under its reserved powers, however peculiar 
they may be, in response to the interests, opin­
ions, habits, pursuits, or prejudices of its own 
people, may be respected and accorded to it by the 
public authorities and citizens of every other 
State in the Union.92
All of this, he believed, was positive proof that the Con­
stitution protected slavery.
To defend his cause further, Roberts then went into a 
lengthy description as to why the North was the cause of 
the "impending crisis." The North had accomplished their 
deeds of aggression not only by their non-return of fugitive 
slaves but also by their exclusion of slavery from the ter­
ritories, by the general recognition of universal freedom,
??-Ibid. , p. . 32. 
^Ibid. , pp. 32-33.
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by the use of the patronage of the Executive branch to dis­
criminate against slave labor, by fomenting agitation and 
discord through a free press and free speech, and by agitat­
ing the question until all the departments of the Federal 
Government were enlisted in the cause. These acts, to 
•Roberts, were unconstitutional and incendiary. Whatever 
happened, then, as a result of the present conflict, would 
not be the fault of the slave-holders because they were le­
gally right. The fault would lie in the opposition's arro­
gance and obstinacy.
The opposition— Lincoln, Houston, Republicans, Union­
ists— all stood firmly on "the supreme law of the land" 
clause in Article VI of the Constitution which was a power 
of the national government and therefore could not be a re­
sidual power of the states. Lincoln best legitimized their 
constitutional stand against slavery.in 1860 by pointing out 
that neither the word "slave" or "slavery" could be found in 
the Constitution, that no such right was specifically writ­
ten in the Constitution, and that the majority of the found­
ing fathers "certainly understood that no proper division of 
local from federal authority, nor any part of the Constitu­
tion, forbade the Federal Government to control slavery in
94the federal territories . . . ." To them the Constitution
93ibid., pp. 41-42.
^Abraham Lincoln, "Address at Cooper Union," 27 Feb­
ruary 1860 in American Speeches, eds. Wayland Maxfield Par­
rish and Marie Hochmuth (New York: Longmans, Green and Com­
pany, 1954), pp. 284-304.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 8 9
and the Union were inseparable and inviolate; it was the 
disunionists who were misinterpreting it.
Mythication
Arthur Smith explains best how the agitator uses myth­
ication to glorify his cause:
‘ By suggesting that 'it is our destiny,' 'the flow 
of history dictates,' or this plan is good for 
'our children,' the rhetor effects an exhortation 
for his audience. The audience is connected to 
the great universe . . . .  The group possesses a 
spiritual dynamism that sets it off from all other 
groups because of the appropriation of certain 
supra-rational influences to its cause. The mem­
bers of the group become for all practical reasons 
the chosen people, the saviors, and the beautiful.
They recognize the peculiar challenge confronting 
them as a group if the rhetor speaks to them in 
terms of forefathers and posterity. Indeed, the 
group often feels that it must perform the planned 
task, and it alone.95
Roberts used appeals to history, the forefathers, the race, 
destiny, and posterity to bestow upon his followers this 
feeling of selection, of particularity. He stated directly: 
"The facts of history are on our side." He claimed that 
history would bear out the fact that the Constitution and 
the forefathers were on their side. Indeed the Constitution 
would never have been adopted without provision for the de­
livery of escaped slaves. Even "Mr. Madison" agreed with 
him on that issue, he inferred. Even "Mr. Webster" and 
General Jackson made statements which backed his cause. He 
reasoned from tradition that "we have always had slavery;" 
"it is part of our heritage;" and "it is part of our social
^5Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution, p. 37.
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organization.” Besides that, "the civilized world is with 
our cause: Spain maintains slavery in Cuba; . . . Brazil 
maintains slavery; . . . Russia has millions of serfs; . . .
g g
the cooley trade proves it."
Roberts also appropriated suprarational powers to his 
cause and to his followers by claiming racial superiority. 
He maintained:
It [slavery] tends to the perpetuation of our 
republican institutions, by establishing an inferior 
class, fixed by law, and known by color, and by pro­
moting the equality of the superior white race. Nor 
is this a legalized fiction. For the African race, 
is indeed the inferior, intellectually, and for that 
reason the better fitted for its position of servi­
tude. 97
He continued in this vein:
We believe in the enslavement of the African 
race because we believe it is right— morally and 
politically right— that it is sanctioned by reve­
lation, and by the immemorial custom of mankind, 
and was never questioned until lately. . . .98
Roberts believed that it was the white man's destiny 
to protect and provide for his slaves due to their inferior 
intellect. He wondered what they would do if they were 
freed. He answered: "We cannot turn them loost [sic] 
amongst us. It would be an act of inhumanity to them.
They would have no one to protect them. They would descend 
to the vilest barbarism." Parrington explains this myth 
perpetuated by the southern slave-holder:
^Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," pp. 29, 33, 36, 48.
97Ibid., p. 25.
98Ibid., p. 26.
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In the South, they [the southern apologists] 
pointed out, . . . the master was responsible to 
society for the treatment and.conduct of his slaves.
. . . The workers were never troubled by uncertain 
means of subsistence. . . . Living conditions were 
commonly pleasant, and the personal relations be­
tween master and slave kindly and loyal.-
Roberts was also concerned about posterity if the negroes 
were freed and postulated that "a war of races would ensue, 
and if they were not-exterminated, they, would hang upon our 
society, a demoralizing, degrading element dragging us down 
in the scale of civilization." If the- "menial services re­
quired by society" were not performed by the African race, 
they would have to be performed by the sons and daughters 
of white people. Roberts believed, like the southern
fire-eaters, that if the nation were not kept "a white 
man's country," they and their descendants would suffer 
ruin, degradation, and dishonor.10 -^ Roberts sincerely felt
that the white race was not meant for such a destiny and
102that rather than a sin, it was a moral good.
The opposition also made use of the strategy of myth- 
ication. The anti-slavery advocates did not appeal just to
Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American 
Thought, 3 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 
1927),“3: 101.
100Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," p. 26.
101H. Hardy Perrit, "The Fire-Eaters," in Oratory of 
the Old South, ed. Waldo W. Braden (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1970), pp. 241, 244, 249.
•L02For a more extensive treatment of this topic, see 
Roberts, "On the Use and Misuse of the Principle 'All Men 
Are Created Equal'," Public Lecture at the University of 
Texas, Austin, Texas, 26 February 1892, printed in Our 
Federal Relations, Appendix 1, pp. 1-23.
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history, the forefathers, or posterity. They truly believed 
that God was on their side. Many secessionists appealed to 
God or to Christianity, but not as frequently or as zealous­
ly as the abolitionists. God, they believed, had bestowed 
upon them a special vision to see the right. To the Repub­
licans and Unionists, the struggle was between truth and 
error, right and wrong, morality and sin, with truth, right, 
and morality on their side. To glorify their cause-, they
called not only upon God, but upon liberty, freedom, jus-
103tice, and humanity. In his First Inaugural Address,
Lincoln called on "the Almighty Ruler of nations with his
eternal truth and justice," "Heaven," "the mystic chords of
memory," "the patriot grave," "the chorus of the Union,"
104and "the better angels of our nature" as suprarational 
support. In the use of mythication the secessionists had 
met their match in the anti-slavery orators.
Solidification 
In 1860 Texans were ready for action in some form.
They had changed their attitude toward the secessionists 
from disapproval to apathy to sympathy. To marshal the 
sympathizers into a more unified, purposeful group and to 
reinforce the cohesiveness of the confirmed secessionists,
103Oliver, History of Public Speaking in America, 
pp. 229-239, 253-269, 283-308.
104
Abraham Lincoln, "First Inaugural Address," m  
Parrish and Hochmuth, American Speeches, pp. 42-43.
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Roberts used appeals to their pride and their fear in his 
speech. To solidify further the people in a common cause, 
Roberts and the states' rights leaders utilized in-group 
publications, novels, poems, symbols, and slogans.
Taking advantage of the Texans' malaise, Roberts ap­
pealed to their injured pride and to their fear of what may 
happen if they stayed in the Union and submitted to Repub­
lican rule. Invoking their pride, he boasted of their in­
telligence, judgment, and honor:
Which one of these remedies may be adopted, 
it is for the people to say when they have found 
the means of expressing their will. . . .  I have 
no fear that inconsiderate rashness will control 
them. They have pondered on the issues of this, 
crisis long and well. It is not unexpected. They 
have their minds made up about it. . .  Our people 
are not asking or seeking to extort any favors 
from the government to themselves, or deprive others 
of any rights. They have no motive or desire for a 
social rupture at home. [They have] a high resolve 
now to throw themselves into the breach, not to de­
stroy, but to protect rights; not to destroy prop­
erty, but to protect property; not: to destroy life, 
but to make life worth having; not to produce dis­
cord, but to end it. . . . I will not yield to any 
argument founded on their want of discretion, want 
of intelligence, want of integrity to act for them­
selves in a serious emergency and to act upon it 
now. ^ 05
He continued by pointing to the patriotism and the long-
suffering patience of the Texans:
. . . They love the Constitution of their country 
and would consider it now as a great boon to be 
allowed to live in peace under it. . . . But the 
truth is, that their patience is exhausted by this 
wrangling, raging discord, with which they have so 
long been beset, . . . this arrogantly assumed con­
trol of their destiny, by others, the oft-repeated
105Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," p. 24.
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and continued violations of plicrhted faith and 
disregard of a sacred c o m p a c t .106
To solidify and activate his audience, Roberts appealed to
their fear of the loss of property and of rights:
. . . And justly alarmed by the rapid progress of 
an infuriate revolutionary spirit, which under the 
guise and forms of government, threatens to over­
whelm them, and destroy their civilization, and 
ultimately to lay their country in waste, they are 
rising in their miqht. of outraged manhood, to set­
tle the question.107
Roberts stated that the public's patience was exhausted and 
that they were rising to action as fact in the hope that 
their impatience and action would match that of the seces­
sion leaders. Of course, he went on to. suggest what action 
they might take.
Roberts and the other secession leaders also sought 
to unify the people.sympathetic to secession.into a more 
loyal and more active group through the use of such in­
group devices as propagandistic prose and poetry, symbols, 
slogans, and in-group publications. The secessionist pa­
pers, especially the Texas State Gazette, the Marshall 
Texas Republican, the Dallas Herald, and the Houston Tele­
graph were so biased that they served as partisan publica­
tions. Hand-bills, pamphlets, and broadsides also publi^- 
cized and promulgated the southern oriented prose, poetry, 
symbols, and slogans.
106Ibid., pp. 24-25.
107Ibid., p. 25.
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Proctor states that the poets, songsters, and writers 
all added their contributions to the mounting volume of 
southern propaganda used by the secessionists.108 In re-, 
sponse to Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin and 
Hinton Helper's The Impending Crisis in the South, southern^ 
ers became aroused to the need of counterpropaganda. Four­
teen pro-slavery novels appeared in reaction to Uncle Tom's 
Cabin and many of them were conveniently assembled for the 
southern reader in a work entitled Pro-Slavery Argument.
The secessionists also used other novels such as L. B. 
Chase's English Serfdom arid American Slavery, J. W. Page's 
Uncle Robin in His Cabin in Virginia and Tom Without One in
Boston, and S. H. Elliot's New England Chattels to defend .
109slavery and the slaveholder.
An excerpt from the long poem, The Hireling and the 
Slave, by William Grayson, serves to exemplify the south­
ern poetry of defense exploited by Roberts and the seces­
sionists to unify their followers.. Grayson first contrasted 
the deprived northern laborer (a wage slave) with the happy 
southern slave and then denigrated certain abolitionists 
such as Sumner, Greeley, Seward, and Stowe:
108Ben H. Proctor, Not Without Honor: The Life of 
John H. Reagan (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press,
1962),.p. 124. .
108Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought,
p. 102.
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There supple Summer, with the Negro cause, 
plays the sly game for office and applause; 
What boots it if the Negro sink or swim?
He wins the Senate— 'tis enough for him.
There Greeley, grieving at a brother's woe, 
Spits with impartial spite on friend and foe. 
To each fanatical delusion prone.
He damns all creeds and parties not his own:
There seward smiles the. sweet perennial smile, 
Skilled in the tricks of subtlety and guile; 
The slyest schemer that the world e'er say; 
Peddler of sentiment and patent law.
Not such with Stowe, the wish or power to please, 
She finds no joy in gentle deeds like these;
A moral scavenger, with greedy eye,
In social ills her coarser labors lie;
The Texas State Gazette was the most prolific publisher of 
the southern literary propaganda in Texas. Besides running 
lists and reviews of southern literature, the Gazette often 
printed the literary products of the Texas secessionists. 
The following poem was an example of the pro-salvery, pro­
secession fare in 1860:
Up, Up! ye Southern Freemen,
Rouse ye at the trumpet's call.
Past is the hour of dreaming;
Break ye the oppressor's thrall.
No longer idly dally,
No more your duty flag;
Under the Lone Star rally.
Ready 'to do or die.'
Gallant sons of gallant Texas,
O'er your head the Lone Star waves;
Fight ye now, beneath that banner,
Or forever ye will be s l a v e s . m
110Ibid., pp. 105-107.
I l l Austin Texas State Gazette, 10 December 1860.
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Roberts and his group also utilized the symbol of the 
Lone Star Flag and various slogans to solidify their follow­
ers. Roberts and other Texans had warned earlier that the 
Lone Star Flag was standing by, ready to be unfurled. Those 
warnings had not been idle. Roberts reported that when the 
news of Lincoln's election reached Texas, Lone Star flags 
were hoisted in almost every town and village in the state. 
He explained that "it was not the result of a boisterous 
and excited impulse" but that it was "a deliberate act done 
in the face of a crisis"; it was a symbol of serious deter­
mination "which could be pictured upon men's faces, to stand
112by and for Texans in every possible emergency." ? . Lubbock
wrote the same: "When news of Lincoln's election reached
Texas, the Stars and Stripes came down and the Lone Star
113Flag unfurled in its place." Ford reported that the 
culminating act of most secession rallies and parades was 
to unfurl the Lone Star Banner. In Austin a special flag­
pole was erected on Congress Avenue to accommodate a 60-
114foot by 20-foot Lone Star Flag. In his speech on Decem­
ber 1, Roberts stated: "The 'Lone Star' flag now floats over 
every city, town, village and hamlet throughout all Texas,"
1 1 2 Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 85.
113Francis R. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, or Mem­
oirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, ed. C. W. Raines (Austin, 
Texas: Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900), p. 303.
114Ford, Memoirs, p. xxxvi.
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and " . . .  let the flag that arose triumphantly upon the 
plain of San Jacinto, and that now flutters in. .the breeze 
throughout Texas be our flag forever."115 in 1860 the Lone 
Star Flag was more than a token emblem. It was an active 
symbol of self-identity and self-determination.
To counteract the slogans and maxims of the abolition­
ists such as "There is a higher law," "A house divided 
against itself cannot stand," "Right makes might," "the ir­
repressible conflict," and "the Constitution and the Union," 
Roberts and the secessionists coined their own. "Damn the 
Union and the Black Republicans" and "Damn Lincoln and Damn 
the Union" were heard at every secession rally. The word, 
"Black," itself served as a double entendre. To show that 
they could subsist economically out of the Union, they shout­
ed "Cotton is King!" To counteract the slogans of the Texas 
Unionists such as "The Union must be served" and "Wait for 
the overt act," they shouted "Safer out than in" and "Seces­
sion, not submission!"116 Rip Ford popularized the slogan
117"My section is my country," and Roberts rephrased the 
maxim from the Declaration of Independence, "All men are 
created equal" to state "All men are endowed by their Crea­
tor with certain inalienable rights; among these are life,
115Roberts, The Impending Crisis," pp. 22, 25.
116Ford, Memoirs, pp. xxxv-xxxvi, 313-321; Friend, Sam 
Houston, p. 331; and-Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and 
War," pp. 198-206.
117Ford, Rip Ford's Texas, pp. 313-321.
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liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in respect 
to those rights, they are created equal."1^8
Polarization
To drive the North and the South even further apart, 
Roberts repeatedly contrasted the two sections so as to fa­
vor the South. By so doing he fulfilled a task of the 
antagonist-rhetor which Black explains is "to produce dis­
course that can overcome an active opposition and, simulta­
neously, contribute to the attractiveness and credibility
119of the rehtor's ideas."
Roberts polarized the northern states and the southern 
states, the northern mind and the southern mind, Massachu­
setts and Virginia, their people and our people, and fanati­
cal aggressors and long-suffering patriots. Using the lan­
guage of divisiveness, he stated:
The great question before the American people 
is, shall the institution of slavery be put upon 
a sure basis of gradual extinction. The Northern 
controlling majorities say it shall. The South 
says it shall not. . . . This is our institution—  
not theirs. . . . our political government, . . . 
our social organization, . . . our industrial pur­
suit, . . . our capital. . . .  We apply the force 
to an inferjgr race, and they to a part of their 
own . . . .
Using parallelism at another point, he contrasted Federalism
Roberts, Our Federal Relations, Appendix 1, p. 1.
119Black, Rhetorical Criticism, p. 150.
120Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," p. 25.
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and its liberal theory of construction to democracy and its 
strict theory of construction:
The preponderance of Northern mind has been 
disposed thus to enlarge the powers and objects 
of the general government. . . . The preponder­
ance of the Southern mind has resisted this usur­
pation and perversion of government. Massachusetts, 
the mother of Northern States, and author of their 
leading ideas, is the type of the former principle; 
Virginia, the mother of Southern States, and author 
of their leading ideas, is the type of the latter.121
In addition to divisive language, Roberts exploited 
a flag issue, a flag individual, and a flag group to polar­
ize the North and South and to force the uncommitted Texans 
into a choice. Roberts presented three major issues in his 
speech. The first issue was that slavery was good. His 
three sub-points here were: slavery is economically benefi­
cial; slavery is morally right; and slavery is constitution­
ally right. His second issue was that the northern states 
were plotting to deprive the southern states of this funda­
mental right. Here he argued that the North crossed south­
ern borders to free slaves, refused to return runaway slaves, 
openly vowed to destroy their domestic institution, and a 
northern Black Republican, who would carry out the destruc­
tive scheme, had been elected President. His third major 
issue was that secession was the proper course. To develop 
this point he argued that secession was constitutional, se­
cession was justified, and secession was necessary.
121Ibid., p. 39.
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The second issue, wrongful northern aggression, re­
ceived the most attention and was the emotional flag issue. 
The question here was: "Can we afford to allow the fanatical 
northern aggressors to take away our most precious and funda­
mental rights without rising to protect those rights?" If 
he could prove to the people that Lincoln and the North 
truly intended to take away their most fundamental and bene­
ficial right, he could force them into a conscious choice 
between passive submission and active separation. He pre­
sented an either-or proposition. Either they could submit 
to a dictatorial Republican ruler or they could secede and 
be free to retain their own economic and social order. They 
could not do both. The time had come to decide. In his 
third issue, he made their decision simple for them by pre­
senting secession as the constitutional, justified, and nec­
essary course to take.
The flag individual was, of course, the "Black" Repub­
lican president, Abraham Lincoln, and the flag group was the 
"Black" Republican Party. This group, he pointed out, was 
the odious, fanatical, antagonistic, aggressive party led by
an equally fanatical and arrogant Lincoln who would ruin
122their entire way of life. Roberts' pride, appeals, his
fear appeals, his divisive language, his flag issue, and the 
total force of his objectification and antagonism was aimed 
at the "fanatical Black Republican Party" led by a man who 
was now in a position to ruin the South.
122Ibid., pp. 22-49.
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Escalation/Confrontation 
The South did not take the northern slogans and abo­
lition threats lightly. To southerners such statements as 
Lincoln's "house divided" and Seward's "irresponsible con­
flict" were calls to arms. They would retaliate. They 
would go to war before they would submit to abolition.123 
In Texas Roberts did his part to escalate the tension and 
goad the Federal Government into disproportionate reaction. 
To effect this, Roberts used the tactics of rumor and 
threatened disruption.
The use of rumor is described by Bowers and Ochs as 
belonging to a general tactic which they term "contrast." 
Its goal is "to ensure that the establishment will expect
the participation of large numbers of agitators, whether
124this expectation has any objective reality or not."
Brembeck and Howell also discuss the use of. exaggeration as
125a tactic of rumor spreading. Roberts and the Texans ex­
aggerated both the quantitative and qualitative strength of 
the state and of the South to heighten the tension. They 
often warned the North of the South's potential power:
122Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 75.
"^24Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, p. 35.
125Brembeck and Howell, Persuasion: A Means of Social 
Influence, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice- 
Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 188.
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That we are on the eve of revolution and war is 
equally clear, but the South can defeat the North.
It can stand a degree of taxation which would beg­
gar any other country, and still remain rich and 
prosperous; and money always commands armies and 
navies in unlimited numbers.126
The secessionists rarely included specific numbers of forces 
or amounts of money, but used such language as "unlimited 
numbers," or "tremendous wealth." But the Texans were ready­
ing themselves for war and openly boasted of their numbers
and valor. Each county was preparing its men and arms.
One military leader reported to Roberts:
Our people here are thoroughly aroused upon 
the subject of secession. More than six-hundred 
are already enrolled as minute men. Some $2500 
has been donated to buy arms. We have ordered 
breach rifles to arm two companies. There will 
be at our next Battalion muster some eight full 
companies from this county alone. They are im­
patient. . . .127
Also the Texans made sure that northerners knew the 
quality of southern valor. They bragged that one Texan 
could whip five northern men in a fair fight and that the 
southerners could easily and quickly beat the Yankees. 
Southerners were more accustomed to carrying, arms, more 
reckless of life, and more fearless of death. Texans 
thought that if the North were cognizant of their "unlimit­
ed numbers," their tremendous wealth," and their "blood-and- 
thunder bravery" that the Yankees would either be too scared
126San Antonio (Texas) Herald, 17 November 1860.
127T. M. Harwood to Roberts, 7 December 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
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to fight them or would over-react and be defeated.128 
Texans were preparing for either eventuality. In his speech, 
Roberts added to the rumor when he stated that "the control­
ling intellectual and physical strength of the State . . . 
can be very well ascertained by the unanimity, ardor, and 
firmness with which the mass of the people enter into the
movement" and that the highest civil and military powers of
129the State would be exerted to protect the people.
Roberts and the Texas secessionists had become braver 
and angrier with their threats in 1860. They threatened 
not only dissolution of the Union but violent retaliation 
if opposed. Roberts warned that Texas and the southern 
states were "arming and disciplining themselves" and that 
"a single federal gun aimed at a withdrawing State, will 
kindle a blaze of war from the Potomac to the Rio Grande."
He also stated that the "overt act" had already been com­
mitted, that Texas must not wait or "defeat will be a mat­
ter of time only," and that as brave freemen they must 
"stand upon the outer wall" rather than see "the black flag 
of fanaticism waving triumphantly" over their beloved South. 
Again he threatened the North: "We cannot and will not 
yield. Our domestic institutions belong to.our guardian­
ship. . . .We have the reserved right to control our own 
destiny." He continued his threats:
128Ford, Rip Ford's Texas, p. 316 and Marshall Texas 
Republican, 10 November 1860.
•I‘28Roberts, "The Impending Crisis," p. 23.
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When States have to be forced by military power 
to the performance of their constitutional obliga­
tions, . . . the sword will be higher authority than 
precedents in law books, and the cannon’s roar will 
be more convincing than the eloquence of statesmen.
. . . If we cannot protect our rights within the 
Union, we will withdraw to protect them. . . . The 
Southern States must act promptly and act together 
to present the alternative to those Northern majori- - 
ties, requiring them to choose between anti-slavery 
and the Union. They cannot have both. -*-30
In his conclusion Roberts reminded his audience and the
North that southern valor was usually triumphant:
Texans may cast their votes on that day [Janu­
ary 8 , the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans], 
inspired by the brilliant achievement that made it 
memorable: Southern valor driving back the enemy.. 
that dared to invade Southern soil. ^ 31
While Roberts was issuing threats from Texas, Wigfall 
and the other southern senators were making threats in Con­
gress and the other states1 secession leaders were preparing 
for disunion and threatening violence if opposed. Confron­
tation was near. With rumors and threats, Roberts increased 
the tension and hastened Texas toward that confrontation.
Effects
Roberts’ speech on December 1, 1860 was reported to 
have been the turning point in the action in Texas toward
1 on
secession. It had an immediate and profound effect on
all who heard and read it. The people expressed their
130Ibid., pp. 22-47.
131Ibid., p. 49.
132Ford, Memoirs, p. 968 and Roberts, "The Political, 
Legislative, and Judicial History of Texas," p. 92.
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approval through hundreds of letters to Roberts and to the 
newspapers. Some wrote that his speech was "a profound and 
patriotic speech— the most lucid and comprehensive informa­
tion on the subject yet" and "a concise, luminous and power­
ful elucidation of the great principles upon which our civil 
and political systems rest, of the .wrongs of which we justly 
complain, and of the remedies which we may apply." Others 
wrote: "Your speech was a great approbation. It has done 
much good.", and "Your speech was complete and unanswerable."
Others expressed the sentiment that they looked forward to
133his "lead in our new prospective relations." A. B. Ellis 
of Comanche expressed the feelings of the people:
Comanche is now almost unanimous for secession.
What few Southern tories [Unionists] we have are 
afraid to cheep. . . . What spectacle can move 
stronger upon a brave and generous heart than that 
of an insulted state attacked by a base and merce­
nary enemy. Go on, Judgel^34
Reagan, too, had decided that the time for delay had 
passed and the time for immediate action had arrived. He 
wrote Roberts after his speech: "I hope Texas may be able 
to go out before Lincoln's inauguration— the majority of the 
Black Republicans will insist that the southern states will 
not go out and they will not believe nothing else [sic]
133M. S. Long, 14 December 1860; T. J. Chambers, 21 
December 1860; Peter W. Gray, 29 December‘I860; Gil McKay,
26 December 1860; Albert N. Mills, 19 December 1860 to 
Roberts, Roberts Papers.
134A. B. Ellis to Roberts, 4 January 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
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until the separation has taken place."135 Roberts' speech
had convinced even Chief Justice Wheeler to enter actively
into the conflict. On December 15 Wheeler sent the press a
letter sanctioning the convention and afterwards made a
136speech in defense of secession.
He had waited a long time, but Roberts now represented 
popular opinion. The Gazette printed his speech, praised it, 
and published letters of approval. One such letter from 
Hollandale, Texas read:
The citizens of this county have now passed 
resolutions of resistance to the encroachments 
of our Northern enemies. . . . The world has lost 
its meaning. That we can't live in brotherly love 
any longer is manifest . . . .  *-37
As expected Houston and the Unionists reacted with 
antagonism. On December 3 Houston addressed the people in 
an effort to counter Roberts' speech:
Fellow Citizens: Although the excited state 
of public feeling growing out of the later Presi­
dential election has induced many to believe the 
people have become the victims of.agitators, yet 
I still have the confidence in their good sense 
to believe that they are not lost to reason. Many 
efforts have been made to prejudice-you,..in advance 
of my action, and to convince you that I am unmind­
ful of your interests, and blind to the fact that 
the time has come when they may be endangered, 
unless vigilantly cared for." The fact that I have 
entertained and have announced that the election 
of a President in the mode pointed out by the
135John H. Reagan to Roberts, 7 December 1860, 
Roberts Papers.
136Austin Texas State Gazette, 22 December I860 and 
Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial History 
of Texas," p. 92.
137Austin Texas State Gazette, 8 December 1860 and
10 December 1860.
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Constitution, is no just cause for revolution and 
a dissolution of the Union, has been construed and 
proclaimed by my enemies, to be an evidence that 
I would use my executive powers to thwart the will 
of the people of Texas, and that I was ready to 
submit myself and see them submit themselves to a 
violation of their rights by the Federal Government.
Such ideas are repugnant to my feelings. . . .138
Other Unionists called Roberts' speech "slave propaganda" 
which was "filled with more fire than eloquence." But 
the die was cast. Some Unionists even crossed over and 
joined the Democrats. One group of Unionists signed a pe­
tition and sent it to Roberts with the message: "Show it to 
140Old Sam." Even Judge Bell became a moderate secessionist
and refused Houston's request that he prepare for him a con-
141stitutional argument against the right of secession.
From the time of his speech to the election for dele­
gates to the convention, Roberts masterminded the campaign 
for the secession convention. He led the other "hot-headed 
secessionists" in "breaking up Union meetings," "clamoring 
for secession," and "denouncing anyone who dared to speak 
for moderation."142 On January 8 the election began and on 
that day Roberts was elected a delegate to the convention
138
Sam Houston, "Address to the People of Texas,"
3 December 1860 in Williams and Barker, The Writings of Sam 
Houston, 8 : 206-207.
139Manning, Some History of Van Zandt County, p. 143.
149Rufus Price to Roberts, 7 December 1860, Roberts 
Papers.
141Friend, Sam Houston, p. 331.
143Ford, Memoirs, pp. 315-318.
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1 4 3from Smith County. During the next month the people of
Texas went to the polls and voted for delegates who were in
favor of secession by an overwhelming margin. Few Unionists
participated in the election, either as candidates or as 
144voters.
Roberts' agitative strategies had worked well in 1860 
with both his immediate and his ..larger audiences. He had 
convinced them that the North was to blame for the crisis, 
that slavery and secession were legal and justified and that 
some action must be taken immediately. ’Persuading his lis­
teners that a secession convention..was the first step to 
take and solidifying them into an organization with a pur­
pose, he had built a reputation parallel to Sam Houston's. 
Now the leader of the Democratic Party, and the leader of 
secession in Texas, he would soon be elected president of 
the Texas Secession Convention, which, by decree of the 
people, would convene on January 28, 1861.
143E m e s t  W. Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession 
Convention of Texas (Austin, Texas: Austin Printing Com­
pany, 1912), p. 419. See pp. 409-452 for official Certif­
icates of Election.
^44Anna Irene Sandbo, "The First Session of the Se­
cession Convention of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quar- 
terly 8 (October 1914): 181 and Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, p. 408.
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C H A P T E R  V I
CONFLICT: THE TEXAS SECESSION CONVENTION - 1861
Situation
As designated in the call for secession, the Texas 
Secession Convention assembled in Austin on January 28. 
Following the certification of delegates, the first order 
of business was the election of a president. Oran Milo 
Roberts was elected by acclamation.^ Roberts described the 
reaction to his election:
. . . Judge Roberts was conducted to the stand 
by a committee composed of Peter W. Gray, George M. 
Flournoy, and A. T. Rainey. He arose, awed by the 
august presence of the audience before him, and si­
lently bowing to different quarters of the house, 
he said in a clear voice, as if explanation of his 
action: 'I bow to the sovereignty of my State.'
Quick as an electric flash, a shout, triumphant, 
defiant, simultaneous over the whole auditory, was 
the response to the sentiment, and with glowing 
countenance they repeated it again and again with 
reverberations that filled the whole house.2
From that hour until the convention adjourned sine 
die on March 26, Roberts held a position in the state which
^"Ernest W. Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession Con- 
vention of Texas (Austin, Texas: Austin Printing Company,
1912), p. 16.
2
Oran Milo Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and 
Judicial History of Texas for Its Fifty Years of Statehood, 
1845-1895," in A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, 
ed. Dudley G. Wooten^ 2 vols. (Dallas, Texas: William G. 
Scarrf, 1898), 2: 100.
210
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
resembled that of a dictator. Sometimes in front of the 
scenes and sometimes behind, he manipulated and maneuvered 
the pronouncements and the actions of the convention. Be­
sides delivering his influential speeches during the conven­
tion, Roberts presided with an iron hand. He supervised the 
drafting of the Ordinance of Secession and campaigned for 
its passage by the people. He helped compose the Declara­
tion of Causes for Secession and the final explanation of 
the proceedings of the convention entitled "Address to the 
People of Texas." He personally offered the resolution 
which refuted Houston's claim that the convention had limit­
ed powers and asserted full power to do whatever was neces­
sary for the safety of the state. He appointed a Committee 
of Public Safety which confiscated all U.S. federal property 
and virtually prepared for war. He maneuvered the ratifica­
tion of the Confederate Constitution and the oath of alle­
giance to the Confederacy required by all officers of the
state. He gave Governor Houston two days to take the oath 
4
or be deposed. Legally or illegally Roberts now wielded 
more power than the Governor of the.state. This chapter 
concentrates upon the rhetorical strategies which Roberts
3
Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M. 
Roberts" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 
1932), p. 122.
4Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention,
pp. 16-261.
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used in 1861 to persuade the people of Texas to leave the 
Union of the United States and to join the Union of the 
Confederacy.
Historical-Political Background
On December 20, 1860, at Institute Hall in Charleston, 
the delegates to the South Carolina convention voted unani­
mously to dissolve the compact between the Union of the 
United States and the State of South Carolina.-5 Between 
December 20 and January 28 when the Texas convention met, 
five other states seceded— Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
g
Georgia, and Louisiana.
As decreed by Houston, the Texas Legislature met in 
special session on January 21, 1861, one week before the 
convention. In his message to the legislators, Houston 
urged them to vote against secession, to limit the power of 
the convention, and to require the final action of the con-
7
vention to be voted on by the people. However, Houston 
failed to delay or subvert the convention. Instead of being 
sympathetic with Houston, the legislature voted to reject
5Harold S. Schultz, Nationalism and Sectionalism in 
South Carolina (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University 
Press, 195d), p. 230.
6Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, 
pp. 7-8.
•7
Houston, Message to the Legislature of Texas, in Ex­
tra Session, 21 January 1861 in The Writings of Sam Houston, 
eds. Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, 8 vols. (Aus- 
tin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, 1943), 8 : 236- 
254.
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Houston's resolution for a southern convention, to recog­
nize the legality of the Texas Secession Convention, to 
provide for the expenses of the convention, and to loan to 
the convention the Hall of Representatives beginning each 
day at 2:00 p.m. They did agree with Houston that an ordi­
nance of secession, if passed, should be submitted to a pop-
O
ular referendum.
Roberts and the Texas secessionists had convinced the 
people that something must be done before Lincoln's inaugu­
ration on March 4. Much of the general public, however, was 
still unsure as to exactly what action should be taken. The 
secessionists knew exactly what they wanted to be done.
Like the Rhett group in South Carolina who had called for 
"an immediate convention to carry the state out of the Union 
while the resentment over the election was still at its
9
height," the Roberts group in Texas wanted to do the same 
with their state. So far they had taken full advantage of 
the anxiety and confusion which resulted from John Brown's 
raid and Lincoln's election. They had persuaded a large 
majority of Texans to vote for a convention to consider
O
Journal of the House of Representatives, 8th Legisla­
ture, Extra Session, 24 January 1861, vol. 51; Journal of 
the Texas Senate, 8th Legislature, Extra Session, 7 Febru­
ary 1861, vol.- 98; and H. P. N. Gammel, ed., The Laws of 
Texas, 1822-1897, 10 vols. (Austin, Texas: The Gammel Book 
Company, 1898), 5: 347, 354, 391-392.
o
Avery 0. Craven, The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 
1848-1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1953), p. 349.
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what Texas should do and to pack that convention with pro­
secession delegates.
Both the people and the legislature had given Roberts 
the authority to proceed. He would take full advantage of 
this power to carry out his preconceived plan. The agita- 
tive strategies which Roberts used in 1861 form the outline 
for one of the most momentous chapters in the history of the 
Lone Star State.
Physical-Sociological Milieu 
The physical setting for the convention was the large, 
impressive Hall of Representatives in the Capitol building 
in Austin, Texas, the political and social center of the 
state in 1861. The convention was divided into two sessions: 
the first session ran from January 28 to February 4 and the 
second session from March 2 to March 25. During the recess 
from February 4 to March 2, the Ordinance of Secession 
passed by the convention was presented to the people and the 
election was held. While in session the convention met each 
day beginning at 2:00 p.m.^
The meeting place certainly gave the convention an air 
of authority but the place was not as important as the so­
cial, cultural, and economic environment surrounding the
10Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 99-133; Winkler, Journal of the Texas
Secession Convention, pp. 7-251; and Ralph A. Wooster, The
Secession Conventions of the South (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 124.
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event. The real question should center around the reasons 
as to why such a group should be meeting at such a place at 
such a time to effect such "a dramatic situational change." 
Parrington stresses the importance of environmental deter­
minism behind such a move. He states: "In this new South 
that was rapidly passing through its frontier development, 
the patriarchal system of Virginia gave way to a system of 
negro exploitation, more naked as it passed further west­
ward. This southern tradition and belief in slavery 
blended with a history of independence, a philosophy of
states' rights, and a frontier tradition born of battling
12Comanches, Mexicans, and variable temperatures. Here,
then, were the reasons why a group of responsible men would
gather to consider such a drastic change for their state.
The occasion was a serious one. Roberts reported that
"the anxious concern manifested by the whole assemblage, and
the occasion which had brought them together impressed the
13scene with a grave solemnity."
Audience
Roberts' immediate audience consisted of the one hun­
dred seventy-seven delegates to the convention and interest­
ed spectators who daily crowded the gallery. Roberts
11Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American 
Thought, 3 vols. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company," 
1927), 3: 62.
12Llerena Friend, "The Texan of 1860," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 62 (July 1958): 17.
13Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 100.
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described the delegates as "a remarkable selection of men" 
who were "from all classes of people in addition to those 
who usually devoted themselves to public affairs." He de­
scribed them further, pointing out their diversity:
Nearly every grade of official position, from a 
justice of the peace to an ex-governor, was there.
One associate of the Supreme Court [Roberts] and 
five district judges were there. The incumbent 
Attorney-General was there. Lawyers of distinction, 
military men, farmers, merchants, physicians, preach­
ers were there. Men of foreign as well as native 
birth, old men, men of middle age, young men, were 
there. More than two-thirds of the number were pri­
vate citizens of local influence who had never en- • 
tered public life in any capacity but who had come .. 
forward to serve their State, in this great emergency.
Among the delegates assembled were ex-Governor Hardin 
R. Runnels and ex-Congressman John H. Reagan, who had re­
signed from the U.S. House of Representatives to serve in 
the convention. Four of the members, James Throckmorton, 
Richard Coke, John Ireland, and Roberts, would later be 
elected governor. Several, including John A. Wharton and 
B. F. Terry, would gain prominence in the Civil War. The 
group was comparatively young, the average age being 40.3 
years and the median age 40 years. Only eight members were 
over 60 years of age. One hundred sixty-one members, or 
90.9 percent of the convention, were from the slaveholding 
states. Only eleven members were natives of free states 
and only five members were b o m  in foreign countries.
Forty members were born in Tennessee; twenty-seven were
14Ibid., pp. 99-100.
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born in Virginia, twenty-two in Georgia, and twenty-one in 
Alabama. In all, natives of eighteen states and two foreign 
countries attended the convention.
Lawyers constituted slightly more than 40 percent and 
35.3 percent gave their occupation as planter or farmer. 
There were eight physicians and seven merchants. Other oc­
cupations ranged from blacksmith and grocer to clergyman and 
"gentleman."
The delegates held an average of $19,583.09 in prop­
erty. With $550,000.00 in real and personal property, T. J. 
Chambers was the wealthiest, and, with only $250.00 in per­
sonal property, J. D. Rains was the poorest. .One hundred 
twenty-seven delegates, or 71.8 percent, held slaves. The 
average holding was 21.9 slaves. Only thirty-five delegates 
held twenty slaves or more. Three members held over one 
hundred slaves each.
Of the seven Unionists who voted against secession, 
six were from Northeast Texas and one from Central Texas. 
This group was slightly younger than convention members as 
a whole with an average age of 37.4 years. They also held, 
less property, with an average of $15,125.00 in real prop­
erty and $10,694.00 in personal property. Five of the seven
15were lawyers, and six held an average of nine slaves.
15Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, 
pp. 405-408 and Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the 
South, pp. 125-131.
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The delegation of men who met in Austin in 1861 to 
decide on their state's future, then,was an early-middle- 
aged, slaveholding, southern-born group with lawyers and 
farmers predominating. Being an early-middle-aged, slave- 
holding, southern-born lawyer and farmer, Roberts especially 
identified with this audience.
Except for the large percentage of lawyers and slave­
holders present, the convention seems to have been a rather 
typical cross section of Texas society at the time. The 
theory of the "great planter conspiracy" does not seem 
valid in regard to Texas because, of the great Texas plant­
ers with fifty or more slaves, only 12 were in the conven­
tion. ^  These facts seem to indicate that the theory of 
states' rights was just as important to this group as the 
personal holding of slaves.
Roberts' larger audience consisted of dissatisfied
Texans who had given Roberts and the convention delegates
the power to decide what action Texas should take in regard
to their federal relations. The majority of them were, by
now, at least sympathetic to the secessionists' cause.
These sympathizers lived primarily in East and South Texas.
The Union sympathizers lived in portions of North and West
Texas and in Central Texas in the area including and sur-
17rounding Travis County.
16Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South, 
pp. 128-129.
l^Roberts, "Tke Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas, p. 93.
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An Ohio schoolteacher living in Texas in 1861 catego­
rized Texans into four classes: (1) the slave-holding aris­
tocracy, gentlemanly in manner, but "unscrupulous champions 
of human bondage"; (2) a non—slaveholding class of respect­
able citizens; (3) poor whites from the southern states, few 
of whom could read or write and all slaves of prejudice; and 
(4) scoundrels— "sharpers— men without principle or moral­
ity." Classes (1) and (4) exercised "a controlling influ­
ence over the ignorant white, who, for a dram of whiskey,
18would vote for the devil." Amelia Barr, an Englishwoman 
who lived in Texas from 1856 to 1866, described the atti­
tudes of Texans during this time:
They were furious with the United States Gov­
ernment's interference with their states' social 
and domestic arrangements. They would not admit 
its right to do so, and were as mad as their own 
prairie bulls, when compulsion was named. I heard 
arguments like these, both from men and women con­
stantly; they talked of nothing else. . . . There 
were bitter disputes wherever men were congregated 
and domestic quarrels on every hearthstone. . . .
From her study of pre-Civil War Texans, Friend concludes 
that not all Texans were southern cavalier gentlemen nor 
were they all crude backwoodsmen or ruffians. They were 
Texans characterized by intense loyalty, rugged individual­
ism, pride in size, and a fearless fighting spirit. They 
were, she surmised, the products of both their southern
■^George Adams Fisher, quoted in Friend, "The Texan 
of 1869," p. 15.
^Amelia Barr, All the Days of My Life (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1913), pp. 218-219.
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roots and of the western frontier. These influences and 
traits made Texans especially vulnerable to the strategies 
which Roberts utilized to turn them against the Union and 
to unify them behind his cause.
Roberts' Rhetorical Goals
As evidenced by his speeches and his actions, Roberts' 
major goals in 1861 were to persuade the delegates and the 
people to secede from the Union of the United States and 
to join the Union of Confederate States. Having justified 
the right of secession and urged unity with the southern 
states since 1850, he was now in a position to turn his 
words into action. In his valedictory address at the close 
of the first session, Roberts spoke of the right of seces­
sion and entreated the delegates to go home and appeal to 
the people "to sustain our action [the passing of the Ordi­
nance of Secession] by their votes." He told them to urge •
the people to vote for "immediate action to sustain the
21rights of the People of Texas. . . . "  In his resolution 
against Sam Houston he vowed that the convention would do 
whatever it deemed necessary and proper for the protection 
of the people and that it would "as speedily as practicable,
^Friend, "The Texan of 1860," p. 17.
^Roberts, "Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts at the 
Close of the First Session of the Convention of the People 
of Texas," 4 February 1861, Roberts Papers, Archives, Uni­
versity of Texas, Austin, Texas and in Winkler, Journal of 
the Texas Secession Convention, p. 85.
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consummate the connection of Texas with the provisional 
Government of the Confederate States of America."22
Houston presented a special problem for Roberts. Be­
cause of his position as Governor, Houston was an obstacle 
in the path which Roberts had mapped out for the state. 
Roberts knew that he would have to convince Houston to give
up his opposition to the convention and to secession or dis-
23pose of him in some other manner.
In 1861 Roberts still harbored an ambition to become 
a senator, this time in the Confederate Congress. After the 
adjournment of the convention, Roberts once again asked his 
Democratic friends to support him. The Texas secession 
leaders had word that Louis Wigfall, who was serving as a 
delegate in the Provisional Confederate Congress in Mont­
gomery, would be leaving the Congress to take up a full-time
military career. Some of Roberts' friends agreed to support
24Roberts for this office. Apparently he thought that the 
active role which he played in the convention would earn him 
a much-deserved and much-delayed senatorial seat.
22Roberts, "Resolution of President 0. M. Roberts, 
Offered in Convention," 8 March 1861, Roberts Papers, and 
in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, 
p. 119.
2 3 John S. Ford, Memoirs, 8 vols. (Typescript, Archives, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1887), 5: 9.
2^Thomas J. Devine to Roberts, 27 August 1861, Roberts 
Papers; John C. Robertson to Roberts, 10 October 1861,
Roberts Papers; and Alvy King, Louis T. Wigfall (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 126-136.
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Strategies
Petition
During the convention, Roberts appointed several com­
mittees to petition Houston to cooperate with the convention 
or at least not to oppose proceedings. "The object of this," 
he stated, "was to show the proper respect to the chief ex­
ecutive of the State, and if possible to conciliate his op­
position to the action of the convention." The gentlemen 
whom Roberts appointed to the committees "were selected be­
cause of their known friendly personal relations with him 
[Houston]."2^
On January 30, Roberts appointed a committee of five 
to confer with Governor Houston on the subject of federal 
relations. Houston was polite to this committee but non­
committal and evasive. He indicated that the proper medium 
for expressing the voice of the people in the crisis was 
the legislature and not the convention and continued send­
ing official state business to the legislature. On Febru­
ary 1, Roberts sent a committee of two to invite Houston to 
witness the convention vote on the Ordinance of Secession. 
Roberts' purpose here was to show Houston the overwhelming 
opposition against him and by doing so to convince him to 
give up the fight. Houston attended and witnessed the del­
egates' vote of 167-7 for the ordinance, but did not relent 
in his stand against disunion. On February 4, Roberts
25Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas, " p. 101.
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dispatched a committee of three to inform Houston that the
Committee of Public Safety was preparing to take possession
of all United States property within the state of Texas and
to secure his views. Houston agreed that if it must be done
it should be done promptly and prudently before unauthorized
men seized the property, but that he could not officially
sanction that action while Texas remained in the Union and
that his oath to support the U.S. Constitution was still 
26binding on him.
Tired of Houston's opposition and avoidance, Roberts 
devised a plan whereby all officers of the state were re­
quired to take an oath of allegiance to the Confederate 
States of America. On Thursday, March 14 Roberts requested 
George W. Chilton to deliver a notice to Houston regarding 
the required oath. Roberts gave Houston one more chance to 
adjust or capitulate. Roberts' letter read as follows:
To His Excellency Sam Houston
Governor of the State of Texas
Sir,— An ordinance has this day been adopted by 
the people of the State of Texas, in convention as­
sembled, prescribing an oath of office for all of­
ficers of the State of Texas who held office on the 
2nd day of March, and those thereafter elected to 
office. By the provision of said ordinance, it is 
my duty, as president of the convention to notify 
you of this action . . . .  I therefore, in the dis­
charge of that duty, most respectfully notify and 
advise you as governor of the State of Texas that 
on Saturday, the 16th day of March, at twelve 
o'clock M., the convention will be prepared to re­
ceive your Excellency and the appointed officers
26Ibid., pp. 101-112 and Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, pp. 34-71.
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under said ordinance, to administer the oath to 
office prescribed. Trusting that said day and 
hour may suit your Excellency, I have the honor 
to be,
Your obedient servant,
0. M. Roberts
President of the Convention 2_ 
Representative Hall, March 15, 1861
At noon on Saturday, March 16 Roberts called out the name of 
Sam Houston three times. When Houston did not come forward 
to take the oath, Roberts declared the office of Governor to 
be vacant. He then administered the oath to the Lieutenant- 
governor Edward Clark and declared him to be the new Gover­
nor of Texas. On March 18 Clark took possession of the of­
fice of Governor and Houston left the office, still claim-
28ing to be the rightful governor of the state. ” The peti­
tioning was over and Roberts could proceed with more drastic 
strategies in the assurance that Houston would no longer be 
in his way.
Promulgation
On February 1 the convention approved the secession 
ordinance, but one more step was required before Roberts 
could declare that Texas had seceded from the Union. The
27Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 122-123 and Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, pp. 178-179.
28Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 124-125 and Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, pp. 183-184i
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convention had to present the ordinance to the people for 
ratification or rejection. To secure the votes of the pub­
lic for ratification, Roberts and the secession leaders 
campaigned at mass meetings and through the secession press.
The Texas Secession Convention in itself was a mass 
protest meeting with Roberts as the chief agitator. But to 
assure that the outcome of the convention would be as they 
planned, Roberts and the other secession leaders staged 
meetings, rallies, and parades to gain a large vote for se­
cession. Although Roberts was confident of the outcome, he
wanted a large vote to show a unified front and to secure
29cooperation of all branches of the government. The se­
cessionists staged meetings throughout February with "many 
noted orators speaking on secession and states' rights."3^ . 
Roberts himself gave a public speech at a meeting in Pales­
tine on February 10 where he appealed to the Texans to vote 
for secession. After reviewing the proceedings of the con­
vention, Roberts stated:
It behooves every.patriot of the land to devote 
that day [February 23] to his country, by going to 
the polls and giving a free expression of his will.
That day may fix the destiny of this State for gen­
erations to come. Six of our sister States have 
already seceded and are now in consultation by their 
delegates in convention at Montgomery, Alabama to 
establish a Provisional Government.31
29Roberts to Louis Wigfall, 4 February 1861, Roberts 
Papers.
30Austin Texas State Gazette, 23 February 1861.
31Roberts, "Speech at Palestine," 10 February 1861, 
in Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 February 1861.
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The secessionists also promulgated their message 
through the Texas State Gazette, the Dallas Herald, the Mar­
shall Texas Republican/ the Houston Telegraph, and the 
Clarksville Northern Standard. They printed the daily pro­
ceedings of the convention and the major speeches of the se- 
32cessionists.
In addition to printing Roberts' convention addresses, 
the State Gazette, the Dallas Herald, and the La Grange True 
Issue also circulated Roberts' speech in Palestine.
Roberts also used the Texas Republican to urge a large vote 
for the secession ordinance:
While there is not a shadow of doubt_as to the 
overwhelming result in favor of secession, it is 
nevertheless our duty to urge you one and all to 
go to the polls and cast your vote . . . .  
the submissionists see and feel their weakness.
As their influence increased, Roberts and the separatists
occasionally converted a Union paper. On February 13, they.
proudly announced:
The La Grange True Issue, one of the bitterest 
Union sheets in Texas, has nobly changed its tune 
since the action of the convention. It urges the 
people to ratify the Ordinance of Secession and 
says most truthfully 'those who vote against the
32Larry J. Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War: 
John Marshall and the Texas State Gazette," Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly, 62 (October 1958): 207 and Winkler, 
Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, p. 59.
33Austin Texas State Gazette, 16 February. 1861; Dallas 
(Texas) Herald, 20 February 1861; and La Grange (Texas) True 
Issue, 21 February 1861.
34Marshall Texas Republican, 16 February 1861.
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ordinance will be claimed as friend to the Aboli­
tion cause at the North by those insane, deluded 
fanatics.’ Let the voice of Texas go up as one man.35
Although they were in the minority, the Unionists
were not idle during the convention. They held meetings,
made speeches, and exploited the newspapers with the Union
doctrine. The anti-secession members of the convention and
of the legislature banded together and issued an address to
the people urging them to vote against secession. It was
signed by four senators, fifteen representatives, and six
36members of the convention. Their leaders, including 
Houston, A. J. Hamilton, John Hancock, and James Throckmor­
ton, made speeches throughout the state. In a speech at a 
La Grange Union meeting, John Hancock stated that "the lit­
tle slave oligarchy would wither and crisp before the march
37of the Federal Army like a piece of paper in a flame."
The Gazette reported that "the submission leaders in this
city meet in daily and nightly caucus, plotting new schemes
38against the peace and dignity of Texas." The major Union
paper was the Austin Southern Intelligencer assisted by
smaller papers such as the Bastrop Advertiser and the La
39Grange True Issue, who later turned pro-secession.
35Pallas (Texas) Herald, 13 February 1861.
36Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, 
p. 85, note.
37Marshall (Texas) Texas Republican, 23 February 1861.
33Austin Texas State Gazette, 33 March 1861.
39Gage, "The Texas Road to Secession and War," pp. 
195-209.
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Although the Unionists were not idle in the campaign,
Roberts and the secessionists inundated the state with pro­
secession propaganda.
Image Building
Roberts' greatest socio-psychological need was prob­
ably the need for superiority which Murray defines as "the 
need to excel" or "a composite of achievement and recogni­
tion." This need is associated with a person's ambition, 
will power, and desire for accomplishment and prestige.4® 
Roberts expressed this motive when as a young boy he voiced 
the desire to be a judge so that he could be superior to 
other men. He seemed to follow this ambition the rest of 
his life. He never had much money nor did he have many 
close personal friends, but he did become famous. By 1861 
he had used his intelligence, his speaking skill, and his 
position on the bench to become one of the best-known and 
most powerful men in Texas. During the convention he used 
his "great judicial mind" to become "a diplomatist of rare 
skill, well versed in the intricacies of statecraft." He 
"dominated all matters" including the unique plan to have 
Houston depose himself. In the execution of his plans,
41Roberts was "a superb manager" and "wise as a serpent."
40Winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persua­
sion: A Means of Social Influence, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 93.
41James T. De Shields, They Sat in High Places (San 
Antonio, Texas: The Naylor Company, 1940), pp. 312-313.
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Ford stated that Roberts performed his duties, as president 
with "great industry and integrity" and that he "examined a 
matter well," but that when he formed an opinion, it was 
difficult to cause him to abandon it."42 To the majority of 
Texans and the secessionists Roberts depicted the image of a 
great and wise leader of his state. To Unionists and north­
erners, he was a demagogue.
Now that Roberts was the most powerful man in the 
state, he could afford to publicly express humility. In his 
introductory remarks he stated: "I bow to the sovereignty of 
the people of my state. All political power is inherent in 
the people. That power, I assert, you now represent." The 
audience could not have been unaware of the fact that, as 
president, Roberts represented the power of the people and 
the power of the convention. He continued to express humil­
ity and seek rapport when he admitted that it was his' posi­
tion as associate justice which had helped him to be elected 
president. He confessed:
. . . While not insensible to the great honor con­
ferred upon me by this body of distinguished .citi­
zens, I am aware that my selection is attributable 
more to my position in the judiciary of the State 
than to my experience or knowledge of parliamentary 
deliberations.43
But he turned even this point around in his favor when he
continued:
42Ford, Memoirs, p. 996.
43Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts Upon Taking the 
Chair as President of the Convention of the People of 
Texas," Roberts Papers and in Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, pp. 16-17.
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It is an indication to the world that this move­
ment of the people of Texas has not originated in 
any revolutionary spirit of disorder, and I doubt 
not that the moderation and wisdom of your delib­
erations and acts will demonstrate it.44
Here Roberts implied that, as their leader, he represented
order, moderation, and wisdom.
Houston dared to assert that Roberts and the conven­
tion had only limited power. To demonstrate exactly how 
much power he had, Roberts stepped down from the chair on 
March 8 and offered the following resolution which was 
adopted unanimously:
Whereas, a letter bearing.date March 6 , 1861 
'has been read before this convention, written by 
the Executive of the State, addressed to a commit­
tee of this body, calling in question the power 
of this convention to do more than submit the or­
dinance of secession to the people of Texas for 
their ratification or rejection, and whereas it 
is important that there should be no misunder­
standing upon this subject, therefore,
Resolved that this Convention do now declare 
that it not only had power to pass and submit the 
ordinance of secession, but that also it possesses 
and will exercise the right, on behalf of the peo­
ple of Texas, to do whatever may be incidental to 
the same, and that may be necessary and proper for 
the protection of the rights of the people and the 
defence of the State in the present emergency, and 
that it will as speedily as practicable consummate 
the connection of Texas with the provisional gov­
ernment of the Confederate States of America, whose 
constitution has already been ratified by an ordi­
nance of this Convention.45
Roberts had the ambition, the will power, and the intelli­
gence to fulfill his need to excel. In 1861, as president
44Ibid., p. 17.
^Roberts, "Resolution of President O. M. Roberts, 
Offered in Convention," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, p. 119.
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of the Texas Secession Convention he had achieved much of 
the power and prestige which he had always desired. He had 
built an image which was unexcelled in Texas.
Objectification
As presiding officer of the convention, Roberts en­
gaged in little overt objectification during the convention 
proceedings. He made it quite clear for eleven years that 
he blamed the North for all of Texas' problems. In his 
lengthy speech at the Capitol in 1860, he had blamed the ag­
gressive northern states and the fanatical Black Republicans 
for the present crisis. In 1861 he objectified the North, 
Republicans and abolitionists at meetings, through the press, 
and through the Ordinance of Secession and the Declaration 
of Causes which he helped to draft.
The Ordinance stated that the Federal Government was 
to blame for the dissolution of the- Onion because it had 
failed to uphold the compact of union between the states.
It had failed to protect the frontier of the property of 
citizens. The order also postulated that recent develop­
ments in federal affairs had made it evident that the power
of the Federal Government was being used as a weapon against
46the southern people.
In the Declaration of Causes Roberts and the seces­
sionists asserted the imbecility of the Federal Government
46
Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention,
pp. 35-36.
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and the disloyalty of the northern states. They named spe­
cifically Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wiscon­
sin, Michigan, and Iowa. They listed ten aggressive actions
of the northern Republicans which were the causes of the di- 
. . 47visiveness. These were the same reasons which Roberts had
given in his 1860 speech.
The states' rights men called the Unionists "weak sub-
missionists," "timid men," "frightened old ladies," and
"traitors." One secessionist spoke for all when he stated:
"We will continue to expose and denounce the insidious and
wicked enemies of our state. We will perseveringly point
out to the submissionists dirt for their stomachs until they
48can be filled ad nauseum."
Houston and the Unionists retaliated by calling 
Roberts and the secession men "disappointed demagogues," 
"irresponsible usurpers of power," "ambitious office seek­
ers," "petty tyrants," "traitors," and an "unauthorized mob."
They called the convention "revolutionary," "illegal," "sub-
49versive," "malevolent," and "dangerous." Houston engaged
50in personal vilification when he called Roberts a Shylock. 
^Ibid. , pp. 61-65.
^Austin (Texas) Texas State Gazette, 5 January 1861.
^Austin (Texas) Southern Intelligencer, 23 February;
2, 20, 27 March 1861 and Sam Houston, "To The People of 
Texas," 16 March 1861, and "Message to the Texas Legisla­
ture," 18 March 1861, in Williams and Barker, Writings of 
Sam Houston, 8 : 271-278, 278-284.
50Houston "To The People of Texas," in Williams and 
Barker, Writings of Sam Houston, 8 : 278.
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Legitimation
To legitimize the actions of the convention, Roberts 
again based his justification on the constitutional right 
to slavery, the states' rights theory of government, and 
the First Amendment of the Texas Constitution. He stated:
The crisis upon us involves not only the right 
of self-government, but the maintenance of a great 
principle in the law of nations— the universal 
recognition of slavery wherever it is not locally 
prohibited and also the true theory of our general 
government as an association of sovereign States, 
and not a blended mass of people in one social 
compact.51
As before, Roberts presented the compact theory of govern­
ment of the states' rights theory not as theory, but as 
fact, or "true theory." Roberts had repeated this argument
with such frequency that he had become guilty of the fal- ■
52lacy of "repeated assertion." Just because Roberts con­
tinually repeated this argument as fact did not necessarily 
make it "true."
He also based his justification on the First Amendment 
of the Texas Constitution which stated that "all political 
power is inherent in the people," and that they have "the 
inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of 
government, in such manner as they may think expedient." 
Previous to the convention, Roberts repeatedly used the
Roberts, "Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts Upon 
Taking the Chair," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Seces­
sion Convention, p. 17.
■^Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate, 5th 
ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1981), p. 144.
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phrase "the sovereignty of the state." Since the secession­
ists had managed to secure a convention through the people 
rather than through the state, he now used the phrases "the
sovereignty of the people" and "the political power of the
53people" more and more. He was still an ardent states' 
sovereignty man; only the phraseology had changed.
Roberts considered the legality of the "sovereign 
power inherent in the pepple" to be very important because 
this, he declared, was where the convention received its 
right to act. Houston claimed that the convention had only 
power to submit the question of secession to the people and 
declared all of its other actions null and void. Roberts 
immediately offered his resolution declaring full powers 
for the convention. To vindicate his actions, he justified 
his belief in the legal powers of the convention when he 
later explained:
. . .  If everything that the convention did was 
null and void, . . . what effect, legally or consti­
tutionally, would the action of the legislature have 
had in simply submitting the question of secession 
to be voted upon by the people, and directing the 
votes to be returned to the Secretary of State, to 
be counted in the presence of the Governor and At­
torney General of the State? It has been well estab­
lished by the highest courts of the country that 
such a proceeding would not have the force of a law 
passed by the legislature, and it should to be en­
forced, as having the effect of a law, it would be 
judicially declared to be null and void. Much less 
would it have the effect of an ordinance of a con­
vention, dissolving the political connection of the
Roberts, "Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts Upon 
Taking the Chair," and "Address to the People of Texas," 
30 March 1861, in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession 
Convention, pp. 16-17, 253.
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State with other States in the Union, and absolv­
ing its citizens from obedience to the Constitu­
tion and laws of the United States. . . . The only 
assumption upon which the right of secession can 
be logically predicated is, that the Constitution 
of the United States is a compact between sover­
eign States acting in their several capacities; 
and on such an assumption the people of the State, 
acting through a convention representing its 
sovereignty, can secede from the Union. The 
legislature cannot do it.54
As Houston pointed out in his message to the legisla­
ture, the legislature had approved only the power of the 
convention to submit the question of secession to the people 
and the people had voted for secession only. They had not 
voted to join the Confederate Union. The delegates of the 
convention had done that. As a matter of fact, the Conven­
tion sent seven delegates to Montgomery even before the Or­
dinance of Secession was presented to the people. Houston 
questioned the right of these actions:'
The objects of the Convention were alleged 
to be to restore Texas to the position of a sov­
ereign independent State. Was any power derived 
from the people to destroy that sovereignty by 
making Texas a part of the Southern Confederacy?
Did the people who voted for the delegates, did 
the legislature suppose that they were transfer­
ring the whole liberties of the free people of 
Texas, into the keeping of this Convention to be 
bartered away to suit the ambitious schemes of 
office seekers? When then arose the power on the 
part of the Convention to elect seven delegates, 
four of whom were its own members, to take part 
in the formation of a Provisional Government at 
Montgomery? The Convention did not dare to de­
clare Texas out of the Union; but submitted that 
question to a vote of the people. It doubted . 
its own powers in that respect; yet it usurped
54Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 130-131.
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the power to elect delegates to bind the people to 
a new government before they had thrown off the 
old one.55
Roberts and the secessionists tried to defend this 
move by stating that the convention had acted as the "autho­
rized agent of the people," that the people knew what the 
convention intended, and that the public had affirmed the 
convention's power by ratifying their "principal act" 
(secession).
That the people might approve by the existing 
Convention, or that it might provide for another 
popular election, remained for determination on 
the arrival of the Constitution [the Confederate 
Constitution]. Had it contained any unexpected 
principle, . . .  the importance of prompt ratifi­
cation could have yielded to the paramount neces­
sity for another election. But no such necessity 
appeared in any part of the Constitution. . . .
Former elections, with attending circumstances, 
left no doubt of the public wish and the corres­
ponding authority of the Convention for immediate 
and final ratification of the Constitution. . . .
The people could not desire to be troubled by an­
other general election without necessity, and they 
felt the importance of early relief from strife 
within this state as to its political position.
Prompt certainty, of course, would justify the 
Confederate government in adopting more expensive, 
effective, and permanent measures for the defence 
of this State, especially its desolated frontier, 
than could be expected before a finality.55
As if these justifications might not satisfy, the se­
cessionists gave further reasons. The appearance of uncer­
tainty would, they claimed, "embarrass" pending arrangements
55Houston, "Message to the Texas Legislature," in 
Williams and Barker, Writings of Sam Houston, 8: 282-283.
56"Address to the People of Texas," in W.-nkler, 
Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, pp. 258-259.
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for an alliance between the Confederacy and the Choctaw, 
Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee nations. Hesitation on the 
part of Texas would also stimulate hesitation in Arizona 
and New Mexico. Procrastination would hamper relations 
with Mexico and stimulate marauding and incendiary efforts. 
Postal, judiciary, and revenue arrangements would be retard­
ed. Delay would prostrate trade and commerce. On the other 
hand, they insisted, a quick and final connection with the 
Confederacy would give Texas additional strength. It would 
promote early success in its peace negotiations with the 
U.S. Government. Moreover, they asserted, a prompt and 
permanent connection of Texas with the Confederacy would 
have a favorable influence on the border states and induce 
them to abandon their equivocal positions and to join with 
their "southern sisters and natural associations." This 
would "materially" affect immigration from those states and
be advantageous both for the immigrants and to the growth 
57of Texas.
The Republicans and Texas Unionists reacted to the 
convention by accusing the Texas secessionists of being 
extralegal, revolutionary, and traitorous, but Roberts al­
ways had a "legal" defense at hand. With his knowledge of 
the U.S. and Texas constitutions and his judicial mind, he 
was always prepared with a rebuttal to any accusation ad­
vanced by his opponents. Roberts had become the leader of
^Ibid., pp. 9-10.
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the Texas secessionists primarily because of his talent for
legitimation— his special ability to "explain, vindicate, and
justify" the actions of his followers. As the legitimizer
for the cause, he never allowed himself "to be encapsulated
5 8by the charges of his opposition."
Mythication
To glorify the secessionists' cause in 1861, Roberts 
once again used appeals to the forefathers, destiny, poster­
ity, the white race, and God. To Roberts the secession con­
vention was every bit as crucial as the American Continental 
Congress and the delegates' mission was just as important as 
the mission of the founding fathers. He used a romanticized 
historical appeal when he addressed the convention delegates:
We have been congregated in obedience to the 
public will by the spontaneous and voluntary concert 
of the people of this state to consider and dispose 
of questions equally as momentous and more varied 
than those that were solved by our Revolutionary 
Forefathers of ''76. '59
By referring to the "public will," "the spontaneous and vol­
untary concert of the people," and the "voice of a united 
60people," Roberts implied that he was following the spiri­
tual, reverberating, collective voice of a chosen people,
58Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution 
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 41.
Roberts, "Address of Honorable O.' M. Roberts Upon 
Taking the Chair," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Seces­
sion Convention, p. 17.
Roberts, "Address of Honorable O. M. Roberts at the 
Close of the First Session," in Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, p. 85.
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an archetypal motif suggested by Northrop Frye.61 It was 
not just the collective voice of Texans but the. voice of 
all southern slaveholders throughout time.
In addition to the appeals of ancestors, Roberts also 
used appeals to country, destiny, and posterity:
It behooves every patriot of the land to devote 
that day [February 23] to his country, by going to 
the polls and giving a free expression of his will.
That day may fix the destiny of this State for gen- 
erations to c o m e . 62 [italics mine.]
He made his listeners feel important, and romanticized his
cause by telling them that it was their destiny, as true
patriots, to vote for secession and save the state not only
for themselves but for their progeny as well.
Roberts also saw to it that the idea of the superior­
ity of the white race was perpetuated. He reminded the 
people in 1861 that when Texas was annexed in 1845 it was 
with the provision that she be able to maintain and protect 
the institution of Negro slavery which had existed from the 
first settlement of the wilderness by the white race. He 
also belittled that "great national party" [Republican] for 
its unnatural feeling of hostility to the "beneficient and 
patriarchal system of African slavery" and for its "debas­
ing doctrine of the equality of all men— a doctrine which
^Northrop Frye, "Myth, Fiction, and Displacement" 
in Criticism: The Major Texts, ed. W. J. Bate (New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970)-, pp. 625-636.
62Roberts, "Speech at Palestine," Austin, Texas State 
Gazette, 20 February 1861.
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was at war with nature." He claimed that all governments 
in the country were established by white men for white men 
and their posterity, that the African race had no part in 
it, that they were an inferior race, and that they could be 
beneficial and tolerable in America only in their subservient 
condition. He contended that it was "all white men" who
were entitled to equal civil and political rights, not "all
„63 men."
Roberts maintained that the idea of white superiority 
was not only authorized and justified by the experience of 
mankind but it was also "the revealed will of the Almighty 
Creator, as recognized by Christian nations." The intoler­
able doctrine of the equality of all men irrespective of 
race or color was not only against nature and mankind, but 
it was also "in violation of the plainest revelations of 
the Divine Law." God, he implied, had clearly "revealed" 
the fact of white superiority, and therefore God was on his 
side. Since the Federal Government had fallen prey to the
wrongful views of his opponents, Texas must turn "to God
64and her own sons." Roberts must have felt that, of all 
the men ever congregated in Texas, this group of "sons" 
were indeed the chosen saviors who were acting out God's 
revealed purpose.
63Roberts, "Speech at Palestine," and "Declaration 
of Causes," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Con­
vention , pp. 61-65.
64Ibid.
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Braden suggests that these kinds of "popular and sen­
timental" myths were very effective, especially when condi­
tioned with frequent repetition. He explains that they 
held their attractiveness for over a hundred years and kept 
alive sectional isolation and racial hatred. They also 
drove out opposition and stifled needed reform.65 Roberts 
perpetuated the popular myths inherent in the defense of 
slavery by appealing to the regional prejudices of the 
Texans. He certainly kept alive sectional isolation and 
racial hatred. With the use of myth, he was also able to 
overcome his opposition and to help postpone the moderniza­
tion and civilization of America for over a decade.
Solidification
In 1861 Oran Milo Roberts was finally able to solidify 
his followers into the unified, cohesive group which he had 
dreamed of. He accomplished this to a great extent by iden­
tifying with his audience in a way which he had never done 
before. Roberts used appeals which made him one with his 
audience and which made his audience one with another. In • 
so doing Roberts established what Kenneth Burke terms "con- 
substantiality" or the use of identification to become "sub­
stantially one" with an audience. Burke explains consub- 
stantiality as "an acting-together" and that "in acting
65Waldo W. Braden, "Myths in a Rhetorical Contect," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal 40 (Winter 1975): 120.
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together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, 
ideas, attitudes that make them c o n s u b s t a n t i a l , R o b e r t s  
achieved this "commonality" by stressing his and his audi­
ence's common goals, ideas, and attitudes. Linguistically 
he accomplished consubstantiality with the repetition of 
collective terms. Roberts established common ground when 
he stated that "We have been congregated in obedience to 
the public will" and that "I trust that this body [we] will 
be fully adequate . . . ." He also identified himself with 
his audience when he stated: "Let us go home and appeal to 
them to sustain our action by their votes; and when we re­
assemble on the 2nd of March, let us bring back with us the
voice of a united people in favor of immediate action to
67sustain the rights of the People of Texas . . . ."
[italics mine] Roberts also identified with both his imme­
diate audience and his larger audience when he stated: "I 
bow to the sovereignty of the people"; "all political power 
is inherent in the people"; "That power, I assert, you [the 
delegates] now represent"; and "We [will obey] the public 
will . . . ." In other words he identified himself and the 
delegates with the people of Texas as a unified whole with
66Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), p. 21.
67Roberts, "Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts. Upon 
Taking the Chair," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession 
Convention, p. 17 and "Address of Honorable 0. M. Roberts at 
the Closeof the First Session," in Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, p. 85.
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common interests, attitudes, and goals. Roberts also gained 
rapport and identified with his audience when he compared 
them (and himself) to "our Revolutionary Forefathers of '76," 
expressed confidence in their moderation and wisdom in de­
ciding the future of the people of the state, and praised 
the "distinguished citizens" for their "indulgence, courtesy, 
and conciliation" towards him as their presiding officer.
He also established consubstantiality when he proclaimed 
that his election to represent "this movement of the people" 
was an indication to the world that their cause had not
originated in "the spirit of social disorder" and "the un-
6 8mistakable voice of the people sanction us in our acts."
With these appeals to their pride, prestige, and commonality,
Roberts unified the delegates and the people and urged them
into concerted action.
Roberts also solidified Texans with all southerners
by pointing out their common goals, interests, images, etc.
He frequently referred to "our sister States" and "the
69rights of Texas and the South." In his resolution assert­
ing full powers for the convention, he implied that Texas 
had more in common with the South than with the United States 
of America and should "as speedily as practicable consummate
68Ibid.
69 'v l . j  Ibxd.
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the connection of Texas with the provisional Government of 
the Confederate States."7®
Roberts reinforced the cohesiveness of his followers 
with symbolic appeals as well, including a number of tactics 
which Bowers and Ochs describe as "essentially reinforcing 
rather than persuasive in their relationship to ideology and 
group membership." 7 ^ Roberts and the secessionists used 
symbols, slogans, and other propagandists materials to in­
crease the responsiveness to their wishes. They accomplished 
this both in the convention and through their in-group pub­
lications used to promulgate their message.
Roberts had warned the North for over a decade that 
the Lone Star Flag, the symbol of Texas independence, was 
always there, ready to replace the Star Spangled Banner if 
Texas rights were violated. On February 1, 1861, the seces­
sionists unfurled the Lone Star Flag in the Convention, not 
as just a warning, but as a symbol of defiance, separation, 
and independence. Roberts received the specially-made Lone . 
Star Flag after the Ordinance of Secession was passed. He 
described the ceremony:
After the tumultuous cheering which greeted 
the announcement [secession] had ceased, a number 
of ladies, preceded by George M. Flournoy, entered 
the hall, waving over their heads a beautiful 'Lone 
Star Flag.' The enthusiasm was now renewed, and
Roberts, "Resolution of President 0. M. Roberts. 
Offered in Convention," in Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Seccession Convention, p. 119.
71John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massacgusetts! Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 20.
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the building resounded with cheer after cheer as 
the party proceeded to the centre of the hall.
Mr. Flournoy, in an animated, brilliant, and soul- 
stirring address, presented the flag to the conven­
tion in behalf of the ladies of Austin. . . . The 
flag [was] placed in full view at the stand . . . .
The Texans were very proud of their flag with its white
five-pointed star in a field of blue with a sheet of white
and red and guarded it zealously. When Louisiana adopted a
flag with similar colors and design in 1861, Texans objected
and pointed out the long history of the Lone Star as their
symbol.73
Military leaders, such as John S. Ford, also used the 
flag as a sign of militancy. Whenever they occupied a U.S. 
fort, the first order of business was the raising of the 
Lone Star along with another symbol of militancy, a gun sa­
lute . Ford reported to the convention when he took over 
the U.S. fort at Brazos Santiago:"a salute of 33 guns was 
fired and the Stars and Stripes were lowered," and then "the
Lone Star Flag was hoisted and cheered with enthusiasm and
74was saluted by 22 guns." To cement further Texas and the
72Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 104 and Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, p. 49.
73C. G. Forshey, Superintendent of Texas Military 
Institute to H. K. Elgee of Louisiana, 20 February 1861 in 
Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, pp. 
103-107.
74John S. Ford to the Committee on Public Safety,
22 February 1861 in Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession 
Convention, p. 325.
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South, the Texas secessionists added the Bonnie Blue Flag of
the Confederacy as a unifying symbol.75
The slogans which the secessionists used in 1861 also
reflected the militant atmosphere in the state. They still
shouted "Secession, not submission," "Damn the Yankees,"
and "Damn the Union." But they added the militant calls
"Texans, to your rifles" and "Whip the Yankees." Whenever
Houston spoke of saving the Union, Texans shouted "Three
Cheers for South Carolina," "Three Cheers for Rhett," or
76
"Three Cheers for Yancey." After the ratification of the 
Confederate Constitution, Texans added the symbols and the 
slogans of the South to their own.
As another solidifying tactic, the secessionists con­
tinued to spread the literature of southern propaganda.
They added to their list of reading George Fitzhugh's 
Cannibals AllI or, Slaves Without Masters, Thomas Kettrell's 
Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, William L. G. Smith's 
Life at the South: or, "Uncle Tom's Cabin" As It Is, or 
David Brown's The Planter, none of which possessed literary 
merit. A few read and shared the southern romantic novels 
of William Gilmore Simms or the realistic novels of
75Francis R. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, or Memoirs 
of Francis Richard Lubbock, ed. C. W. Raines (Austin, Texas: 
Ben C. Jones and Company, 1900), p. 312.
76
Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1954), pp. 330- 
332 and Ford, Memoirs, pp. 950-960.
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77Augustus B. Longstreet or Joseph G. Baldwin. Didactic
poetry often carried a message such as the following:
Sons of the South, awake to glory!
Hark! Hark! what myriads bid you rise.
Your children, wives, and daughters hoary, 
Behold their tears and hear their cries.
To arms! to arms! ye brave,
Th' avenging sword unsheath!
Roberts took advantage of the unrest and the confusion of
the times to solidify his followers into an activist group.
The people wanted leadership and a plan of action. Roberts
gave it to them. When he pointed out their common goals,
interests, images, and ideas, he was able to establish con-
substantiality with the delegates and all Texans to commit
them to deeper devotion and further action in the cause.
With propaganda tactics, Roberts and the other secession
leaders increased the pride and dedication of the group.
Polarization
Since the Texas-New Mexico bounday dispute in 1850, 
Roberts had been polarizing the North and the South. He 
had blamed the North for all of Texas' economic, political, 
and social problems and touted southern allegiance as the 
solution to these problems. In 1850 he declared that the 
Federal Government, encouraged by northern liberals, had
77Craven, Growth of Southern Nationalism, pp. 407- 
408; Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, pp. 
125-136, 166-179; and Proctor, Not Without Honor, p. 124.
78Donald E. Reynolds, Editors Make War (Nashville, 
Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970), p. 184.
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confiscated land that was legitimately theirs and that the 
Nashville Resolutions which threatened secession were the 
answer. In 1865 he used the Know-Nothings as a scapegoat 
to polarize the North and South and again praised the south­
erners as the true patriots. Once again, in 1860, he blamed 
northern aggression for the "impending crisis" and advocated 
a union with the other southern states. In 1861 Roberts 
completed the schism with every public word he uttered and 
every public act he committed.
He divided Texas from the North when he convinced the 
people to vote for a secession convention over the objections 
of Houston and the pro-Unionists. He further divided them 
when he became the president of that convention and openly 
urged the people to withdraw from the Union. He polarized 
the two when, in an official statement of causes of seces­
sion, he named the northern states and the Republicans as 
the cause for the division. He completed the fracture when 
he conducted the'election for delegates to Montgomery, urged 
ratification of the Confederate Constitution, and began ne­
gotiations with the Provisional Confederate Congress. He 
had urged separation for over a decade but had been ahead 
of the times. On March 4, 1861 Roberts was finally able to 
make the ultimate polarizing statement:
I, therefore, as president of the convention, 
on behalf of the people of Texas, do declare the 
State of Texas to be a free, sovereign and inde­
pendent nation of the earth, and that her citizens
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are absolved from all other allegiance than to 
her as such.?9
On March 23 Roberts finally was able to announce that the
southern union he had been advocating so long was a reality.
He declared that Texas was officially a part of the Confed-
80erate States of America. Due to his position, Roberts 
had the "honor" of being the one to declare that Texas' 
ties with the northern states were severed and that a new 
liaison with the southern states was in effect.
Roberts was able to complete the polarization in 1861 
through the use of an emotionalized flag issue, a flag organ­
ization, and a flag individual. These tactics were issues,
groups, or individuals "especially susceptible to the charges
81made against the establishment by the agitator's ideology."
To force uncommitted Texans into the secessionist camp and 
to gain a large vote for secession, Roberts warned the people 
that their very security and safety were in danger. He re­
iterated the danger of loss of property and rights and add­
ed the emotionalized inference that not only were their 
rights, property, and mode of life in danger but that their
7Q
Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 114 and Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, p. 88.
80Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 13 and Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, pp. 234-235.
81Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and 
Control, p. 27.
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very lives might be in jeopardy. By using such terms as 
"crisis," "emergency," "security," "safety," and "defence," 
Roberts sought to convince the Texans that they would be 
safer to unite with the South than to stay in a union with 
the "fanatical" northern aggressors. "They have invaded 
southern soil and murdered unoffending citizens" and "they 
have sent hired emissaries among us to b u m  our towns and
distribute arms and poison to our slaves for the same pur-
82pose." He presented to the uncommitted•Texans one last 
choice: they could lose their property, their sovereignty, 
their way of life, and perhaps their very lives if they re­
mained under northern domination or they could retain all 
of their rights and be safe and secure if they joined in an 
equal union with the other southern states.
To polarize further the two sections, Roberts placed 
the "Black Republican" Lincoln and the "submissionist trai­
tor," Houston, in one camp. Lincoln represented the evil 
and aggressive abolitionists and would force the South to 
her knees, he warned. The northern-loving cooperationist, 
Houston, would stand aside and allow him to do it. Roberts 
feared and despised Lincoln because of his ideas on slavery 
and because of his powerful official position and vowed 
never to live under his domination. But Houston was the im­
mediate obstacle to Roberts' success. During the convention,
82Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention, 
pp. 17, 64, 85, I T T .
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Roberts never stooped to vilify Houston publicly; he called 
him "Governor" and "Your Honor" as he devastated him politi­
cally and personally. Because Houston refused to cooperate, 
Roberts devised other ways to remove the opposition. First, 
he defeated him at the polls on the issues of the legality 
of the convention and on secession. Then he refuted- Hous­
ton's claim of limited power for the convention and official­
ly won full powers to do as he saw fit. Finally he managed
to dispose of him entirely by requiring the oath of allegi-
83ance to the Confederacy for all state officers. Roberts 
would have liked Houston as an ally because of Houston's 
reputation and his position as Governor. However, Houston 
remained firm in his support of the Union causing Roberts to 
use more drastic measures to effect "the dramatic situation­
al change" he desired.
Roberts again used the northern Republicans and the 
Texas Unionists as the groups who were vulnerable to his 
accusations. The Republicans were vulnerable because of 
the abolitionist activities in Texas and because their views 
were in opposition to the vast majority of Texans, especially 
slaveholding Texans. The Unionists were susceptible because 
they could be placed in the same position as the northerners 
with accusations of abolitionist—lovers and weak submission— 
ists. Since the Texas Unionists, except for Sam Houston,
83Ibid., pp. 119, 178-179.
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were of little importance, Roberts and the delegates used 
the Republicans as the major flag group.
By the use of the polarizing terms, "we" and "they," 
Roberts was able to make the choice easier for the uncom­
mitted Texans. "They" have trampled upon "our" rights, 
stolen "our" slaves, invaded "our" soil, impoverished "us," 
enriched "themselves," and elected a president who will ruin 
"us." On the other hand, "we" have patiently borne these
wrongs for years, but now "we" must rise up and protect 
84"our" rights. Roberts again presented them with an ulti­
matum; they could follow Lincoln, the Republicans, Houston, 
and the Unionists to economic and social destruction, or 
they could follow Roberts and the secessionists and their 
southern allies to happiness and prosperity.
Escalation/Confrontation
Since 1850 Roberts had been using a series of tactics 
designed to goad the Federal Government and the North into 
a confrontation. He had come near to his goal in the hot 
summer of 1860 when he encouraged Texans in their violent 
retaliations against the abolitionists' activities in Texas. 
Although many northern leaders sanctioned the abolitionists' 
actions, the Federal Government denied involvement and there­
fore did not resort to a violent confrontation with the agi­
tators. Disappointed, but determined, Roberts continued to 
utilize the tactic of "threatened disruption" and added
Ibid., pp. 63-65.
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85another tactic of "token violence" or actual, physical 
disruption in 1861 to escalate the tension and lead to a 
physical confrontation.
In the anticipation that the Federal Government would 
resort to violent suppression, Roberts made calculated, un­
compromising threats. Claiming that he had exhausted all 
efforts at reasoned discourse, Roberts threatened: "The time 
for argument on this question has passed. The unmistakable 
voice of the people in the late overwhelming vote sanction­
ing us in our acts precludes it." If he had to resort to 
violence, he implied, he would be representing the wishes 
of the people. To show the North just how far he was will­
ing to go with his threats, Roberts warned that he was pre­
pared to protect the rights of the people of Texas and of
86the South "at all hazards, and to the last extremity."
For the first time, Roberts articulated overtly what he had 
been hinting at for years. He was willing to back his 
threats with his life and the lives of his comrades. To 
protect his state and his section from northern domination, 
he was willing to cause a civil war if necessary. He was 
prepared to support it "to the last extremity."
On January 30, two days after the convention began, 
Roberts appointed the powerful, militant Committee on Public
p C
Bowers and Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Con­
trol, pp. 36-37.
86 Roberts, "Address of Honorable O. M. Roberts at the 
Close of the First Session" in Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, p. 85.
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8 7Safety. The committee, in turn, appointed Colonels Ben 
McCulloch, Henry E. McCulloch, and John S. Ford as field 
officers. The duties of this committee were to protect and 
control the state during the recess of the convention, to 
raise military forces, and to confiscate all arms and.prop­
erty in possession of the Federal Government. They had no 
difficulty raising forces as numerous troops had already 
volunteered their services to the convention. For financial 
support, Roberts arranged for a loan of $95,000.00 to be 
used under the direction of the Safety Committee. Roberts
O O
also superintended the disbursement of the funds.
On February 16, with five hundred Texas volunteers, 
one hundred fifty members of the militant Knights of the 
Golden Circle, and approximately three hundred citizens 
from the area, Colonel Ben McCulloch surrounded the arsenal, 
the ordnance, the Alamo, and the commisary buildings occu­
pied by the U.S. troops in San Antonio. The U.S. officer 
in charge, General Twiggs, surrendered all munitions and 
property, which McCulloch confiscated in the name of the 
convention.
P7
The activities of the Committee on Public Safety, 
which were known only to Roberts, the Committee, and the 
military officers involved, are recorded in "Reports of 
the Committee on Public Safety," Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, pp. 262-404.
88Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," pp. 110-132 and Winkler, Journal of the 
Texas Secession Convention, pp. 7-8, 262-404.
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On February 21, Colonel John S. Ford.captured the 
U.S. fort at Brazos Santiago and later the small federal 
garrison at Brownsville, thereby securing the lower Mexican 
border. By late March all U.S. forces had received General 
Twigg's order to evacuate and had abandoned all U.S. mili­
tary posts in Texas. As the U.S. forces withdrew, the Texas 
volunteers took their places.
Through physical disruption under Roberts' direction, 
the convention now possessed all the arms in Texas. To sup­
plement their munitions, Roberts sent J. H. Rogers to Loui­
siana to procure more arms. Governor Thomas 0. Moore of
Louisiana promptly sent one thousand stands of muskets to
89the troops in East Texas. Under Roberts' guidance, the 
Texas secessionists now stood ready to join their southern 
cohorts in a final violent confrontation with the North.
If it had not been for Sam Houston, the Civil War 
may very well have started in March, 1861 in Texas. By mid- 
March President Lincoln had sent Houston at least two offers 
of military assistance. Lincoln offered Houston the aid of 
seventy thousand men and means to sustain them in a fight 
against Roberts and the secessionists. Although Houston 
deplored the actions of the convention and denounced the 
Committee on Public Safety as "the committe of danger," he 
feared a civil war in his own state. Therefore he refused
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Lincoln's offer. Violent confrontation was once more 
postponed. Because of Houston's refusal of federal mili­
tary aid and because of the peaceful surrender of U.S.
posts to the Texas forces, the secessionists were able to
take over the state without bloodshed. Roberts had esca­
lated the tension in Texas to the breaking point, but he 
would have to wait for the violent confrontation until after
April 12 when Fort Sumter was fired upon.
Effects
As a result of his rhetorical strategies, Roberts was 
imminently successful in 1861 with both the convention dele­
gates and the Texas public. Because he was a respected 
Supreme Court judge and president of the Texas Secession 
Convention as well as an intelligent and persuasive speaker 
he convinced his listeners to do as he asked.
On February 23, following Roberts' speeches urging a 
large secession vote, Texans voted overwhelmingly for se­
cession. They cast 44,317 votes for secession and 13,020 
votes against. After the votes were tabulated on March 4, 
the date of Lincoln's inauguration, Roberts fulfilled a 
long-term major goal: he was finally able to make the ex­
treme polarizing statement that he, as president of the con­
vention, on behalf of the people of Texas, declared the
90 Friend, Sam Houston, pp. 340-341.
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State of Texas to be a free and independent sovereignty.9 -^
Also during the convention, Roberts fulfilled another major
objective: on March 5 he announced passage of the ordinance
uniting Texas with the Confederate States and on March 23
he announced the ratification of the Confederate Cons tit u- 
92txon.
Another of Roberts' goals in 1861 was to diminish the 
power and influence of his old adversary, Sam Houston. Be­
cause of Roberts' increasing political power and persuasive­
ness, he was able to accomplish this goal. Since Houston 
stubbornly stood by the Union and refused to capitulate or 
adjust to Roberts' requests and demands, Roberts devised a 
plan to render him powerless and transfer that power to him­
self. First, he offered the resolution declaring full pow­
ers for the convention. He then "dethroned" Houston by re­
quiring an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy which Hous­
ton refused to take. Then he swore in a fellow secessionist
93as governor thereby completing his plan.
Personally Roberts achieved much of the fame which he 
had sought. Because of his position as president of the 
convention, he was known not just by the leading citizens
91Roberts, "The Political, Legislative, and Judicial 
History of Texas," p. 114 and Winkler, Journal of the Texas 
Secession Convention, pp. 87-90.
^Winkler, Journal of the Texas Secession Convention,
pp. 101, 235.
9-*Ibid., pp. 178-184.
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who were delegates, but by all Texans throughout the state.
He was no longer just an influential judge and one of the 
leaders of the states' rights Democrats. He was now the 
foremost leader of the states' rights-secession movement in 
Texas. In fact because of changing events and changing sen­
timent, Roberts was more powerful at this time than the gov­
ernor or any other state official. Roberts also became 
known more widely throughout the South. Because of his po­
sition in the convention and because of his correspondence 
with other southern leaders, he built a reputation with in­
fluential southern politicians as well. George Flournoy, 
the attorney-general and one of the secession leaders, gave 
a clear picture of Roberts' prestigious role and effect in 
the convention. After the convention, he wrote to Roberts:
The public knew you in public action. . . .
I knew you as a private worker who did more than 
any other to promote concert of action.
I know that I was as early as the earliest 
in the fight and I know further that the sharpest 
weapons I wielded, had received their burnishing 
touch from you. . . .
Posterity shall rank you in the position you 
deserve to occupy, in the memory of that great 
movement, of a great people.
The results of the convention did not happen spontane­
ously or accidentally. Roberts was a calculating and reflec­
tive thinker. He planned his words and actions carefully.
The strategies which he used during the convention brought
about the results which he sought. With the strategy of
94George M. Flournoy to Roberts, 8 July 1861, Roberts 
Papers.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
objectification, he convinced the Texans that the North was 
fully to blame for the crisis. Through legitimation he con­
vinced them that the convention was both legal constitution­
ally and justified. He romanticized the southern cause and 
the white race by the use of mythication and convinced the 
people that the emancipation of inferior blacks would be un­
wise and unsafe. Through the strategy of solidification he 
persuaded the Texans to join the Southern Confederacy and 
achieved his goal of a united southern front. Through his 
tactics of polarization, Roberts persuaded his state to dis­
associate completely from the northern enemy by seceding 
from the Union of the United States, thus completing the se­
cession of the lower South. By further escalating the tense 
hostilities between the two sections, Roberts helped the 
South prepare for a physical confrontation. He justified 
these more drastic strategies because, through petition, he 
had attempted to persuade Houston to call a convention 
through normal channels and had met with. avoidance and at­
tempted suppression. His strategies were successful with 
the public partially because he was able to effectively 
promulgate the secession message. Through the strategy of 
image building, Roberts acquired a reputation equal to that 
of the Governor and, for the first time, brought himself to 
the attention of secession leaders throughout the South.
At the close of the convention, Roberts laid down his 
gavel and returned to the court. For a few months after 
the convention, Roberts aspired to become a senator in the
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Confederate Congress. Once again he was disappointed in
his ambition to be a congressman. When Wigfall chose to
run for reelection to the Congress in Montgomery rather
than entering the military full-time, Roberts withdrew his 
95name. As zealous as he was in the southern cause, Roberts 
could not sit by idly and watch others fighting the northern 
enemy. With the avenues to political service closed to him, 
he resigned his seat on the bench, personally raised a regi­
ment, the Eleventh Texas Infantry, ariid became its Colonel.
He was an excellent soldier and became somewhat of a hero 
in the Battle of Bourbeaux. Upon the death of Chief Justice 
Wheeler, while Roberts was still with, his command in Louis­
iana, he was elected Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme 
Court. He returned to Texas and held the office of chief 
justice until the collapse of the Confederate cause in
Q C
Thomas J. Devine to Roberts, 27 August 1861; John C. 
Robertson to Roberts, October 1861, Roberts Papers; and 
King, Louis T. Wigfall, p. 135.
96Roberts, Scrap Book, 1842-1897, Roberts Papers 
and Walter Prescott Webb, ed., Handbook of Texas, 2 vols. 
(Austin, Texas: The Texas State Historical Association, 
1952), 2: 484-485.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The rhetorical strategies which Roberts used to 
achieve his goals brought about five major results or ef­
fects. First, he helped to keep the states' rights Demo­
crats in power during this decade. Contensoraries attested 
to the fact that no Democrat did more than Roberts to defeat 
the Unionists and to assure the political supremacy of the 
states' rights Democrats. By continually objectifying the 
Unionists, he was able to defeat them. By polarizing "them" 
and "us" he convinced uncommitted Texans to join the Demo­
cratic cause. Roberts labored diligently to keep the Demo­
cratic Party the ruling party in Texas and to assure that 
the states' rights wing controlled the Democratic Party.
Secondly, Roberts justified secession to the Texans. 
Roberts repeated his public explanation and justification 
of the compact theory of states, or states' rights, so often 
that he convinced the majority of Texans that it was the 
"true theory" of government. Of the nine agitational strat­
egies, Roberts used legitimation most frequently. Whenever 
an action occurred which needed to be justified to maintain 
the movement's legality, Roberts produced a defense. A mas­
ter of constitutional legitimation, he used it not only in
261
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reaction to the opposition's accusations, but in anticipa­
tion of their charges of prejudice, violence, and treason. 
With his repeated, unrelenting legitimation, Roberts also 
escalated the tensions between the two sections and led to 
the final violent confrontation. He convinced the Texans 
that even civil war was justified because it was constitu­
tionally "legitimate." Obstinate in his legitimation, 
"Roberts held to the doctrine of states' rights as tenacious­
ly as Calhoun ever did."1 On March 4, 1861, Roberts real­
ized the fruits of his justificatory tactics when he an­
nounced that the people of Texas had voted to secede from 
the Union of the United States.
Thirdly, Roberts unified the Texans into an organized 
activist group and convinced them to join with other south­
erners in a Confederate Union. In urging both secession 
and southern unity, Roberts was ahead of most Texans in his 
thinking. When Roberts first warned them, Texans saw no 
need for the threat of disunion or for a unified southern 
front. As times and events changed, Roberts became more 
powerful and more persuasive. He never relented in his plea 
for southern unity. Taking advantage of the emotional 
events of 1860, he convinced the public that the time had 
come to demonstrate southern unity and strength. To solid­
ify the Texans, he progressively appealed to their pride 
and promulgated southern propaganda. He persuaded them that
^Editorial, Weatherford (Texas) Times, 1 June 1878.
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as white southerners with a proud common heritage and com­
mon attitudes, interests, and goals, they had more in com­
mon with the Confederate States than they did with the 
United States. For Roberts, this rhetorical goal came late. 
But he did finally solidify the Texans and the southerners 
in "the glorious cause." Not really believing that it 
would lead to war, Texans blindly followed Roberts out of 
the Union and into the Confederacy. On March 5, 1861, 
Roberts accomplished this rhetorical goal when the Conven­
tion passed the ordinance uniting Texas with the Confederate 
States and on March 23 when they ratified the Confederate 
Constitution.
Fourthly, Roberts ruined Sam Houston politically. 
Although Roberts refused to stoop to personal vilification, 
he took every opportunity to objectify the Unionists and 
their leader, Houston. Whatever group Houston was affiliat­
ed with, whether it be the Know-Nothings or the Unionists, 
Roberts placed squarely in the pro-North, pro-abolition camp 
in opposition to the South. By thus polarizing the two sec­
tions and identifying Houston with the enemy, he damaged 
Houston's reputation with the Texans and the southerners. 
When Houston made a comeback in 1859, Roberts used drastic 
measures to rid the state of the one obstacle to Texas se­
cession. Wooten attests to Roberts' skill in ruining Hous­
ton's career:
. . . In the delicate and difficult tactics re­
quired to out-general Governor Houston, his 
[Roberts'] shrewdness, firmness, and political
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sagacity were eminently exhibited, it is a fact 
not generally known that he might have been one of 
delegates to the Provisional Government of the 
Confederate States, . . . but he declined, saying 
that it would require no small effort to counter­
act Governor Houston's powerful opposition at home, 
and that he preferred that task. How he managed 
the maneuver and achieved his purpose, is one of 
the most curious and thrilling episodes in the 
political history of the State.^
On March 16, 1861 Roberts achieved this rhetorical goal and
ended Houston's political career. Two years later during
the war which he had warned would be the inevitable result
of secession, Houston died.
Fifthly, Roberts built the image of a wise and self­
less leader of his state. He established a reputation in 
the state as an astute politician and an articulate spokes­
man who was, at the same time, a "servant of the people." 
Through petition, he took great care to show that he always 
tried to go through normal channels of persuasion first be­
fore resorting to his tactics of agitation. Each time he 
spoke, he also pointed out that he was speaking for the peo­
ple at their request. Thereby he anticipated any charges of 
political ambition. Through his leadership in the Texas 
agitation, he also built a reputation as a courageous leader 
of the Cause among the other southern secessionists. To a 
large extent, it was his image or reputation which compelled 
the Texans to believe whatever Roberts told them.
Dudley G. Wooten, "The President's Annual Address:
The Life and Services or Oran Milo Roberts," The Quarterly 
of the Texas State Historical Association 2 (July 1898): .
141 '
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Roberts had not achieved his rhetorical goals without 
an active opposition. Smith states that "agitation depends 
on active opposition for its success because only with mas­
sive and intense opposition can the inactive masses see the
3
clear outline of the situation." Roberts' local opponents 
were Houston and the Unionists or, as in 1855, the Know- 
Nothings. His larger and more distant opposition was Lin­
coln and the "North," i.e. the northern states, Republicans, 
Federalists, and abolitionists. Bowers and Ochs maiiTt-ain 
that "when the agitators confront the regulatory agency with 
proposals which require change in the establishment's struc­
ture, policy, ideology, or power, it can adopt one of four
rhetorical strategies: avoidance, suppression, adjustment,
4
or capitulation." Since the principles involved were so 
fundamental to them, the establishment figures refused to 
adjust or to capitulate. Instead they chose the control 
strategies of avoidance and suppression. At first Lincoln 
and Houston attempted to ignore and avoid the rumors, peti­
tions, and threats directed to them. When that became im­
possible, they resorted to suppression. Suppression led to 
physical confrontation. In fact, the larger establishment 
in power, the North, had to resort to war to. suppress com­
pletely the southern agitators. Lincoln and the northern
^Arthur L. Smith, Rhetoric of Black Revolution (Boston 
Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1969), p. 28.
^John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric 
of Agitation and Control (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison- 
Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1971), p. 41.
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leaders used the means at their disposal to defeat what they 
viewed as stubborn, arrogant, inhumane, small-minded south­
ern slavocrats in general. More specifically, Houston's 
target was Roberts and the Texas secessionists. Houston was 
an excellent speaker and a master of acrimony and invective. 
He "harangued" and "clamored" against Roberts and the states' 
rights men calling them "traitors," "demagogues," and "howl­
ing jackals." He compared them to the ram who butted him­
self all away except the tail but still kept in motion. He 
opposed them fervently and faithfully to the bitter end.5 
Roberts was able to defeat Houston by becoming himself the 
spokesman for a regulatory, establishment agency, however 
extralegal or revolutionary it may have been.
The only goal which Roberts failed to achieve with 
his agitational strategies was to become a Texas senator. 
Roberts' Democratic colleagues invariably chose Wigfall over 
Roberts because they viewed Wigfall as the more "eloquent", 
orator. For over a decade, Roberts had used his keen mind, 
his training in elocution and debate, his legal knowledge, 
and his exalted position to lead his state. However, he 
would never realize his personal ambition to be a Congress­
man. Even when he was finally elected to represent his 
state in the U.S. Congress following the Civil War, the
5Llerena Friend, Sam Houston: The Great Designer 
(Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1954), pp. 239, 
246, 251 and Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, eds., 
The Writings of Sam Houston (Austin, Texas: University of 
Texas Press,), Vols. 6, 7, 8., passim.
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Reconstruction Congress refused to seat him because of his
g
active role in secession and the war.
Texas historians have been kind to Roberts. Both his 
contemporaries and later Texas authors have added to his 
good reputation. Roberts rates little mention in national 
histories, but the Texas historians praise him eloquently.
In the style of nineteenth century historians, Lynch wrote 
of Roberts:
Here genius, once fledged in the nest of morality, 
leaps forth like a young eagle from its eyrie, and 
spreading the wings of resolution, soars away to 
the heights of its ambition and capacity. Here 
honor and distinction demand no glittering armorial, 
wealth no splendid heirloom of inheritance, and 
eminence no pomp of pride or lictorial badge. Here 
fame requires no arbitrary circumstances, depends 
upon no golden opportunities, and exacts no imper­
sonal qualifications; but only that he who would 
reach its realms shall be girded by the beacons 
which it has established along the sacra via of 
its glory.7
In a typical historical estimate, Norman G. Kittrell writes:
Perhaps no man was ever better known in Texas 
since Sam Houston than Oran Milo Roberts, and no 
man was more deeply entrenched in popular confi­
dence and respect. He was a singular combination 
of intellect and almost childish simplicity. . . .
He was popular, yet he had none of the arts of the 
demagogue. . . . Every man who heard him knew there 
was behind what he said, that which must be behind 
every speech if it has any weight, or in anywise 
influences popular action, namely— a man.
Oran Milo Roberts, A Journal of Travel Incidents and 
Public Events, 1866, Roberts Papers and Dictionary of Amer­
ican Biography 16 (1935): 13-14.
7James D. Lynch, Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: 
Nixon-Jones Printing Company, 1885), pp. 273-274.
8Norman G. Kittrell, Governors Who Have Been and 
Other Public Men of Texas (Houston, Texas: Dealy-Adey-Elgin 
Company7 1921) , p. 37.
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Historians describe Roberts in generally laudatory terms 
such as the foregoing or they praise his actions as an able 
jurist and frugal governor. Rarely do they discuss him as 
a spokesman for secession. This writer found only one de­
scription of Roberts in history books which was in the least 
derogatory. Wentworth Manning describes Roberts as "a slave 
propadandist of the Calhoun school of politicians" and
states that his speeches are full of "more fire than elo- 
9
quence."
Although historians do not discuss his role as a se­
cession agitator, Roberts himself felt compelled to justify 
his secession activities. For the rest of his life, he con­
tinued to legitimize secession and to defend his earlier 
words and actions. As governor from 1879-1882,^ as law 
professor from 1883-1893,^ and as .a popular speaker in
9
Wentworth Manning, Some History of Van Zandt County 
(Des Moines: Homestead Company, 1919), p. 143.
"Standing in this place on the 4th day of March, 1861 
as the president of the seceding convention, and acting 
by their authority, I proclaimed Texas a free and inde­
pendent state. I did it in good conscience, believing 
it to be right. I now, with the same good conscience, 
as the governor of the State, declare Texas to have 
been in good faith reconstructed." (Roberts, First 
Inaugural Address as Governor of Texas, 21 January 
1879, Austin, Texas, Roberts Papers.)
^S e e  his lectures printed in Roberts, Our Federal Re­
lations: From a Southern View of Them (Austin, Texas: Eugene 
Von Boeckmann, Printer, 1892). Seeespecially his lectures 
entitled "The Causes of the War Between the States, North 
and South," "On the Crisis in 1860, Then Imposing a Duty 
Upon the People of the South, and Exhibiting the Wrongs Done 
by the Northern States," and "On Sovereignty: Its Location 
and Effects in the Governments of America," pp. 5-68.
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12
later life, Roberts defended his role as secession leader.
In her dissertation on Roberts, Bailey states that
Roberts was a great leader, organizer, and philosopher who
"relied, in putting over measures, on reflective thinking
13rather than on pre3udice and passion." Evidence indicates 
that, as a jurist and as a governor, Roberts did rely on 
reason and evidence when making a decision. However, as a 
secession speaker, he seems to have relied more on prejudice 
and passion. His prejudice and his passion were not ex­
pressed in an overt, emotional manner, but in a calm, delib­
erate, and dignified way. As a secession leader, Roberts 
was a product of his southern birth, education, and training.
In this phase of his life, he seems to have been ruled more . 
by his emotions than by his logic.
Because of his long and varied career, Roberts defies 
further labeling and classification. At various times during 
the secession campaign, Roberts was called a "fire-eater."
In many ways he was like the southern fire-eaters and in
14some ways he was not. Like the fire-eaters, Roberts' 
pleas of protest and his rhetoric was a rhetoric of despera-
1 2Roberts, "Speech at the Reunion of Mountain Rem­
nants," 28 July 1895, Marble Falls, Texas, Roberts Papers.
^3Lelia Bailey, "The Life and Public Career of 0. M.
Roberts" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 
1932), p. 347.
14The following comparison is based on H. Hardy Per-
ritt, "The Fire-Eaters," in Oratory in the Old South, ed.
Waldo W. Braden (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1970), pp. 234-257.
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'kion. He shared with the fire-eaters the common theme that 
"the South must resist unconstitutional exploitation or suf­
fer the loss of her way of life." Like the fire-eaters, his 
speeches and writings were highly logical in tone with strong 
undertones and his language was predominantly simple. He, 
too, based his conclusions on premises widely held in his 
region and was single-minded in his efforts to preserve the 
culture and traditions of the South. He considered himself 
a noble white Anglo-Saxon b o m  with the mission to protect 
the peculiar institution from the North. Like the fire- 
eaters, Roberts was devoted to the cause, consistent, dig­
nified, intense, learned, and unquestionably honest. On the 
other hand, unlike the fire-eaters described by Perritt, 
Roberts held a high political position and had led his state 
out of the Union and into the Civil War. Contrary also to 
the fire-eaters, Roberts did not force the Texans into what 
they would consider premature action.. Although he warned 
them early and consistently, he rode the crest of opinion 
until the time was ripe. Because he acted "for" the people, 
not in spite of them, and because he redeemed himself after 
reconstruction, Roberts has not been discredited by histori­
ans. Roberts did not have the reputation with the people 
as being arrogant, impulsive, intransigent, or doctrinaire.
Probably the most obvious difference between Roberts 
and most fire-eaters was the absence of vilification or in­
vective. Although replete with the other agitational strat­
egies, Roberts’ public speaking is surprisingly void of any
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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personal vituperation. Although a master at the use of 
objectification, he refused to use personal epithets or 
name-calling of any kind. On the whole, then, Roberts pos­
sessed some of the characteristics of a "southern fire- 
eater" but is more appropriately classified as a states' 
rights agitator.
As a public speaker, Roberts was simple, clear, and 
forceful, more like a Calhoun than a Webster. He was not 
a flambuoyant orator. He had none of the characteristics 
usually attributed to the nineteenth-century "eloquent" ora­
tor such as golden tones, rapid speech, or elegant gestures. 
But Braden warns us that the idea of the 'typical' grandilo­
quent, bombastic pre-war southern orator who "soared in ora­
torical flight" is more myth than reality.^ In reality 
Roberts was an effective agitator who held firmly to the 
beliefs in slavery, states' rights, and an agrarian society. 
His effectiveness was a result of his position and reputa­
tion, the strategies which he used, and his ability to pre­
sent his ideas to his audience in a clear and forceful man­
ner. As an effective agitator, Roberts took advantage of 
his audience's feelings of'"distrust, dependence, exclusion,
^Waldo W. Braden, "The Emergence of the Concept of 
Southern Oratory," .Southern Speech Journal 26 (Spring 1961): 
173-183; Braden, "Southern Oratory Reconsidered: A Search 
for an Image," Southern Speech Journal 29 (Summer 1964): 
303-315; Braden, Oratory in the Old South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1970), pp. 3, 17-18.
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anxiety, and disillusionment"16 at just the right moments 
in history. The long-range failure of his case was brought 
about by the outcomes of the Civil War, by the impact of 
the Industrial Revolution, and by the resulting changes in 
.American culture.
Because Roberts was an important and influential 
spokesman for the states' rights-secession movement in Texas 
and because historians and rhetoricians have neglected this 
aspect of his career, this study has attempted to fill a 
small void in the history and criticism of public speaking 
in Texas.
16Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman, Prophets of 
Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 13-14.
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